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INTRODUCTION
When Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal
1
Circuit in 1982, one of the many powers vested in the new court was
the power to review decisions of the U.S. Court of International
2
Trade, also a new federal court at the time. The statutory provision
conferring this jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5), is deceptively
simple, stating merely that the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over any “appeal from a final decision of the United
States Court of International Trade.” However, as reflected in the
Federal Circuit’s international trade jurisprudence of the last three
years, reviewed in this article, this area of jurisdiction encompasses
scores of distinct and difficult issues arising from the federal
government’s regulation of international trade.
Perhaps not
surprisingly, given the steady increase over the years in both the
volume of trade across the United States border and the level of
complexity of the trade laws, the Federal Circuit’s caseload in this
3
area has grown beyond levels anticipated by Congress in 1982.
In reviewing the Federal Circuit’s recent international trade
jurisprudence, this article stresses three related themes. The first is
the standard of review applied by the court, which varies depending
on the type of government regulatory action under review. This
standard has not been static in recent years—particularly with respect
4
to certain determinations of the U.S. Customs Service. The second
1. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(1982). Prior to enactment of the Federal Courts Improvement Act, appellate
jurisdiction over international trade cases resided with the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 3 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11,
13.
2. Congress created the U.S. Court of International Trade through the Customs
Court Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980).
3. The Senate Report accompanying the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982 states the Senate’s anticipation that the structure and jurisdiction of the Federal
Circuit “will produce a reasonable caseload.” S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6, reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 16. According to the Senate Report, during Fiscal Year 1981,
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals terminated thirty cases involving “Customs,
commerce, and international trade.” Id. By contrast, in the most recent twelvemonth period for which the Federal Circuit has provided this figure (ending
September 30, 2002), it terminated a total of 128 international trade cases—more
than a four-fold increase. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ANN.
REP. 2002, tbl.B-8, available at http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep02.pdf (last
modified Apr. 22, 2003).
4. As of March 1, 2003, the U.S. Customs Service was combined with certain
other government agencies and renamed the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, a unit of the new Department of Homeland Security. See Customs &
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theme is the remarkably high rate of reversal of the Court of
International Trade, as compared to other areas of Federal Circuit
subject matter jurisdiction. Indeed, the court’s own statistics reveal a
consistently high reversal rate—in one recent twelve-month period
5
even exceeding fifty percent. The third theme is the intensely
litigated nature of many of the international trade disputes before
the Federal Circuit, and the attendant commercial uncertainty for
interested parties—particularly in cases involving the trade remedy
laws, where final disposition of a case may follow multiple remands
for reconsideration by the U.S. Department of Commerce or the U.S.
6
International Trade Commission and drag on for years.
For purposes of this Article, the Federal Circuit’s international
trade cases over the last three years are divided into three broad
categories: the U.S. customs laws, the U.S. trade remedy laws, and
7
trade and the environment.
I.

U.S. CUSTOMS LAWS

Even within the specialized niche of U.S. customs laws, the Federal
Circuit is called upon to consider a rich and diverse array of issues,
and the period from 2000 through 2002 was no exception. If
anything, changes prompted by the Supreme Court in longstanding
rules governing the standard of review made this a particularly
dynamic and unpredictable period for litigants before the Federal
Circuit. The discussion below begins with the most heavily litigated
area of customs law—questions of classification under the
8
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”) —and
Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, at http://www.
customs.ustreas.gov./xp/cgov/toolbox/about/mission/cbp.xml (last visited May 14,
2003).
5. For the twelve-month period ended September 30, 2002, the Federal Circuit
reversed some aspect of twenty-six percent of the international trade cases
terminated during that same period; for the twelve-month period ended March 31,
2001, the figure is twenty-eight percent; and for the period ended September 30,
2002, the figure is a remarkable fifty-four percent (as compared to an overall reversal
rate of fifteen percent). See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ANN.
REP. 2002, tbl.B-8, available at http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep02.pdf (last
modified Apr. 22, 2003).
6. Review of international trade decisions by the Supreme Court is very rare, so
as a practical matter, final disposition of an international trade dispute arising under
U.S. law is virtually always by the Federal Circuit; several notable exceptions are
discussed in the Article.
7. This Article discusses only published decisions of the Federal Circuit,
representing the vast majority of the court’s international trade decisions over the
three-year review period.
8. The HTSUS is codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1202, but is not published in the Code.
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000).
Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 3007, the HTSUS is published, as annotated for statistical
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moves on to issues surrounding the appraisal of imported
merchandise, duty drawback, final assessment of duties and other
charges owed on entries of merchandise, and other issues affecting
the flow of goods and people across the U. S. border. The discussion
below also reviews the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence over the last
three years with respect to the so-called Harbor Maintenance Tax, an
area characterized during this period by a series of hotly contested
disputes. As detailed below, over the last three years, the Federal
Circuit frequently reversed the Court of International Trade.
A. Tariff Classification
9

The Federal Circuit’s decision in Haggar Apparel Co. v. United States,
10
upon remand from the Supreme Court, marked the end of an
intensely litigated dispute and a turning point in the court’s
jurisprudence concerning the level of deference owed to Customs
classification decisions. Haggar Apparel involved a Customs decision
under the “maquiladora” provision of the HTSUS, which allows a
partial exemption from import duties for certain U.S.-origin articles
that have been assembled or subjected to “operations incidental to
11
the assembly process” abroad. The dispute arose from a refund
proceeding for Customs duties imposed on Haggar Apparel’s imports
of men’s pants, assembled in Mexico with U.S.-origin parts, and
12
“permapressed” prior to importation. Haggar Apparel claimed that
permapressing was an operation “incidental to the assembly
13
process” and, thus, that its men’s pants qualified for a partial duty
14
exemption under HTSUS 9802.00.80. Customs, however, denied
Haggar Apparel’s claim pursuant to a regulation, 19 C.F.R.
§ 10.16(c), listing examples of operations not considered incidental
15
to assembly for purposes of subheading 9802.00.80.
One of the
listed operations was “chemical treatment of components or
reporting purposes, by the U.S. International Trade Commission. See U.S.
International Trade Commission, HTSUS, available at http://www.dataweb.
usitc.gov/SCRIPTS/tariff/toc.html (last modified Apr. 15, 2003).
9. 222 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
10. United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (1999).
11. Haggar Apparel, 222 F.3d at 1338-39. The exemption applies to “Articles . . .
assembled abroad in whole or in part of fabricated components, the product of the
United States, which . . . (c) have not been advanced in value or improved in
condition abroad except by being assembled and except by operations incidental to
the assembly process such as cleaning, lubricating and painting.” Id. (quoting
HTSUS, 19 U.S.C. § 1202, Subheading 9802.00.80).
12. Id. at 1338.
13. Id. at 1339.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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assembled articles to impart new characteristics, such as . . .
16
17
Following a protest proceeding, Haggar
permapressing . . . .”
Apparel challenged Customs’ decision in the Court of International
Trade, which held that 19 C.F.R. § 10.16(c) does conflict with the
plain language of the HTSUS because it is too narrowly drawn,
denying the allowance with respect to certain assembly operations
18
within the scope of the statute.
Accordingly, the Court of
International Trade found that the regulation was not entitled to
19
Chevron deference. Customs appealed to the Federal Circuit, which
20
affirmed the lower court’s decision. Customs then petitioned the
21
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court granted
the writ, and reversed the Federal Circuit’s decision, holding that
HTSUS 9802.00.80 was ambiguous and, thus, that Chevron deference
22
was indeed owed to Customs. The Supreme Court, however, did not
decide whether 19 C.F.R. § 10.16(c) constituted a reasonable reading
of the statute, leaving that issue for evaluation by the Federal Circuit
23
on remand.
In applying Chevron principles on remand, the Federal Circuit
rejected Haggar Apparel’s arguments concerning Congress’s intent,
instead agreeing with Customs that “the statute permits the so-called
24
‘categorical’ or ‘qualitative’ analysis adopted by Customs.” The
permitted analysis involved the delineation, by regulation, of
examples of value-added operations are not considered “incidental to

16. 19 C.F.R. § 10.16(c)(4) (2002).
17. See Haggar Apparel, 222 F.3d at 1339 (noting that Haggar Apparel followed
the protest and review procedures set out in 19 U.S.C. § 1515 (1994)).
18. Haggar Apparel Co. v. United States, 938 F. Supp. 868, 874 (Ct. Int’l Trade
1996).
19. See id. at 875 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). As later explained by the Federal Circuit, prior
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Haggar Apparel, the Federal Circuit or the Court
of International Trade never applied Chevron deference to a Customs’ interpretation
of a tariff heading. Haggar Apparel, 222 F.3d at 1343 (citing Universal Elecs. Inc. v.
United States, 112 F.3d 488, 491-93 (Fed. Cir. 1997) and Rollerblade, Inc. v. United
States, 112 F.3d 481, 484 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). The Chevron standard is used to analyze
regulations that administrative agencies make pursuant to their rulemaking
authority. Haggar Apparel, 222 F.3d at 1340. The standard first asks whether
“Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue” and if so then the
investigation stops; however, if “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue” then the court asks “whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.” Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44).
20. Haggar Apparel Co. v. United States, 127 F.3d 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1997), vacated
by United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (1999).
21. Id., cert. granted, United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 524 U.S. 981 (1998).
22. Haggar Apparel, 526 U.S. at 380.
23. Id. at 397.
24. Haggar Apparel, 222 F.3d at 1341.
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the assembly process” for purposes of subheading 9802.00.80. The
Federal Circuit also rejected Haggar Apparel’s contentions as to the
preferred analytical framework in implementing subheading
26
9802.00.80. The court held that a judicial determination of which
approach best reflects Congressional intent would, given the broad
delegation of power, usurp the agency’s authority to implement the
27
intent of Congress in the first instance. Upon concluding that 19
C.F.R. § 10.16(c) constituted a permissible interpretation of an
ambiguous statute, the Federal Circuit also upheld Customs’
underlying application of the regulation in its finding that
“permapressing” was an operation not “incidental to the assembly
28
process.”
In a companion decision to Haggar Apparel—Levi Strauss & Co. v.
29
United States —the Federal Circuit also affirmed Customs’ reliance on
19 C.F.R. § 10.16 to determine whether merchandise assembled
outside the United States from U.S.-origin components qualified for a
30
partial duty exemption under subheading 9802.00.80.
In this
instance, the merchandise was denim fabric shipped to Guatemala
31
for assembly and “stonewashing” prior to U.S. importation. The
procedural history of Levi Strauss was identical to that of Haggar
32
Apparel, and the court incorporated by reference its analysis in
33
Haggar Apparel.
34
In Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit affirmed a
tariff classification decision of the Court of International Trade
regarding certain synthetic organic coloring matter, known as
35
“PERGASCRIPTS,” used to produce carbonless copy paper. CibaGeigy sought to overturn Customs’ classification of PERGASCRIPTS
as “synthetic organic coloring matter” under HTSUS Heading 3204,
36
arguing instead for classification as “ink” under Heading 3215.

25. Id.
26. Id. at 1342.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 222 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
30. Levi Strauss, 222 F.3d at 1346.
31. Id. at 1345.
32. The underlying Customs ruling was that the merchandise at issue did not fall
under subheading 9802.00.80 because the processing operations, performed outside
the country, were not incidental to the assembly process. Id. at 1345-46. Customs’
decision was affirmed first by the Court of International Trade, then by the Federal
Circuit, and reversed by the Supreme Court.
33. Id. at 1346-47.
34. 223 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
35. Id. at 1369.
36. Id.

FINALINTERNATIONALTRADESUMMARY.DOC

2003]

8/15/2003 1:31 PM

INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW DECISIONS 2000-2002

1033

37

Applying a de novo standard of review, but also clarifying that
Customs classification decisions are presumed to be correct, the
Federal Circuit rejected Ciba-Geigy’s contention that ambiguities in
the notes to Chapter 32 compelled classification under Heading
38
3215. The dispute turned on the interpretation of Note 1(a) to
Chapter 32, which excludes from that chapter “separate chemically
defined elements or compounds (except those of heading . . .
39
3204. . . .” Ciba-Geigy argued that Note 1(a) is ambiguous, and does
not direct where in Chapter 32 a specific “synthetic organic coloring
40
matter” must be classified once it is included in Chapter 32. The
Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that, read in conjunction with
41
Note 2(f) to Chapter 29, Note 1(a) is clear that any “separate
chemically defined compound” (such as PERGASCRIPTS) is
42
classifiable only under Heading 3204. In reaching this decision, the
court found it significant that the chapter notes failed to exclude
Heading 3215 classification from the general rule that “separate
chemically defined compounds” cannot be classified under Chapter
43
32.
Notably, the court also rejected Ciba-Geigy’s argument,
pursuant to General Rule of Interpretation (“GRI”) 3(a), that
Heading 3215 offered a more specific product description than did
44
Heading 3204. According to the court, that argument amounted to
a request “to place the cart before the horse,” because a product must
in fact be classifiable in the more specific heading before the GRI 3
45
specificity requirement can be applied.
As noted, however, the
Federal Circuit found classification under Heading 3215 to be
precluded—notwithstanding the arguable specificity of that
46
heading.
47
In JVC Co. of America v. United States, the Federal Circuit again
affirmed a decision by the Court of International Trade to sustain a

37. Id. at 1371 (citing Baxter Healthcare Corp. of Puerto Rico v. United States,
182 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1999) and Mita Copystar Am. v. United States, 21 F.3d
1079, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
38. Id. at 1372.
39. Id. at 1369 (quoting HTSUS, Chap. 32, Note 1(a) (1992)).
40. Id. at 1372.
41. Id. at 1370 (concluding that note 2(f) excludes, among other things, a
“synthetic organic coloring matter” from classification under Chapter 29).
42. Id. at 1370.
43. Id. at 1373.
44. Id. at 1372. GRI 3(a) provides that “[t]he heading which provides the most
specific description shall be preferred to headings providing a more general
description.” Id. The GRIs are an integral part of the legal text of the HTSUS.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 234 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

FINALINTERNATIONALTRADESUMMARY.DOC

1034

8/15/2003 1:31 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1027

48

Customs tariff classification.
The lower court granted the
government’s motion for summary judgment that certain video
camera recorders imported by JVC were properly classified under
49
HTSUS subheading 8525.30.00 as “television cameras.” JVC sought
classification under certain residual provisions (i.e., provisions
covering unspecified or “other” articles) elsewhere in HTSUS
50
51
Chapters 84 or 85. Applying a de novo standard of review —but also
52
stating that “considerable deference” was owed the trial court —the
Federal Circuit rejected JVC’s arguments, including that its
camcorders were “more than” mere television cameras because they
53
also had a recording function. The court noted that the question
whether the “more than” doctrine applied to cases involving the
HTSUS (as opposed to its predecessor, the Tariff Schedules of the
54
United States, or “TSUS”) was “an issue of first impression,” and
ruled on this question for future classification disputes by holding
55
that it did not. The court concluded more broadly that the GRIs
prescribed by statute, which fully and systematically set standards for
classification, supercede the “more than” doctrine created by the
56
courts and preclude its application to HTSUS cases. The court also
dismissed JVC’s reliance on Federal Circuit cases supposedly
establishing a common meaning of the term “television camera”
because those cases, like the “more than” doctrine, construed the
57
TSUS rather than the HTSUS.
58
In North American Processing Co. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s classification of certain bovine fat
trimmings containing both meat and fat as “meat” under HTSUS

48. Id. at 1350.
49. JVC Co. of Am. v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1133 (Ct. Int’l Trade
1999), aff’d, 234 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
50. JVC Co., 234 F.3d at 1350.
51. Id. at 1351 (citing Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 1999)).
52. Id. (quoting Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc., 214 F.3d
1302, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
53. Id. at 1353.
54. Id. at 1353. The court acknowledged that a series of prior Federal Circuit
decisions involving cases under the HTSUS had appeared to approve of application
of the “more than” doctrine. Id. The court, however, distinguished those earlier
cases, finding that this issue was not “squarely presented” to the court previously. Id.
(quoting UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 654 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
55. Id. at 1354.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1354-55 (citing Mitsubishi Int’l Corp. v. United States, 182 F.3d 884, 886
(Fed. Cir. 1999) and H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 100-576, at 549-50 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1582-83).
58. 236 F.3d 695 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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59

subheading 0202.30.60.
The court departed from its usual
explication of the standard of review and presented it as entailing a
two-step process: first, ascertaining the proper meaning of the
specific terms in the tariff provision, a question of law; and second,
determining whether the merchandise at issue fits within such terms,
60
The court further stated that it exercised
a question of fact.
“complete and independent review” over the first step, but reviewed
61
the second “for clear error.” Applying this standard, the Federal
Circuit rejected North American Processing’s arguments seeking
classification of the imported fat trimmings as “fats,” rather than as
62
“meat,” under HTSUS subheading 1502.00.00.
Citing the
Explanatory Notes to Chapter 2, which state that “fat present in the
63
carcass or adhering to meat is treated as forming part of the meat,”
as well as USDA regulations setting forth a comparable definition of
64
“meat,” the court reasoned that the imported merchandise could
65
only be classified as meat under subheading 0202.30.60.
The Federal Circuit again affirmed the lower court’s tariff
classification decision—this time involving plywood made from
tropical hardwoods in Brazil and classified under HTSUS subheading
66
4412.12.20—in Russell Stadelman & Co. v. United States.
In this
instance, the dispute centered around the commercial meaning of
“Baboen,” a term used in subheading 4412.11 to designate tropical
67
wood, but not defined in the HTSUS or legislative history. While
the importer, Stadelman, sought classification of the plywood under
subheading 4412.11, Customs had classified the plywood under a

59. Id. at 696.
60. Id. at 697 (citing Pillowtex Corp. v. United States, 171 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 1999)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 698.
63. Id. The court noted that the Explanatory Notes are “not legally binding or
dispositive,” but “may be consulted for guidance” and that they “are generally
indicative of the proper interpretation of the various HTSUS provisions.” Id. (citing
Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1375, 1378 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The
Explanatory Notes form part of the Harmonized Commodity Description and
Coding System, as maintained by the Customs Cooperation Council, now known as
the World Customs Organization (“WCO”). See Jewelpak Corp. v. United States, 97
F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1195 n.6 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2000) (stating that the Notes are,
according to the WCO, the official interpretation of the scope of HCDCS, which
forms the basis for HTSUS).
64. 236 F.3d 695, 698 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing 9 C.F.R. § 301.2 (2000), which
defines “meat” as “muscle . . . with or without the accompanying and overlying fat”).
65. Id.
66. 242 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
67. Id. at 1048. Subheading 4412.11 provides for plywoods “[w]ith at least one
outer play of the following tropical woods: . . . Baboen.” Id. at 1047.
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residual provision for “other” plywood, subheading 4412.12.20. In
construing “Baboen,” the court explained that, absent evidence to
the contrary, the meaning of a tariff term that is not defined in the
HTSUS or legislative history must be its ordinary or dictionary
69
meaning. It also clarified, however, that the ordinary or dictionary
definition is trumped by a “commercial meaning in existence which is
70
definite, uniform, and general throughout the trade.” The court
further clarified, citing longstanding Supreme Court jurisprudence,
that only commercial use in the United States is relevant in
71
construing the tariff term.
While some evidence existed that
“Baboen” could describe the plywood at issue outside the United
States, the Federal Circuit, upon examining a variety of general and
technical sources, concluded that “Baboen,” as understood in the
72
United States, could not describe the merchandise. The court thus
affirmed the classification of the plywood at issue in a residual
73
category for “other” plywood, subheading 4412.11.20.
74
In General Electric Co. Medical Systems Group v. United States, the
Federal Circuit reversed the classification decision of the Court of
International Trade with respect to multiformat cameras (“MFCs”)
75
used with computerized tomography X-ray scanners. Citing Mead
Corp. v. United States, the court noted that it had no obligation to
defer to a Customs classification ruling that did not explicitly
interpret an HTSUS provision unless Customs had issued a
76
regulation. The court also clarified at the outset that, under GRI
3(a), headings providing more specific descriptions are preferable to
77
headings providing less specific descriptions. The Federal Circuit
68. Id. at 1046.
69. Id. at 1048 (citing Rohm & Haas Co. v. United States, 727 F.2d 1095, 1097
(Fed. Cir. 1984)).
70. See id. (citing Rohm, 727 F.2d at 1097) (noting that courts may only apply
commercial meanings if both Congress and all of the trade would understand the
meaning at the time the law was enacted).
71. Id. at 1049 (citing Two Hundred Chests of Tea, Smith, 22 U.S. 430, 439
(1824)).
72. Id. at 1050 (examining through a lexicographic analysis).
73. Id.
74. 247 F.3d 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2001), amended by 273 F.3d 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
75. Id. at 1232.
76. Id. at 1234 (citing Mead Corp. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1304, 1306-07 (Fed.
Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 530 U.S. 1202 (2000), vacated, 533 U.S. 218 (2001)). In its
amended opinion, based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Mead, the Federal
Circuit issued a replacement paragraph describing the revised standard of review
applicable to Customs tariff classification decisions. Gen. Elec., 273 F.3d at 1071
(citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)) (stating that a court must
review a customs classification issued without an explicit regulation in accordance
with Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)).
77. Gen. Elec., 247 F.3d at 1235.
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reversed the lower court’s classification of the MFCs under Heading
9006 as fixed focus cameras because, as it explained, merchandise
78
must be classified in its condition as imported, and the MFCs at
issue could, in that condition, only be used as accessories to
79
computerized tomography X-ray equipment. The court also found
that the imported MFCs were “combination apparatuses” because
each included both a camera assembly and a separate display
80
monitor. The court then held that Heading 9022, which described
an “apparatus based on the use of x-rays,” provided the most specific
81
description of the MFCs.
Notably, the court rejected Customs’
82
argument, based on the Explanatory Notes, that the MFCs could not
be classified under Heading 9022 because, in their condition as
83
imported, they could not generate X-rays. The court characterized
84
the Explanatory Notes as “non-binding,” and held that the statutory
language clearly contemplated the inclusion in Heading 9022 of
85
articles that do not, by themselves, generate X-rays.
86
In Heartland By-Products, Inc. v. United States, due in part to the
Supreme Court’s revision of the applicable standard of review in
Mead, the Federal Circuit affirmed a Customs classification ruling that
87
had been reversed by the Court of International Trade. The dispute
involved the appropriate HTSUS classification of certain sugar
syrups—some of which are under a Tariff Rate Quota (“TRQ”), and
88
others of which are not. In 1995, Heartland By-Products obtained a

78. Id. (citing Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 481, 487 (Fed. Cir.
1997)).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. The court’s analysis pertained to ninety-seven of ninety-eight MFCs
imported by General Electric. Id. at 1232. The single MFC was like the others except
that it included a shield that enabled it to be used in connection with magnetic
resonance imaging (“MRI”) systems. Id. The court classified this MFC under
subheading 9018.90.80. Id. at 1236. In its amended opinion, and based on the
agreement of the parties to the litigation, the court reclassified this MFC under
subheading 9018.19.80, noting that this subheading was more accurate for MFCs
used with MRI systems than the earlier classification. Gen. Elec., 273 F.3d at 1071.
82. Gen. Elec., 247 F.3d at 1236 (stating that Explanatory Notes are non-binding
and do not require that an accessory device be imported with an apparatus).
83. Id. at 1236.
84. Id. (citing Mita Copystar Am. v. United States, 21 F.3d 1079, 1082 (Fed. Cir.
1994)).
85. Id.
86. 264 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
87. See Heartland By-Products, Inc. v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1344
(Ct. Int’l Trade 1999), rev’d, 264 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that Customs
abused its discretion in classifying the product inconsistently with the Tariff statute).
88. Heartland By-Products, 264 F.3d at 1128-29. Specifically, sugar syrups, classified
under HTSUS subheading 1702.90.10 and 1702.90.20, are subject to the TRQ, while
syrups classified under HTSUS subheading 1702.90.40 are not. Id. at 1129.
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ruling letter from Customs classifying the syrups it intended to import
89
under a subheading not subject to the TRQ; however, U.S. interests
opposing this classification sought its review, and in 1999 Customs
published notice revoking the earlier ruling, and reclassifying the
90
syrups at issue under a subheading subject to the TRQ. Heartland
By-Products then filed a complaint with the Court of International
91
Trade, which declared Customs’ revocation ruling unlawful and
ordered classification of the syrups under HTSUS subheading
1702.90.40, as they had been classified prior to the revocation
92
ruling. The United States and certain U.S. interests appealed the
93
court’s decision.
In articulating the applicable standard of review, the Federal
Circuit noted that since issuance of the decision below, the Supreme
Court had ruled, in Mead, that courts may defer to Custom
classifications depending on their power to persuade, pursuant to the
94
Court’s 1944 decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. The Federal Circuit
proceeded to review the lower court’s reversal of the Customs
revocation ruling—reviewing it in particular for completeness and
95
logic and against relevant sources and prior interpretations —and
96
The
reversed the decision of the Court of International Trade.
Federal Circuit identified one factor militating against deference to
the revocation ruling, i.e., its inconsistency with the underlying 1995
ruling, but held that this inconsistency was not, by itself, a basis for
denying deference to the revocation ruling given that the earlier
ruling was not issued pursuant to a notice and comment process, and
given that it had not addressed the specific technical points that gave
97
rise to Customs’ revocation in 1999.
The Federal Circuit also
disagreed with the lower court’s reading of the applicable HTSUS
89. See id. at 1129 (citing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 810329 (May 15, 1995)) (agreeing with
plaintiff Heartland By-Products that because syrup was not lactose, maple, glucose, or
fructose, it could not be classified under heading subject to a tariff).
90. Id. at 1131 (citing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 33, Cust. Bull. No. 35/36, at 41 (Sept. 8,
1999)).
91. Heartland By-Products obtained jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h),
which permits the Court of International Trade to review the classification of goods
prior to importation if the party bringing the challenge can show that irreparable
harm will result if judicial review is not obtained prior to importation. Heartland ByProducts, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 1326, 1329-32.
92. Id. at 1345.
93. Heartland By-Products, 264 F.3d at 1128.
94. Id. at 1133 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) and
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)).
95. Id. at 1135 (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 220).
96. Id. at 1136-37 (finding that the Court of International Trade should have
deferred to the Customs revocation because it met the Mead standard).
97. Id. at 1136.
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provisions and Explanatory Notes, describing its construction of these
98
provisions as unduly “narrow.”
99
In Rocknel Fastener, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s classification of certain metal fasteners
100
imported by Rocknel Fastener from Japan.
Customs placed the
fastener entries under HTSUS subheading 7318.15.80, a residual
101
subheading covering certain “other” threaded fasteners.
Rocknel
Fastener protested, claiming classification under subheading
102
The court explained at
7318.15.20, which covers certain “bolts.”
the outset that where, as here, a tariff term is not statutorily defined,
the term’s common meaning applies, and that the common meaning
may be discerned by consulting various sources, such as dictionaries
103
and lexicographic or scientific authorities.
The court also
acknowledged the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Mead,
requiring the reviewing court to take into account the persuasiveness
104
of the decision under review.
The issue of statutory construction
before the Federal Circuit hinged on whether the fasteners at issue
105
Applying longstanding definitions of
were “bolts” or “screws.”
fasteners embodied in American National Standards Institute
(“ANSI”) specifications, Customs’ classification essentially held the
106
latter. The Federal Circuit tested Customs’ analysis by reference to
a variety of technical sources, including the Millwrights and
Mechanics Guide, Machinery’s Handbook, as well as to Webster’s and
107
American Heritage Dictionaries,
and found that the ANSI
108
specifications were consistent with the dictionary definitions.
The
court also rejected Rocknel Fastener’s proposed alternate definitions,
concluding that because Rocknel Fastener’s alternative definitions
were not more consistent with the common meaning of the terms,
109
Customs’ classification was appropriate.

98. Id.
99. 267 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
100. Rocknel Fastener, Inc. v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1238-39 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2000), aff’d, 267 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (classifying fasteners as
screws under subheading 7318.15.80 and denying plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment to classify fasteners as bolts under subheading 7318.15.20).
101. Rocknel Fastener, 267 F.3d at 1356.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1356-57 (citing C.J. Tower & Sons v. United States, 673 F.2d 1268, 1271
(C.C.P.A. 1982)).
104. Id. at 1357 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 220 (2001)).
105. Id. at 1356.
106. Id. at 1358-59.
107. Id. at 1359-60.
108. Id. at 1360.
109. Id. at 1361.
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The Federal Circuit again affirmed the lower court in Rollerblade,
110
Inc. v. United States, a case involving in-line skating protective gear.
Again applying Mead deference principles, the Federal Circuit
111
affirmed the Court of International Trade. Rollerblade contended
that the protective gear should be classified as “other accessories”
112
Agreeing with the lower
under HTSUS subheading 9506.70.2090.
court, however, the Federal Circuit found that the applicable HTSUS
provisions did not define “accessories,” such that it was appropriate to
113
turn to the common meaning of the term.
That analysis, in turn,
led to the conclusion that the protective gear could not be classified
as accessories to in-line skates because the gear is not physically
114
connected to and does not contact the skates.
Moreover, the
protective gear merely provides skaters with comfort, but is not
115
necessary to the safe operation of the skates. The court concluded
that Customs did not err in classifying the protective gear in the most
116
appropriate residual category.
117
In Mead Corp. v. United States, on remand from the Supreme
118
Court, the Federal Circuit for the second time reversed the Court of
119
International Trade’s affirmance of a Customs classification ruling.
The original judgment of the Federal Circuit in Mead was reversed for
120
failure to apply deference under Skidmore; however, even applying
the more deferential standard required by the Supreme Court, the
Federal Circuit held that Customs’ reasoning was unpersuasive and
121
reversed the classification ruling. The merchandise at issue was five
models of Mead’s day planners, classified by Customs under HTSUS

110. 282 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
111. Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1257 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2000), aff’d, 282 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that Customs properly classified
product under subheading 9506.99.6080).
112. Rollerblade, 282 F.3d at 1351.
113. Id. at 1352-53.
114. Id. at 1353 (citing Trans Atl. Co. v. United States, 48 C.C.P.A. 30 (1960)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1354 (citing EM Indus. v. United States, 999 F. Supp. 1473, 1480 n.9
(Ct. Int’l Trade 1998)).
117. 283 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
118. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (requiring lower court
to consider case under Skidmore standard).
119. Mead, 283 F.3d at 1344.
120. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227 (holding that an agency’s interpretation is entitled to
deference because of its expertise).
121. The Federal Circuit explained that, “[w]hile this court . . . recognizes its
responsibility to accord a classification ruling the degree of deference commensurate
with its power to persuade, this court also recognizes its independent responsibility
to decide the legal issue regarding the proper meaning and scope of the HTSUS
terms.” Mead, 283 F.3d at 1346 (citing Rocknel Fastener, 267 F.3d at 1358).
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122

subheading 4820.10.20 as bound diaries. Mead sought classification
under subheading 4820.10.40, a residual basket provision, arguing
123
that the day planners were neither bound nor diaries. The Federal
Circuit first analyzed whether Customs and the lower court
124
reasonably concluded that the planners were diaries.
Relying on
dictionary definitions, and noting in particular the limited amount of
space that the planners provided for “detailed notations about events,
observations, feelings, or thoughts,” the court concluded that the
125
planners were not diaries.
The court also considered whether
Mead’s planners were “bound,” and again disagreed with Customs
126
and the lower court. Relying on both the structure of the HTSUS
and dictionary definitions, the court ruled that the concept of
127
binding did not encompass loose-leaf binding.
In light of this
analysis, the court concluded that Customs’ classification was not
128
persuasive under Skidmore deference.
129
In Franklin v. United States, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower
court’s grant of summary judgment to the United States with respect
to the classification of imported Japanese coral sand packets used to
130
purify water.
Customs classified the coral sand packets under
HTSUS subheading 2106.90.99, a residual basket provision covering
131
food preparations. Franklin sought classification under subheading
8421.20.00, which includes machinery used to filter and purify
132
water. Citing Mead, Rollerblade, and Rocknel Fastener, the court stated
that its review would be based on the persuasiveness of Customs’
133
classification decision.
The court turned first to Franklin’s
contention that the principal purpose of the coral sand packets was
to “purify” water, and agreed that the packets should be classified
134
under 8421.20.00.
Because the coral sand removed unwanted
chlorine, bacteria, and acidity from water, the court found it fit the
definition of purify—“to remove unwanted constituents from a
122. Id. at 1344.
123. Id. at 1345 (noting that under this subheading, Mead would not owe an
import tariff).
124. Id. at 1346-47.
125. Id. at 1348 (arguing that a day planner is used to plan future events, while
diaries account past events).
126. Id. at 1350.
127. Id. at 1349-50 (finding that a book is bound if it is permanently secured).
128. Id. at 1350.
129. 289 F.3d 753 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
130. Franklin v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2001), rev’d,
Franklin v. United States, 289 F.3d 753 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
131. Franklin, 289 F.3d at 755.
132. Id. at 756.
133. Id. at 757.
134. Id. at 758.
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135

substance.” The court turned next to whether any basis existed for
the classification of the sand packets under subheading 2106.90.99,
136
Noting that GRI 3(a) requires
i.e., as a food preparation.
classification under the HTSUS Heading providing the most specific
description of the product at issue, the court found Heading 8421
provided a more specific description of the coral sand packets than
137
classification as a food preparation. The court further agreed with
Franklin’s argument that coral sand packets are not a food
preparation at all because the sand packets are not consumed when
138
placed in water, but purify the water.
The Federal Circuit
concluded that the underlying classification decision was not
139
persuasive under Skidmore.
140
Finally, in Jewelpak Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
affirmed a Court of International Trade decision involving the
141
reclassification of Jewelpak’s imported jewelry boxes. The first issue
before the Federal Circuit was whether Customs was required,
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1315(d) and 19 C.F.R. § 177.10(c)(2), to
142
publish notice of its intended reclassification of the jewelry boxes.
Jewelpak contended that the original classification constituted an
established and uniform practice (“EUP”) under the precursor to the
HTSUS—the TSUS—such that reclassification, which occurred well
after the transition to the HTSUS, triggered the statutory publication
143
obligation under § 1315.
Relying heavily on an earlier decision
defining the establishment and rescission of EUPs, the Federal
Circuit ruled that Jewelpak had failed to meet its burden that any
144
EUP had been applicable.
The Federal Circuit also rejected
Jewelpak’s related argument that, given the absence of a published
145
notice of the intended reclassification, it was prejudiced. The court
135. Id. (quoting Noss Co. v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 1408, 1412 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 1984)).
136. Id. at 760.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 760-61 (differentiating the coral sand packets from tea bags because a
tea bag is placed in water with the intent of drinking the tea, whereas the packets are
intended to purify).
139. Id. at 761.
140. 297 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
141. Jewelpak Corp. v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 2d 100 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2001),
aff’d, 297 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
142. Jewelpak, 297 F.3d at 1331.
143. Id. at 1332.
144. Id. at 1332-34 (citing Heraeus-Amersil, Inc. v. United States, 795 F.2d 1575
(Fed. Cir. 1986)). The court characterized Heraeus as the case most relevant to its
analysis, and admonished Jewelpak’s counsel for failing to cite it in its opening brief.
Id. at 1333 n.6.
145. Id. at 1334.
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found it was unreasonable to find that Jewelpak had been prejudiced
by the lack of published notice of the change in classification because
146
In addition, the Federal Circuit rejected
it had actual notice.
Jewelpak’s challenge to the Court of International Trade’s
determination as to the common meaning of “jewelry box” as used in
147
the HTSUS.
The Federal Circuit found the lower court had
correctly determined the common meaning of “jewelry box” based
on the GRIs and relevant caselaw, and that Jewelpak had failed to
148
identify any errors in that reasoning.
Finally, the Federal Circuit
dismissed as meritless, without explaining its analysis, Jewelpak’s
contention that action by the International Trade Commission and
149
the President was necessary to justify Customs’ reclassification.
Judge Gajarsa dissented from the majority opinion, finding that
Customs had indeed departed from an EUP, and that, because the
effect of the change was to impose a higher tariff rate, the notice and
150
comment requirement of 19 U.S.C. § 1315(d) applied.
Judge
Gajarsa also criticized the majority opinion for undermining the
policy that § 1315(d) seeks to serve—to facilitate efficient
international trade by permitting investors to rely on established
practices and the knowledge that Customs will give notice before
151
raising duty rates.
B. Valuation Issues
During the three-year period being reviewed, three cases involving
the valuation of imported merchandise for Customs appraisal
purposes reached the Federal Circuit, and in two of the three
instances, the Federal Circuit reversed. The valuation statute, 19
U.S.C. § 1401a, establishes that the baseline for appraisal of imported
152
merchandise is its “transaction value.”
The “transaction value” is
defined as “the price actually paid or payable for the merchandise
when sold for exportation to the United States,” and is subject to
153
certain statutorily enumerated adjustments and exceptions.
154
involved the
First, Century Importers, Inc. v. United States
importation of Canadian beer by Century Importers. Customs
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id. at 1336.
Id. at 1336-37.
Id. at 1337.
Id. at 1337-38 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1340.
19 U.S.C. § 1401a(a)(1)(A) (2000).
19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(1).
205 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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initially assessed duties for the imported beer according to the
155
However, based on a separate agreement in which
invoice price.
the Canadian exporter agreed to reimburse Century Importers for
U.S. import duties, Century Importers initiated an action in the
Court of International Trade seeking adjustment of the transaction
value, and a partial refund of duties paid, to reflect the duty
156
reimbursements from the Canadian exporter.
Century Importers
argued that, by agreeing to the duty reimbursement scheme, the
157
exporter had actually reduced the price of the beer. The Court of
International Trade agreed with Century Importers, ordering
158
adjustment of the transaction value as sought by Century Importers,
159
but the Federal Circuit reversed. Noting that Customs decisions are
160
entitled to a presumption of correctness, the Federal Circuit
reviewed the applicable provisions of the valuation statute, including
161
The court determined that because
§§ 1401a(b)(3) and (4).
Century Importers had not separately identified the duty amount to
be reimbursed on its invoices, Customs had no authority to deduct
162
this amount in calculating the transaction value.
The court
specifically noted that, under § 1401a(b)(4)(B), Customs was
precluded from taking into account post-importation “rebates” in
163
establishing transaction value. The court also found that 19 U.S.C.
§ 1520(c)(1), which authorized revision of Customs entry papers for
the correction of clerical and other inadvertent errors, did not apply
because Century Importers had acted “negligently” rather than
164
inadvertently.
Judge Newman dissented from the panel majority’s decision,
pointing out that Customs had acknowledged it would have valued
the merchandise as proposed by Century Importers when entry
papers were filed if the invoices had expressly reflected the
165
reimbursement agreement. Judge Newman posited that the failure
of the invoices to reflect this fact was the kind of error that section

155. Id. at 1310.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Century Imps., Inc. v. United States, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (Ct. Int’l Trade
1998), vacated, 205 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
159. Century Imps., 205 F.3d at 1309.
160. Id. at 1311.
161. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(3)-(4) (2000) (stating that the transaction value does
not include duties listed separately).
162. Century Imps., 205 F.3d at 1311-12.
163. Id. at 1311.
164. Id. at 1312-13.
165. Id. at 1313 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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1520(c)(1) of the statute was designed to encompass.
Judge
Newman also charged the panel majority with misunderstanding the
nature of the payments from the Canadian exporter to Century
Importers, arguing these payments were not a rebate but part of the
underlying agreement between the parties establishing the transfer
167
price.
168
Second, Fabil Manufacturing Co. v. United States
involved a
Customs regulation authorizing post-importation reductions in the
assessed valuation of merchandise if the merchandise is damaged
169
when it is imported.
The Court of International Trade rejected
Fabil Manufacturing’s claim for a full reduction in the assessed value
of certain defective merchandise because Fabil Manufacturing could
not “tie” the allegedly defective merchandise to the specific entries
for which it sought the reduction, and granted the government’s
170
motion for summary judgment. The Federal Circuit, however, held
171
that the regulation did not contain a “tying” requirement and
found that Fabil Manufacturing’s evidence demonstrated a prima
facie case for its right to receive a refund of duties paid for the
172
defective merchandise. The Federal Circuit did not direct summary
judgment for Fabil Manufacturing, but ordered the Court of
International Trade to conduct further proceedings consistent with
173
its decision.
The Federal Circuit also criticized the Court of
International Trade for requiring too high a standard of proof in its
initial proceeding and clarified that the applicable standard for
parties seeking revaluation of damaged merchandise is
174
“preponderance of the evidence,” not “clear and convincing.”
175
Third, in Luigi Bormioli Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment for the United
States in a dispute involving the treatment of certain interest charges
in the valuation of glassware imported by Bormioli from its Italian
166. Id. at 1314.
167. Id. at 1314-15.
168. 237 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
169. 19 C.F.R. § 158.12 (2002).
170. Fabil Mfg. Co. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999),
rev’d, 237 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
171. Fabil Mfg., 237 F.3d at 1337.
172. Id. at 1339.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1339-41. The court relied in large part on its decision in St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, which, it explained, holds that the civil preponderance
of the evidence standard applies in cases challenging post-importation Customs
decisions in the Court of International Trade, but not Customs rulings before
importation. Id. at 1340 (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 6
F.3d 763 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
175. 304 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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176

parent company.
Specifically, Bormioli did not agree with
Customs’ inclusion in the valuation at issue of a 1.25% interest
177
charge specified in an agreement between Bormioli and its parent.
The principal issues on appeal to the Federal Circuit were whether
178
Treasury Directive 85-111,
which provided guidelines for the
treatment of interest expenses in computing transaction value,
applied in this instance and, if so, whether it was consistent with the
179
valuation statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1401a.
Bormioli argued that
“separately invoiced” charges, as it claimed were at issue, were not
governed by TD 85-111 but by earlier Customs policy
180
pronouncements.
Reviewing de novo, the Federal Circuit rejected
this argument, explaining that “Bormioli confuses the legal inclusion
of a charge in the ‘price actually paid or payable’ with the physical
181
listing or invoicing of the ‘price actually paid or payable’” and that
TD 85-111 in fact superseded the earlier pronouncements on which
182
Bormioli relied. The court also rejected Bormioli’s attempt to show
that summary judgment was inappropriate in this case due to
183
Noting that the record established that
material questions of fact.
Bormioli and its parent company did not typically adhere to the
interest payment terms in their agreement, the Federal Circuit found
that the lower court correctly held that the financing arrangement
with Bormioli Italy for the subject charges was not in a demonstrable
184
writing, as required by TD 85-111.

176. Id. at 1363.
177. Id. at 1365.
178. Treatment of Interest Charges in the Customs Value of Imported
Merchandise, 19 Cust. B. & Dec. 258 (1985), 50 Fed. Reg. 27,886 (July 8, 1985) (“TD
85-111”). TD 85-111 provides that interest payments, whether or not included in the
price actually paid or payable for merchandise, should not be considered part of
dutiable value provided the following criteria are satisfied:
(1) The interest charges are identified separately from the price of the
goods;
(2) the financing arrangement was in writing; and
(3) where required, the buyer can demonstrate that the goods undergoing
appraisement are actually sold at the price declared, and the claimed rate of
interest does not exceed the level for such transaction prevailing in the
country where and when the financing was provided.
Id.
179. Luigi Bormioli, 304 F.3d at 1365.
180. Id. at 1369.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1371.
183. Id. at 1372 (discussing Bormioli’s argument that three letters from Bormioli
Italy to Bormioli satisfy TD 85-111’s writing requirement, despite the parties’
departure from the terms of those letters).
184. Id. at 1372-73.
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C. Harbor Maintenance Tax
During the period 2000 through 2002, the Federal Circuit
considered a wide range of issues arising out of the Supreme Court’s
185
1998 ruling in United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., where the court held
186
that the so-called Harbor Maintenance Tax (“HMT”), as applied to
187
exports, violated the Constitution’s Export Clause.
Even with this
issue settled by the Supreme Court in U.S. Shoe, implementation of
that ruling generated scores of hotly litigated cases and accounted for
a substantial portion of the international trade cases before the
Federal Circuit during the past three years. The Federal Circuit
reversed or remanded to the Court of International Trade in roughly
half of these cases.
188
In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. United States the Federal Circuit
considered whether people—or more specifically, passengers on
Carnival’s cruise ships—are subject to the HMT as applied to
189
exports.
Carnival Cruise Lines prevailed before the Court of
International Trade, which held that application of the HMT to
190
passengers violates the Constitution’s ban on export taxes.
The
U.S. Government appealed this decision to the Federal Circuit, which
reversed. The Federal Circuit first noted that cruise ship passengers
are outside the scope of the Constitution’s Export Clause because
191
they are “neither ‘articles’ nor ‘goods.’”
The court further noted
that, in enacting the HMT, Congress “could not and did not”
transform the carriage of passengers into the export of goods and

185. 523 U.S. 360 (1995).
186. 26 U.S.C. § 4461 (2000). The HMT, enacted as part of the Water Resources
Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, 100 Stat. 4082 (1986), placed an ad
valorem tax on commercial vessel operators for their use of certain ports. Id. The Act
imposed liability for payment of the HMT on the importer in the case of imports, on
the exporter in the case of exports, and on the shipper in all other cases. Id.
187. U.S. Shoe, 523 U.S. at 370 (finding that the HMT violates the Export Clause,
but that exporters may be subject to user fees for harbor maintenance if those fees
are proportionate to the exporter’s use of the harbor). The Export Clause provides
that “[n]o Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
188. 200 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
189. Id. at 1362. The HMT applies to “commercial cargo,” which is defined as
including “passengers transported for compensation or hire.” 26 U.S.C. § 4462(a)
(2000).
190. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 2d 877 (Ct. Int’l Trade
1998), rev’d, 200 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
191. Carnival Cruise Lines, 200 F.3d at 1364. The court explained that delegates to
the Constitutional Convention drafted the Export Clause to assure Southern States
that Northern States would not oppress them through taxation of southern
commercial exports, making application of the Export Clause to people inconsistent
with the basic purpose of the Clause. Id. (citing United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs.
Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 859 (1996)).
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thereby bring this activity into the scope of the Export Clause. The
Federal Circuit’s analysis then turned to the Water Resource
Development Act’s severability clause and the question of whether,
under Supreme Court severability precedent, the Act as a whole
193
could function absent the unconstitutional export tax.
Applying
the principle that “the unconstitutional provision must be severed
unless the statute created in its absence is legislation that Congress
194
would not have enacted,” the court found that the remaining
portions of the Act (including the application of the HMT to
passengers) could function as intended by Congress without the
195
unconstitutional export tax clause.
The court also rejected
Carnival’s other contentions, including its argument that Congress
would not have imposed the HMT without applying it to exports, that
the Act’s severability clause does not apply to the HMT, and that
severance of export taxes only from the HMT could lead to conflicts
with U.S. trading partners under the General Agreements of Tariffs
196
and Trade (“GATT”) rules. On the last point, the court noted that
no trading partner of the United States had formally challenged the
HMT, and that Congress or the executive branch will act in such a
197
situation.
198
In Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit upheld
the application of the HMT to passengers, but also considered two
other issues—the application of the HMT to passenger stopovers or
199
layovers, and the assessment of the Arriving Passenger Fee (“APF”)
200
on passenger cruises. As in Carnival Cruise Lines, the Federal Circuit
reversed the Court of International Trade’s invalidation of the HMT
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1366-69.
194. Id. at 1367 (citing Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987)).
195. Id. (noting that Congress chose to include exports in the HMT despite its
awareness that the Export Clause might invalidate that application).
196. Id. at 1367-69.
197. Id. at 1369.
198. 201 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
199. Id. at 1354. The HMT provides that “when a passenger boards or disembarks
a commercial vessel at a port within the definition of this section, the operator of
that vessel is liable for the payment of the port use fee.” Id. at 1356 n.4 (citing 19
C.F.R. § 24.24(e)(3)(i) (2002)).
200. Id. at 1354; see 19 U.S.C. § 58c(a)(5) (2000) (imposing the APF fee on
passengers arriving in the United States from abroad on commercial vessels or
aircraft). Section 58c creates an exemption for passengers arriving from Canada,
Mexico, U.S. territories, or adjacent islands, as well as passengers whose travel
originated in the United States but was limited to those destinations. 19 C.F.R.
§ 24.24(g)(2)(i)(A) (2002). The APF fee is assessed based on the place the journey
“originated,” which Customs regulations define as “the location where the person’s
travel begins under cover of a transaction . . . into the customs territory of the United
States.” 19 C.F.R. § 24.22(g)(2)(i)(B).
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as applied to passengers (the lower court did not reach the stopover
201
issue) and remanded the APF claim for recalculation. On the issue
of stopovers or layovers, Princess Cruises argued that, should the
Federal Circuit uphold the HMT as applied to passengers, it must
also hold that the HMT does not apply to mere stopovers or layovers,
because these events do not, under 19 C.F.R. § 24.24, amount to
202
“boarding” or “disembarking.” Citing Haggar Apparel and applying
Chevron deference, the court found that application of the HMT to
stopovers and layovers, as provided in the regulations, was consistent
with congressional intent and therefore constituted a reasonable
203
interpretation of the statute. The court reasoned that discharging
and reboarding passengers at a port for shopping and sight-seeing is
no different from boarding or discharging passengers at a port at the
204
beginning or end of a cruise.
The court also rejected Princess’
claim of estoppel against the government, for which Princess Cruises
relied on a fax from a Customs official stating that the HMT would
205
not apply to stopovers. With respect to the APF, the Federal Circuit
again reversed the lower court’s decision and upheld Customs’
regulatory interpretation of “journey” as including all stages of an
206
itinerary, regardless of the mode of transportation.
Again citing
Haggar Apparel and applying Chevron deference, the court noted that
Congress had not defined “journey,” thereby leaving this task to
207
Customs. The court also rejected Princess’ argument that the APF
statute exempts any passenger whose last port of call before arriving
208
in the United States was an exempt port. As explained by the court,
under the only reasonable reading of the statute, the origin of the
journey raises the exemption and not the last port of call before
209
discharging at port in the United States.
The Federal Circuit again reversed the Court of International
210
Trade in International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, a test
201. Princess Cruises, 201 F.3d at 1355.
202. Id. at 1358 (arguing that because neither term is defined in the statute, the
court should rely on other Customs regulations for the definition).
203. Id. at 1360 (noting Congress’s intent to impose a fee for usage of ports and its
failure to explicitly exclude stopovers or layovers with its exclusions for other uses,
such as ferries).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1361 (rejecting Princess’ argument that “journey” does not begin at the
location from which the passenger left the United States, but rather at the starting
point of the cruise).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1361-62.
209. Id. at 1362.
210. 201 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

FINALINTERNATIONALTRADESUMMARY.DOC

1050

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/15/2003 1:31 PM

[Vol. 52:1027

case involving the right of parties owed HMT refunds from the U.S.
211
Government to collect interest on those refunds. The lower court
held that 28 U.S.C. § 2411, which provides for interest on tax refunds,
212
also applies to HMT refunds, and the U.S. Government appealed.
The Federal Circuit noted at the outset that the issue before it was
purely one of statutory construction, warranting full and
213
independent review, and that its analysis would focus on whether
Congress had expressly waived sovereign immunity by consenting to
214
The court stated that it was
interest payments on HMT refunds.
“abundantly clear” that, notwithstanding the codification of the HMT
as part of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”), Congress intended
HMT to be administered and enforced as a customs duty, not a tax
215
under the IRC.
The analysis, thus, turned on whether 28 U.S.C.
§ 2411, which expressly authorizes interest on tax refunds, is a
216
provision related to “administration and enforcement” of the HMT.
Because the HMT statute did not define “administration and
enforcement,” the court examined the ordinary meaning of those
217
terms and interpreted them broadly.
The court found that
Congress intended “administration and enforcement” to include
judicial enforcement and awards of tax refund interest, in addition to
218
agency action.
The court could find no other statutes expressly
providing for interest on HMT refunds and concluded that the
taxpayers could not receive interest on the HMT refunds without a
219
specific grant of such relief by Congress.
In another post-U.S. Shoe test case, the Federal Circuit in Swisher
220
International, Inc. v. United States reviewed whether Customs’ denial
of a request for HMT refunds was a “protestable” decision for
purposes of 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a), such that subsequent Court of
International Trade jurisdiction would be available under 28 U.S.C.
221
§ 1581(a), and reversed. The lower court held that denials of HMT
211. Id. at 1369.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1370 (citing Medline Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 F.3d 1407, 1409
(Fed. Cir. 1995)).
214. Id. (citing Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986)).
215. Id. at 1371. 26 U.S.C. § 4462(f)(3) provides, in pertinent part, that the HMT
“shall not be treated as a tax for purposes of subtitle F or any other provision of law
relating to the administration and enforcement of internal revenue taxes.”
216. Int’l Bus. Machs., 201 F.3d at 1371.
217. Id. at 1372-73.
218. Id. at 1373.
219. Id. at 1375.
220. 205 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
221. Id. at 1360. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) provides that “[t]he Court of International
Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to contest the
denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under § 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930.”
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refund requests were not protestable and, accordingly, that such
denials could only be challenged pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the
222
court’s “residual” jurisdiction provision. As a result of the two-year
statute of limitations for actions initiated under § 1581(i), the Court
of International Trade found certain of Swisher’s refund claims time223
barred under the provision.
The issue was novel because, in U.S.
Shoe—where the Supreme Court found that the HMT violates the
Constitution’s Export Clause—the challenge followed a different
procedural path, i.e., no Customs protest pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
224
§ 1514(a) and jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).
Noting the existence of considerable confusion concerning the
appropriate jurisdictional basis for a challenge at the time of U.S.
Shoe, the Federal Circuit held that Swisher, or other HMT
challengers, are not restricted by U.S. Shoe and a two-year statute of
225
The Federal Circuit also cited various grounds,
limitations.
including decisions of the Court of International Trade, to support its
finding that HMT payment issues are protestable decisions with
respect to a “charge or exaction” for purposes of 19 U.S.C.
226
§ 1514(a)(2), the statute allowing for protests of customs decisions.
Finally, the Federal Circuit noted equitable considerations to support
its holding, positing that:
[I]f we were to hold that a request for refund was not a protestable
decision, Swisher, and others, would be limited to recovering only
that HMT paid within two years before filing suit in the Court of
International Trade. Given that the constitutionality of the HMT
was not seriously questioned until 1994 and not completely resolved
until 1998, such a holding would bar recovery of much of the
227
unconstitutional HMT paid by exporters between 1987 and 1998.
228

In Florida Sugar Marketing & Terminal Ass’n v. United States, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the
Constitution does not prohibit assessment of the HMT on shipments
229
between the ports of different states.
Noting that the question
before it was purely legal, i.e., whether the term “exports”

222. Swisher Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 2d 234, 239 (Ct. Int’l Trade
1998), rev’d, 205 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1362-63.
225. Id. at 1365.
226. Id. at 1365-67 (citing Eurasia Imp. v. United States, 31 C.C.P.A. 202, 211-12
(1944); Thomson Consumer Elec., Inc. v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 1999)).
227. Id. at 1368.
228. 220 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
229. Id. at 1341.
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encompasses interstate shipments, the court applied a de novo
230
standard of review and turned to various historical sources of law in
attempting to ascertain the Framers’ intent as to the scope of the
231
Export Clause.
While Florida Sugar identified an abundance of
materials contemporaneous with the Constitution showing that lay
232
usage of the term “export” included interstate shipments, the
Federal Circuit found that this lay usage was not dispositive in
ascertaining the legal meaning of the term because a term’s lay
233
meaning is often broader than its legal definition. Instead, relying
primarily on records from the 1787 Federal Convention, the court
found that the debate over the scope of the Export Clause was closely
linked to the importation of slaves and clearly tied to overseas
234
commerce.
The court also found that the nature of the NorthSouth divide at the time of the Constitutional Convention, in
particular the South’s opposition to the export tax, strongly indicated
that the tax under discussion related exclusively to foreign
235
commerce.
The court found the constitutional context of the
Export Clause provided further indicators that the Clause was
236
intended to apply only to foreign shipments.
These indicators
included the fact that the Export Clause only proscribes the activities
of the federal government, making the relevant jurisdiction the
237
federal government and not the states.
Finally, the court rejected
Florida Sugar’s reading of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue,
concluding that, aside from a single dissenting opinion that was
arguably not germane, Florida Sugar had failed to cite a Supreme
238
Court case supporting its interpretation of the Export Clause.
239
Stone Container Corp. v. United States raised the procedural issue of
whether initiation of a class action lawsuit for recovery of
230. Id. at 1333.
231. Id. at 1333-41 (examining the Constitutional Convention records and the
applicable line of Supreme Court cases).
232. Id. at 1334 (explaining Florida Sugar offered newspapers, correspondence,
advertisements and state statutes to demonstrate the meaning of the term “export”).
233. Id. at 1334-35 (illustrating that the current legal definition of export refers to
international commerce, whereas, a contemporary New York Times article uses the
term export to refer to the interstate shipment of trash).
234. Id. at 1335-36 (citing 2 RECORDS OF THE FED. CONVENTION 220 (Max Farrand
ed., 1787) (statement of J. Madison, Aug. 8, 1787)).
235. Id. at 1336-37 (explaining that, because the South’s economy was based on
exporting cash crops overseas and the North’s economy was based on the domestic
sale of industrial products, the South’s fear that the North could discriminate against
it with the export tax indicated that the tax could not have been on just interstate
commerce but related to shipments from foreign countries).
236. Id. at 1337-38.
237. Id. at 1338.
238. Id. at 1339-41.
239. 229 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Stone Container Corp. was designated by the
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unconstitutional HMT payments tolled the applicable two-year statute
240
of limitations codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2636(i) and, if so, for how
241
242
Applying a de novo standard of review, the Federal Circuit
long.
agreed with the Court of International Trade that, under the
circumstances, tolling began with initiation of the class action, but
243
ended upon dismissal of the class by the trial court.
Stone
Container argued the two-year statute was tolled by the 1994 filing of
244
Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. United States, which sought the certification
of a class of plaintiffs consisting of all persons who had paid the HMT
245
on the export of commercial cargo.
In 1996, the Court of
246
International Trade denied class certification in Baxter Healthcare.
However, Stone Container argued that tolling continued until such a
247
time as any aspect of Baxter Healthcare could no longer be appealed,
and that it would be unconstitutional to apply any statute of
248
limitations to claims for the repayment of an unconstitutional tax.
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the latter argument, holding that
Supreme Court precedent clearly allowed a “relatively short”
249
limitation period after a tax is found unconstitutional. The Federal
Circuit did agree with Stone Container that tolling of the statute of
limitations was dictated by the rule promulgated by the Supreme
Court in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, which suspends the
Court of International Trade as a test case to resolve the limitations issue for
thousands of individual claims for recovery of improperly collected HMT payments.
Id. at 1347.
240. 28 U.S.C. § 2636(i) provides that:
A civil action of which the Court of International Trade has jurisdiction
under § 1581 of this title, other than an action specified in subsections (a)(h) of this section, is barred unless commenced in accordance with the rules
of the court within two years after the cause of action first accrues.
As discussed above, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) is the Court of International Trade’s
“residual” grant of jurisdiction.
241. Stone Container, 229 F.3d at 1347.
242. Id. at 1349.
243. Id. at 1347.
244. 925 F. Supp. 794 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1996).
245. Stone Container, 229 F.3d at 1348.
246. Baxter Healthcare, 925 F. Supp. at 796, 800.
247. Stone Container, 229 F.3d at 1348.
248. Id. at 1349.
249. Id. (quoting McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496
U.S. 18, 45 (1990)). The Federal Circuit observed, following its discussion of
McKesson, that they were clearly required to follow the Court’s guidance because the
Court’s statements regarding the statute of limitations were unambiguous and
carefully measured. Id. at 1350. The Federal Circuit also disagreed with Stone
Container’s claim that, due to uncertainty surrounding the available tax refund
remedies, a longer, six-year statute of limitations should apply in lieu of the two-year
period specified in 28 U.S.C. § 2636(i). Id. The court explained, however, that the
confusion claimed by Stone Container was not regarding the applicable statute of
limitations, but rather whether the Court of International Trade was granted
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) or 1581(i). Id. at 1351.
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statute of limitations for all members of a class when a class action is
250
However, the Federal Circuit also held that the tolling
initiated.
ended upon dismissal of the class certification by the trial court,
251
thereby significantly limiting the relief sought by Stone Container.
252
In Amoco Oil Co. v. United States, the Federal Circuit again
addressed the severability of the export provision of the HMT and
affirmed the Court of International Trade’s decision not to grant
Amoco Oil’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
253
relief could be granted.
On appeal, Amoco Oil argued that
severability is a question of fact, not of law, such that it should have
been afforded the opportunity by the trial court to engage in
254
discovery and offer additional evidence.
Amoco Oil also argued
that Congress had not intended the export provision of the HMT to
be severable, as evidenced by its understanding that a tax solely on
255
imports would breach U.S. international obligations under GATT.
Relying on recent and controlling precedent in Princess Cruises, Inc. v.
256
257
United States and Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. United States, the
258
Federal Circuit quickly rejected both of Amoco Oil’s arguments.
The court also dismissed certain constitutional arguments made for
259
the first time in Amoco Oil’s reply brief as having been waived.
Further, because Amoco Oil’s counsel had failed to acknowledge in
their opening briefs the controlling precedent established in Princess
Cruises and Carnival Cruise Lines, the Federal Circuit admonished
Amoco Oil’s counsel for inappropriate conduct that plausibly
260
violated their duty of candor toward the tribunal.
261
In BMW Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the Court of International Trade’s holding that Customs was
authorized to assess the HMT on goods imported into a Foreign

250. Stone Container, 229 F.3d at 1354 (citing Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414
U.S. 538, 554 (1974)).
251. Id. at 1355 (citing Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1378
(11th Cir. 1998)).
252. 234 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
253. Id. at 1375.
254. Id. at 1376.
255. Id.
256. 201 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
257. 200 F.3d 1361, 1365-69 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
258. Amoco Oil, 234 F.3d at 1377.
259. Id. (stating the court would not address Amoco’s arguments regarding
HMT’s violation of the Uniformity and Port Preference Clauses because the
arguments were not introduced in Amoco’s opening brief).
260. Id. at 1377-78 (suggesting that in light of recent precedent, Amoco should
have dropped the appeal after the cases were decided).
261. 241 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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Trade Zone (“FTZ”). FTZs are defined as areas located at or near
ports of entry into the United States which, pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§§ 81a-81u, receive preferential treatment under the U.S. customs
263
laws.
BMW argued that the FTZ statute’s bar on the collection of
264
one aspect of FTZ preferential treatment,
customs duties,
265
Applying a de novo standard of
precluded HMT import payments.
266
review, the Federal Circuit rejected BMW’s arguments, holding first
that the HMT does indeed apply to imports into FTZs because, while
Congress had clearly provided certain exemptions from the HMT, it
267
did not provide an exemption for FTZs. The court also found that
HMT import charges were not custom duties exempted by the FTZ
268
statute, reasoning that, among other things, Congress had clearly
structured the HMT as a tax imposed for using ports and not for
269
entering the United States’ customs territory.
270
In Thomson Consumer Electronics, Inc. v. United States, the Federal
Circuit again addressed the appropriate jurisdictional basis for the
271
Court of International Trade’s review of HMT refund issues.
Thomson brought suit before the Court of International Trade
challenging the constitutionality of the HMT as applied to imports,
272
claiming residual jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). The Court
of International Trade, however, dismissed Thomson’s suit for lack of
jurisdiction, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), which governs appeals
273
of Customs protest decisions, provided the only jurisdictional
274
On appeal, resolution of the issue hinged on whether it
basis.
would have been futile for Thomson to invoke standard Customs
protest procedures to challenge the constitutionality of the HMT as
275
applied to imports. The Federal Circuit agreed with Thomson that
276
filing a Customs protest would have been futile, as Customs was
277
No
powerless to do anything other than passively levy the HMT.
administrative procedure existed for Thomson to exhaust before
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id. at 1359.
Foreign Trade Zones, 19 U.S.C. § 81b (2000).
19 U.S.C. § 81c(a).
BMW Mfg., 241 F.3d at 1360.
Id.
Id. at 1361.
19 U.S.C. § 81c(a).
BMW Mfg., 241 F.3d at 1362.
247 F.3d 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1212.
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (2000).
Thomson Consumer Elec., 247 F.3d at 1212.
Id. at 1213-14.
Id. at 1215.
Id.
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278

initiating judicial review.
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s
279
holding in United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., Thomson was authorized
to avail itself of § 1581(i) residual jurisdiction in challenging the
280
constitutionality of HMT import payments.
281
In U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit reversed the
lower court’s decision requiring Customs to pay interest on refunds
282
of impermissibly collected HMT payments.
Applying a de novo
283
the Federal Circuit emphasized the
standard of review,
longstanding rule that a party may only recover interest against the
government if the government has explicitly waived sovereign
immunity, either by contract or statute, or if the Constitution
284
requires.
Relying on its earlier decision in International Business
Machines (“IBM”), the court ruled that no statute permitted the award
285
of interest on refunded HMT payments.
The court also rejected
U.S. Shoe’s various arguments that failure of the government to pay
286
interest on HMT refunds amounted to an unconstitutional taking.
The court noted in conclusion that, given the clarity of Supreme
Court jurisprudence limiting the government’s payment of interest
absent express waivers of sovereign immunity or violation of
constitutional rights, it would be an abuse of discretion for a “judge287
fashioned” remedy to be applied here.
288
Finally, Hohenberg Bros. Co. v. United States involved a procedure
developed by the Court of International Trade for Customs to
289
Under the procedure, each claimant,
provide HMT refunds.
278. Id. The court explained that:
It is unsuitable to apply the exhaustion doctrine in the circumstances of the
present case. There are no facts that Customs could have developed
regarding whether or not the HMT was constitutional, nor did it have
discretion in applying the HMT to Thomson’s imports. Moreover, judicial
efficiency, administrative autonomy, and the weakening of Customs as an
agency are not implicated by this case. Thus, we are not faced here with a
premature resort to the courts.
Id.
279. 523 U.S. 360, 365 (1998) (holding that § 1581(i) was the proper
jurisdictional basis for HMT disputes).
280. Thomson Consumer Elec., 247 F.3d at 1215.
281. 296 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
282. Id. at 1380.
283. Id. at 1381.
284. Id. (citing Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 311 (1986)).
285. Id. at 1381-82 (citing Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 201 F.3d 1367,
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
286. Id. at 1383-85 (holding that no taking resulted in violation of the Fifth
Amendment because no private property right existed in any interest associated with
payment of the HMT).
287. Id. at 1386 (citing Int’l Bus. Machs., 201 F.3d at 1374).
288. 301 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
289. Id. at 1302.
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including Hohenberg, executed a consent judgment for the return of
HMT principal and interest, depending on the outcome of the IBM
290
The consent judgments identified that the Court of
test case.
International Trade had residual jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
291
§ 1581(i).
When the Federal Circuit in IBM determined that no
interest could be paid on HMT refunds arising out of judgments
292
under § 1581(i), Hohenberg and other exporters sought to amend
293
their consent judgments to invoke jurisdiction under § 1581(a).
294
The lower court denied those motions. Hohenberg challenged the
denial of the motion, arguing that the Federal Circuit’s decision in
295
Swisher International required the Court of International Trade to
296
The
amend the jurisdictional statement in the consent judgment.
Federal Circuit disagreed, and affirmed the lower court’s denial of
297
the motion to amend.
The Federal Circuit reasoned that
Hohenberg could have preserved jurisdiction under § 1581(a), but
that it chose not to because it desired to obtain an immediate refund
298
of its HMT payments.
As the court noted, Hohenberg elected an
immediate refund, gambling that the IBM case would not lead to
299
advantageous resolution of the interest issue.
The court also
summarily dismissed Hohenberg’s other arguments, citing its recent
300
decision in U.S. Shoe that neither the Constitution nor any statute
mandated the payment of interest, leaving Hohenberg unable to
301
demonstrate any entitlement to interest on HMT refunds.
D. Duty Drawback
Since 2000, the Federal Circuit has decided two cases involving
contracts for duty drawback under 19 U.S.C. § 1313, i.e., agreements

290. Id.
291. Id. (noting that the original complaints asserted Court of International Trade
jurisdiction pursuant to § 1581(a) and (i), but that the consent judgment was based
solely on § 1581(i) jurisdiction).
292. Int’l Bus. Machs., 201 F.3d at 1374.
293. Hohenberg Bros., 301 F.3d at 1303 (noting that Hohenberg sought an award of
post-summons interest under 28 U.S.C. § 2644, the section applicable to awards
under 1581(a) jurisdiction).
294. Id.
295. 205 F.3d at 1358.
296. Hohenberg Bros., 301 F.3d at 1303.
297. Id. The applicable standard of review was whether the lower court had
abused its discretion in denying the motion. Id. (citing Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v.
United States, 254 F.3d 1367, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
298. Id. at 1305 .
299. Id. (noting that IBM can be read to allow interest on HMT refunds to
claimants asserting jurisdiction under § 1581(a)).
300. 296 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
301. Hohenberg Bros., 301 F.3d at 1306.
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between importers and Customs providing for refunds of duties paid
on imported merchandise that is incorporated into articles for
302
export. The Federal Circuit affirmed in both instances.
303
In International Light Metals v. United States, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the Court of International Trade decision, on remand, to
direct Customs to repay certain duty drawback payments to
International Light Metals (“ILM”) that the company had previously
304
refunded.
The decision involved certain drawback claims filed by
305
Customs first
ILM with respect to imports of titanium sponge.
306
allowed the drawback claims, but later reversed in part. ILM repaid
as required by Customs, and subsequently filed suit in the Court of
International Trade challenging Customs’ recalculation of the
307
drawback amount.
The Court of International Trade affirmed
Customs’ drawback recalculation, but was subsequently reversed by
the Federal Circuit, which held that ILM was entitled to repayment of
308
a portion of the refunded drawback.
On remand, the Court of
International Trade ordered Customs to repay ILM a specified
309
The U.S.
amount of previously refunded drawback, with interest.
Government appealed this remand decision, contending that the
lower court should not have directed Customs to repay a specified
amount of drawback, but should instead have remanded the issue to
Customs for action consistent with the court’s interpretation of the
310
drawback statute.
According to the government, the trial court’s
order violated the settled principle of administrative law that a
reviewing court may not dictate to the agency how it is to apply the
311
law to the facts, where the agency has particular expertise.
The
Federal Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the only issue in
the prior appeal had been Customs’ interpretation of the drawback
302. 19 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (2000).
303. 279 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
304. Id. at 1000-01.
305. Id. at 1001.
306. Id. (Customs discovered ILM had been substituting titanium alloy scrap for
titanium sponge in its production process, which it found was improper under the
drawback contract).
307. Id. at 1002.
308. Id. The specific question before the Federal Circuit in the earlier
International Light Metals case was whether certain exported titanium products were
“of the same kind and quality” as certain imported titanium products for purposes of
19 U.S.C. § 1313(b). Int’l Light Metals v. United States, 194 F.3d 1355, 1357 (Fed.
Cir. 1999). Under this provision, drawback may be requested with respect to certain
merchandise substituted for the imported duty-paid merchandise, but only if the
substitute merchandise is “of the same kind and quality” as the imported duty-paid
merchandise. 19 U.S.C. § 1313(b) (2000).
309. Int’l Light Metals, 279 F.3d at 1002.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 1003.
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statute, which determined the specific amount of drawback to be
312
Accordingly, all that remained for Customs on
repaid to ILM.
remand was the ministerial act of repaying the amount of drawback
initially approved, with interest, an action not requiring agency
313
expertise.
314
In Hartog Foods International, Inc. v. United States, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s rejection of the exporter’s claim
that Customs should have paid interest on certain grants of duty
315
drawback.
The dispute arose when the exporter, Hartog Foods,
316
paid ad valorem duties on imported juice products and, upon export
317
Customs initially denied
of the merchandise, filed for drawback.
318
Hartog Foods then initiated protest actions and, five
the request.
319
years later, Customs paid the requested drawback without interest.
After unsuccessfully seeking payment of interest through another
protest action, Hartog Foods brought suit in the Court of
320
International Trade. The Court of International Trade granted the
U.S. Government’s request for summary judgment, finding that
321
sovereign immunity principles precluded an interest award. Hartog
Foods appealed.
The Federal Circuit’s decision turned on
application of 19 U.S.C. § 1505, which requires Customs, inter alia, to
“refund any excess moneys deposited, together with interest thereon,
322
as determined on a liquidation or reliquidation.”
Applying a de
323
novo standard of review and emphasizing its obligation to construe
324
waivers of sovereign immunity strictly in favor of the government,
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. 291 F.3d 789 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
315. Id. at 790.
316. The definition of ad valorem is “proportional to the value of the thing taxed.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 53 (7th ed. 1999).
317. Hartog Foods Int’l, 291 F.3d at 790.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 790-91.
320. Id. at 791.
321. Id. (reporting that the Court of International Trade affirmed Customs’ denial
of interest for two reasons: (1) drawback moneys do not qualify as “excess moneys
deposited” and (2) sovereign immunity for interest awards on drawback claims is not
specifically waived under the United States Code).
322. 19 U.S.C. § 1505(b) (2000). Section 1505(c) further specifies that any
qualifying interest accrues from the date estimated duties are deposited with
Customs. 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c).
323. Hartog Foods Int’l, 291 F.3d at 791 (citing Mead, 283 F.3d at 1346) (explaining
that while certain Customs rulings are entitled to deference proportional to their
persuasiveness, Customs had decided the protest without issuance of a ruling in this
case, such that no agency interpretation existed to which to defer).
324. Id. (citing Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 314 (1986)) (confirming
applicability of the “no interest rule,” i.e., that absent an express statutory waiver, the
United States is immune from any requirement to pay interest).
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the Federal Circuit held that “excess moneys deposited” for purposes
of § 1505 applied to the overpayment of estimated duties, but not to
325
standard drawback claims. The court reasoned that Hartog Food’s
interest claim was not a claim for “excess moneys deposited” because
the company had not paid to Customs an amount “beyond legal
326
requirements.” Additionally, Customs had not, as with all standard
327
drawback situations, held or profited from excessive collections.
The court also found it significant that, in the Customs
Modernization Act of 1993, Congress had declined to amend § 1505
328
to expressly authorize interest awards on duty drawbacks.
The
Federal Circuit distinguished its drawback decision in International
Light Metals, explaining that the grant of interest on the refund of the
drawback amount reclaimed by Customs was merely a way to put ILM
329
in its rightful position before Customs’ error. The court also stated
that International Light Metals did not involve standard drawback
claims or implicate the sovereign immunity principles governing
330
awards of interest by the government.
E. Other Customs Issues
Over the period 2000 through 2002, the Federal Circuit reviewed
several other Court of International Trade decisions involving aspects
of U.S. customs law outside of the general categories discussed above.
These decisions reflect the richness and complexity of the U.S.
customs laws, as well as the numerous exceptions to the free flow of
goods and services across the U.S. border. The Federal Circuit
reversed in two of the three cases discussed below, in each case
applying a different standard of review.
331
In Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
considered certain due process issues arising under 19 U.S.C. § 1466,
which authorizes Customs to impose duties on the value of certain
332
repairs to U.S. vessels undertaken in foreign ports.
In 1994, the
Federal Circuit construed that statute in its decision for Texaco Marine
333
Services, Inc. v. United States.
The Texaco court modified an earlier,
more restrictive interpretation of § 1466, holding that covered
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id. at 792-93.
Id. at 793.
Id.
Id. at 794.
Id.
Id. at 794-95.
239 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1367-68.
44 F.3d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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expenses were those repair expenses that would not have been
334
Following Texaco, Customs
incurred “but for” the repair work.
issued guidelines, published in the Customs Bulletin, announcing the
335
required change in practice and adoption of the “but for” test.
Customs applied the test to certain of Sea-Land Service’s vessel repair
336
Sea-Land Service filed protests before Customs,
expense entries.
and challenged the denial of its protests before the Court of
337
International Trade. Sea-Land Service’s challenge was based on the
theory that, in applying the “but for” test, Customs had violated the
notice and comment procedures applicable to “interpretative rulings
338
or decisions” as set forth at 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c).
The Court of
International Trade granted the U.S. Government’s request for
339
summary judgment, and Sea-Land Service appealed.
340
Applying a de novo standard of review, the Federal Circuit
rejected Sea-Land Service’s arguments and affirmed the lower court’s
341
decision. The court found that Customs was not required to apply
the notice and comment procedures of § 1625(c) because it was the
Federal Circuit, not Customs, that prompted the change in Customs’
342
pre-Texaco interpretation of the vessel repair statute.
As the court
stated, “Texaco wiped the slate of decisions under § 1466(a) clean,
requiring the dutiability of all vessel repair expenses to be
343
determined by the ‘but for’ test.”
Accordingly, in the wake of
Texaco, Customs was applying a new interpretation of § 1466(a)
rather than modifying a “prior interpretative ruling or decision” for
344
purposes of § 1625(c).
Finally, the court noted that the policy
reasons underlying § 1625(c) did not apply because the interested
public was informed through publication of the Texaco decision that
Customs would be required to administer § 1466(a) applying the “but
345
for” test.

334. Id. at 1544-45.
335. Sea-Land Serv., 239 F.3d at 1369 (citing Customs Headquarters Memorandum
113308 from the Assistant Commissioner for Customs Office of Regulations and
Rulings, to Customs’ New Orleans Regional Director (Jan. 18, 1995)).
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 1370.
339. Id. at 1371.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 1372.
344. Id. at 1373.
345. Id. at 1373-74 (holding that although Customs’ individual evaluations of
vessel repair expenses was the first time Customs used the new test, the new
approach was first directed by the court’s decision in Texaco).
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346

In Bestfoods v. United States, involving the application of federal
marking rules to peanut slurry imported from Canada and used in
the production of Skippy peanut butter, the Federal Circuit reversed
347
the lower court’s invalidation of an implementing regulation. The
federal marking statute provides that imported articles must be
marked “in a conspicuous manner . . . to indicate to an ultimate
348
purchaser the English name of the country of origin of the article.”
However, under 19 C.F.R. § 102.11, promulgated pursuant to the
NAFTA, an imported article is deemed to be of U.S. origin if postimportation manufacturing in the United States is sufficient to
349
change the article’s tariff classification, i.e., to “shift” the tariff.
Applying § 102.11, Customs determined that Bestfood’s postimportation processing did not change the tariff classification of the
imported peanut slurry and, accordingly, that Bestfoods was required
350
to mark the Canadian origin of the final product.
Following an
351
initial challenge to Customs’ application of § 102.11, Bestfoods
raised a new argument that the imported peanut slurry should have
qualified for a de minimis exception to the marking provisions, 19
352
C.F.R. § 102.13(b). The Court of International Trade agreed with
Bestfoods, and effectively extended § 102.13 to certain agricultural
353
The U.S.
products, including Bestfoods’ peanut butter.
354
Government appealed from this decision.
Noting that the federal marking statute expressly delegates to
Customs the authority to promulgate implementing regulations, the
Federal Circuit reviewed the lower court’s decision under the
Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA’s”) arbitrary and capricious
355
The court reasoned that, in light of the
standard, and reversed.
broad statutory language of the marking statute, which requires
marking of all articles with certain enumerated exceptions, it could
not conclude that Customs was required to provide additional
356
exceptions.
The court also found that, by withholding the seven
346. 260 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
347. Id. at 1322.
348. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (2000).
349. See Bestfoods, 260 F.3d at 1322-23.
350. See id. (stating that since peanut slurry and peanut butter have the same tariff
classification the tariff shift method does not apply).
351. See id.
352. Id. at 1323. This provision applies to non-agricultural products and excepts
from the marking requirements imported material constituting less than seven
percent of the overall value of the good into which it is incorporated. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 1322.
355. Id. at 1323-24 (citing, inter alia, 5 U.S.C. § 706).
356. Id. at 1324.
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percent exception from agricultural products, the regulation tended
to harmonize country-of-origin rules for marking purposes with
357
Finally, the court
country-of-origin rules under the NAFTA.
rejected Bestfoods’ arguments that the regulation had been
motivated by a misplaced concern for consumer safety and that it led
358
to absurd results. Finally, citing pertinent provisions of the NAFTA,
the court stated that it was not arbitrary or capricious for Customs to
“consider substantially transformed ingredients to be products of the
country of manufacture” even if the raw materials come from another
359
country.
360
In Ford Motor Co. v. United States, the Federal Circuit reversed a
factual determination of the Court of International Trade arising
from a complex and longstanding dispute between Ford and
Customs—including a fraud investigation—concerning the treatment
of certain car and truck components imported by Ford into its
361
Foreign Trade Subzone (“FTSZ”) in Louisville, Kentucky.
Under
19 U.S.C. § 1504(a), an entry not liquidated within one year of the
date of entry is deemed liquidated at the rate of entry asserted by the
362
importer at the time of entry.
However, § 1504(b) authorizes
363
On the basis of the
Customs to extend the one-year deadline.
ongoing fraud investigation, Customs issued three one-year
extensions, ultimately liquidating the entries at issue at rates higher
than originally asserted by Ford and claiming additional duties of
364
over $5 million.
Ford protested Customs’ liquidation and,
following denial of the protest, filed suit with the Court of
365
International Trade.
That court granted summary judgment for
the United States, holding that the ongoing fraud investigation
366
justified Customs’ three extensions of liquidation.
Ford appealed
to the Federal Circuit, which remanded to the lower court for
consideration of the reasonableness of Customs’ delays in
367
liquidation.
Thereupon the Court of International Trade

357. Id. at 1325.
358. Id. at 1325-26 (noting that under the regulation, consumers would not be
informed of any quantity of foreign material in a product where such foreign
material had undergone substantial transformation and, therewith, a “tariff shift”).
359. Id. at 1326 (citing NAFTA Annex 311).
360. 286 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
361. Id. at 1337-40.
362. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a) (2000).
363. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(b) (2000)
364. Ford, 286 F.3d at 1338.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 1338-39.
367. Id. at 1339.
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conducted a three-day trial, and found the delay to constitute a
368
reasonable exercise of Customs’ authority under 19 U.S.C. § 1504.
369
Recognizing at the
The Federal Circuit subsequently reversed.
outset Customs’ broad discretion to extend liquidation of entries
under § 1504, and explaining that its review of lower court factual
determinations are under a “clear error standard,” the Federal
Circuit affirmed the Court of International Trade’s individual
370
findings of fact, but disagreed with its ultimate factual conclusion.
Reviewing in detail the record of the Customs investigation, the
Federal Circuit stressed that Customs had pointed not to
extraordinary circumstances to explain the delay of the fraud
investigation, but only to typical workplace exigencies such as
“competing responsibilities, an agent taking sick leave, and the
371
various tasks associated with starting a new office.”
The Federal
Circuit concluded that affirmance under the circumstances “would
372
be setting an unacceptably low bar for reasonableness.”
Judge Bryson dissented, noting that the Federal Circuit had
previously held that Customs enjoys “very broad” discretion in
extending liquidation so long as the total pre-liquidation period does
373
not exceed four years. Judge Bryson reasoned that, given this high
degree of discretion, combined with the “intensely factual” nature of
the lower court’s inquiry, he would have affirmed the lower court’s
374
decision.
He also pointed out that a long period of inactivity in a
particular investigation does not automatically render the delay
unreasonable where, for example, busy agents are conducting
multiple investigations simultaneously and are forced by heavy case375
loads to prioritize.

368. Id.
369. Id. at 1335.
370. Id. at 1340-41.
371. Id. at 1343 (contrasting the delays caused by typical workplace occurrences
with delays caused by outside events such as national catastrophes).
372. Id.
373. See id. at 1343-44 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. v. United States, 6 F.3d 763, 767-68 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
374. Id. at 1345-46.
375. Id. (arguing that prioritization dictates putting less pressing matters off for
more immediate deadlines throughout many professions).
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II. TRADE REMEDY LAWS
A. U.S. Department of Commerce
376

U.S. industries are heavy users of the trade remedy laws, which
authorize, among other things, the imposition of duties to offset
certain foreign trading practices deemed unfair, such as dumping,
i.e., sales in the U.S. market at unfairly low prices, and subsidization
by foreign governments. U.S. law provides for antidumping duties in
377
the case of the former, and countervailing duties in the case of the
378
latter. The vast majority of trade remedy cases before the Federal
Circuit involve methodological decisions of the U.S. Commerce
Department, and of these decisions, the majority concern the
measurement of antidumping “margins,” or the extent to which the
value of the imported product is below its fair value as defined under
law. The margin, in turn, determines the duty liability of the
importer, who is responsible for the payment of any antidumping or
379
countervailing duties ultimately assessed on the imported products.
The considerable commercial implications of these methodologies
380
ensure a constant stream of intensely litigated cases. Moreover, the
overhaul of the U.S. trade remedy laws by the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act of 1994 (“URAA”) generated scores of new issues of
statutory construction that have continued to occupy the Federal
381
Circuit in recent years.
The standard of review applicable to most antidumping and
countervailing duty determinations is dictated by statute, requiring
the court to overturn any determination which it finds “to be
376. See IMPORT ADMINISTRATION, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY
STATISTICS, at www.ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/iastats1.html (last modified Jan. 17, 2003).
377. 19 U.S.C. § 1673.
378. 19 U.S.C. § 1671.
379. See 19 U.S.C. § 1505 (Supp. 2002) (providing for payment of duties and fees
by importer of record).
380. See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. United States, 289 F.3d 792 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding
that where the scope of antidumping duty order was unambiguous and undisputed,
the goods at issue clearly did not fall within the scope of the order); Novosteel SA v.
United States, 284 F.3d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that petitions for
investigation and antidumping and countervailing duty orders did not
unambiguously exclude profile slabs from scope of orders issued); Wheatland Tube
Co. v. United States, 161 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (arising out of claims dealing
with the scope of merchandise subject to antidumping and countervailing duty
investigations).
381. See, e.g., Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United States, 298 F.3d 1330
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that Commerce found, based on the expanded affiliation
provisions of the URAA, that Ta Chen and Sun were affiliated for a portion of the
period covered by the third review); Micron Tech., Inc. v. United States, 243 F.3d
1301, 1303-05 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (discussing antidumping statute as it was amended by
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act).
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unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not
382
As discussed below, application of this
in accordance with law.”
standard during the last three years yielded frequent reversal of the
Court of International Trade.
1.

Scope of merchandise covered by antidumping or countervailing duty
proceedings
During the last three years, the Federal Circuit examined five
decisions of the Court of International Trade involving the “scope” of
the merchandise subject to an antidumping or countervailing duty
investigation, that is, the specific products covered by the proceeding
383
The Federal Circuit allowed the lower court decision to
at issue.
384
stand in only one of these five cases.
385
Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States involved the so-called “anticircumvention” provision of the trade remedy laws, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677j(c), which allows the Department of Commerce to include in
the scope of a proceeding merchandise that is technically outside the
scope of the proceeding, but has been “altered in form in minor
386
respects.” In this case, the Commerce Department had imposed an
antidumping duty order on corrosion-resistant steel from Japan, the
scope of which described various technical aspects of the covered
steel products, including a list of specified percentages by weight of
387
fifteen listed elements.
One of these elements was boron and,
according to the scope, steel containing 0.0008% or more of boron
388
was not covered by the investigation. Subsequently, a domestic steel
producer alleged that Japanese exporters were circumventing the
order by adding small amounts of boron to their product—an
alteration apparently irrelevant to consumers of the steel, but which

382. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (1994).
383. The trade remedy laws authorize the imposition of antidumping and
countervailing duties with respect to “a class or kind of merchandise.” 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673 (2000).
384. See Novosteel, 284 F.3d at 1261 (affirming the Court of International Trade’s
decision holding that substantial evidence supported the scope determination by the
Commerce Department).
385. 219 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
386. Id. at 1349. Subsequent Commerce Department regulations provide that the
Department “may include within the scope . . . articles altered in form or appearance
in minor respects,” 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(i), and specify procedures for determining
whether a particular product is included in the scope. 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(a)-(c)
(2000).
387. Id. at 1350-51; see also Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products
from Japan, 58 Fed. Reg. 44,163 (Dep’t Commerce Aug. 19, 1993) (antidumping
duty order).
388. Nippon, 219 F.3d at 1350.
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389

rendered it outside the literal scope of the order. The Commerce
Department initiated an anti-circumvention inquiry based on the
allegations, and Nippon shortly thereafter filed suit with the Court of
International Trade, pursuant to the residual jurisdiction provision,
28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), seeking a temporary restraining order (“TRO”)
against the Department, as well as preliminary and permanent
390
injunctions.
The court granted the TRO and preliminary
391
The U.S. Government appealed, arguing that
injunction.
jurisdiction pursuant to § 1581(i) was not available to Nippon, as it
could have awaited the Department’s final determination and, at that
392
time, availed itself of jurisdiction pursuant to § 1581(c).
The Federal Circuit explained that the availability of jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) turned on whether Commerce’s initiation
393
of the minor alterations inquiry was beyond its authority.
If the
court decided Commerce’s initiation was proper, then the Court of
394
International Trade had no basis for its preliminary injunction.
Therefore, both the merits of the case and the jurisdictional question
hinged on whether Commerce acted within its authority in initiating
395
its inquiry.
Noting, first, that courts ordinarily should decline to
interfere with an agency until it has completed the action at issue, the
Federal Circuit reasoned that the Commerce Department had
responded to the anti-circumvention petition precisely as authorized
396
by the statute and regulations.
The Federal Circuit also rejected
the lower court’s reasoning that its hands were bound by the Federal
397
Circuit’s decision in Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States. As the court
explained, the major distinguishing factor between Wheatland Tube
and this case was that, in Wheatland Tube, the very product for which
domestic producers sought an anti-circumvention inquiry had been
398
expressly excluded from the scope.
Moreover, in Wheatland Tube,
the issue was the propriety of the Department’s decision to conduct a

389. Id.
390. Id. at 1351.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 1349.
393. Id. at 1353.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 1353-54. The court further stated that Commerce was carrying out a
function given to it by Congress when it initiated the inquiry to determine “if an
antidumping duty order has been circumvented by making minor alterations in the
form of the product otherwise subject to that order.” Id. at 1354.
397. Id. at 1355-56 (citing Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 161 F.3d 1365
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
398. Id. at 1355.
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scope inquiry rather than an anti-circumvention inquiry. For these
reasons, the Federal Circuit held that the Court of International
Trade had improperly enjoined the Commerce Department from
conducting the anti-circumvention inquiry, and ordered that court to
400
dissolve the injunction and dismiss Nippon’s complaint.
401
In Eckstrom Industries, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
again reversed the Court of International Trade, this time in a
dispute arising out of an administrative scope ruling purporting to
clarify the scope of the antidumping duty order covering certain
402
stainless steel, butt-welded pipe fittings imported from Taiwan. The
Court of International Trade decision at issue affirmed the
Commerce Department’s scope ruling that Eckstrom’s cast pipe
403
fittings were covered by the order. According to Eckstrom, its cast
pipe fittings, produced by molding molten steel into the desired
shape, were entirely different from the fittings covered by the order,
404
produced by shaping and welding sheets of steel.
Applying the
substantial evidence standard, the Federal Circuit agreed with
Eckstrom’s arguments that the Commerce Department had, in its
scope ruling, impermissibly expanded the scope of the antidumping
405
duty order to include Eckstrom’s cast fittings.
The court followed
the analytic framework set forth in the Commerce Department’s
scope regulation—19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1)—and examined “the
descriptions of the merchandise contained in the petition, the initial
investigation, and the determinations of the Secretary (including
406
prior scope determinations) and the Commission.”
The Federal
Circuit found that each factor confirmed that the scope did not
407
In reviewing these factors, the
include Eckstrom’s cast fittings.
court was critical of the Department’s reliance on the fact that
Eckstrom’s pipe fittings happened to meet one of the conditions of
408
use specified in the order, and found that petitioners had described
409
a process “never used to manufacture cast fittings.”
The Federal
Circuit also rejected the Department’s remand scope determination
based on the so-called Diversified Products factors enumerated at 19
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.

Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1357.
254 F.3d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1069.
Id. at 1071.
Id. at 1072.
Id. at 1072-1073.
19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1) (2000). See Eckstrom, 254 F.3d at 1072.
Eckstrom, 254 F.3d at 1072-76.
Id. at 1073.
Id. at 1074.
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C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2), reasoning that the Department should not
have reached these factors because the (k)(1) factors were dispositive
410
The court concluded, “the overwhelming
in clarifying the scope.
evidence indicates that the Order does not cover cast pipe fittings,”
411
and reversed the scope determination.
412
In Novosteel SA v. United States, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
Court of International Trade’s decision upholding the Commerce
Department’s ruling that certain carbon steel profile slabs were
covered by the antidumping and countervailing duty orders on cut-to413
length carbon steel plates from Germany.
In the scope
determination at issue, the Commerce Department found the
existing scope record to be ambiguous with respect to whether the
profile slabs, imported by Novosteel, were “flat-rolled” or “further
414
worked,” and therefore within the scope.
Commerce then
conducted a Diversified Products analysis pursuant to 19 C.F.R.
415
§ 351.225(k)(2).
Emphasizing the Commerce Department’s
substantial discretion in interpreting and clarifying the scope of
416
antidumping and countervailing duty orders, the Federal Circuit
first concluded that the orders did not, as contended by Novosteel,
417
unambiguously exclude the profile slabs.
The court also rejected
Novosteel’s contention that the petitions’ and orders’ omission of the
HTSUS subheading covering the profile slabs was dispositive because
“the petitions hardly defined the scope of the products in terms of
the HTSUS; rather, they described the products covered by the
Orders using ‘dimensional’ criteria and references to non-HTSUS
418
sources . . . .” The Federal Circuit then considered two evidentiary
issues central to the Commerce Department’s scope ruling: first,
whether the profile slabs were “flat-rolled,” a characteristic of
410. Id. at 1075-76.
411. Id. at 1076.
412. 284 F.3d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The underlying antidumping and
countervailing duty orders were published, respectively, in 58 Fed. Reg. 43,756
(Dep’t Commerce Aug. 17, 1993) (antidumping duty order) and 58 Fed. Reg. 44,170
(Dep’t Commerce Aug. 19, 1993) (countervailing duty order).
413. Id. at 1265.
414. As explained in the Federal Circuit’s opinion, the Commerce Department
applied a definition of “flat-rolled” based on the HTSUS, which defines flat-rolled
steel products as products that have been “further worked [beyond] . . . primary hotrolling.” Id. at 1267 (citing HTSUS, Notes 1(k) and 1(j)).
415. Id. at 1266.
416. Id. at 1269 (citing, inter alia, Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v.
United States, 60 F.3d 778, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (pointing out that while the
Commerce Department may not change the scope of its antidumping orders, it has
substantial freedom to interpret and clarify the coverage of those orders).
417. Id. at 1269-70.
418. Id. at 1270.
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merchandise covered by the orders, and second, what weight to
accord to the German producer’s sales brochure describing the
419
profile slabs. On the first issue, the court found that Novosteel had
failed to establish error in the Commerce Department’s or lower
420
court’s definition of that term; on the second, it found that
descriptions of the product and production process set forth in the
producer’s sales brochure “provide the requisite substantial evidence”
421
in support of the scope ruling.
Judge Dyk dissented from the majority opinion, explaining that
while appellant’s briefs were “awash” in frivolous arguments, the
422
“single meritorious argument” has been lost.
This single
meritorious argument, he further explained, was Novosteel’s
423
argument with respect to “further working” of the profile slabs.
According to Judge Dyk, the Commerce Department’s analysis on
424
this point was speculative and “necessarily fails.” Judge Dyk further
expressed his view that the record was undeveloped with respect to
any “further working” that the profile slabs might have undergone,
and that this gap in the record should not be seen as proof of
ambiguity in the coverage of the scope, but as warranting a remand
425
for further investigation of this point.
The dispute before the Federal Circuit in Xerox Corp. v. United
426
States involved a ministerial error by Customs in administering the
scope of the antidumping duty order on certain photocopier belts
427
from Japan. Xerox filed a protest with Customs following Customs’
levy of a 93.16 percent antidumping duty on certain belts imported
by Xerox, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(2), contending that its
merchandise was clearly outside the scope of the antidumping duty
428
order.
Customs denied the protest, and Xerox appealed to the
419. Id. at 1270-72.
420. Id. at 1271-72.
421. See id. at 1272-73 (noting that the scope ruling did not turn on the sales
brochure, but that the brochure provided the Commerce Department with a basis
for deciding to conduct a Diversified Products analysis pursuant to 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.225(k)(2)).
422. Id. at 1274 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
423. Id.
424. Id. at 1276.
425. Id. at 1276-77 (admonishing the majority not to uphold a situation where the
Commerce Department failed to perform the required factual investigation and
subsequently declared the scope to be ambiguous).
426. 289 F.3d 792 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
427. See Industrial Belts and Components and Parts Thereof, whether Cured or
Uncured, from Japan, 54 Fed. Reg. 25,314 (Dep’t Commerce June 14, 1989)
(antidumping duty order) (describing the scope as covering “industrial belts used for
power transmission . . . and containing textile fiber (including glass fiber) or steel
wire, cord or strand”).
428. Xerox, 289 F.3d at 793.
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Court of International Trade pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). The
court dismissed Xerox’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
holding that Xerox should have sought a scope determination from
the Commerce Department, and then it could have appealed
430
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c).
Reviewing the lower court’s
431
432
The court first
decision de novo, the Federal Circuit reversed.
explained that, under well-settled law, the appropriate remedy where
the scope is unclear is to seek a scope ruling from the Commerce
433
Department.
However, where, as in this case, the merchandise at
issue is “facially outside” of the pertinent scope, a scope ruling is
unnecessary, and the power to correct the error lies within Customs’
434
ministerial authority.
The court also clarified that “misapplication
of the order by Customs is properly the subject of a protest under 19
435
U.S.C. § 1514(a)(2).”
The Federal Circuit again reversed the Court of International
436
Trade in Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States, a case arising out of a
Commerce Department scope ruling that certain steel floor plate
with “patterns in relief” imported by Duferco was covered by the
antidumping and countervailing duty orders on cut-to-length carbon
437
steel plate from Belgium.
The relevant scope language included
“flat-rolled products of nonrectangular cross-section where such
cross-section is achieved subsequent to the rolling process,” and
clarified that “[o]nly those products whose nonrectangular crosssections are achieved subsequent to the rolling process are included
438
within the scope of the investigations.”
In its scope ruling, the
Commerce Department stated that the existence of patterns in relief
did not alter the rectangularity of the product, and further supported
its conclusion based on evidence of petitioner’s intent from the early
439
stages of the investigations.
The Court of International Trade

429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 795 (citing Sandvik Steel Co. v. United States, 164 F.3d 596 (Fed. Cir.
1998) and Fujitsu Steel Co. v. United States, 957 F. Supp. 245 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1997)).
434. Id. at 792.
435. Id.
436. 296 F.3d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
437. See Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Belgium, 58 Fed. Reg.
37,083 (Dep’t Commerce July 9, 1993) (final antidumping determination) and
Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,273 (Dep’t Commerce July 9,
1993) (final countervailing duty determination).
438. Duferco, 296 F.3d at 1095 (quoting Appendix I to final antidumping and
countervailing determinations, setting forth scope descriptions).
439. Id. at 1094.
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affirmed the scope ruling, and Duferco appealed.
Beginning by
confirming the considerable deference owed the Commerce
Department in ascertaining the scope of antidumping and
441
countervailing duty orders, the Federal Circuit defined the issue as
“an issue of first impression—whether the scope orders can be
interpreted to cover subject merchandise even if there is no language
in the orders that includes or can be reasonably interpreted to
442
include the merchandise.”
The answer, implied in the court’s
443
In reaching this answer, the
construction of the issue, was no.
Federal Circuit first examined the Court of International Trade’s
characterization of the § 351.225(k)(1) scope analysis framework,
444
finding it to be “exactly backwards.”
Rather than begin with an
evaluation of petitioner’s intent, any scope analysis should look
primarily to the Commerce Department’s final determination, which
“reflects the decision that has been made as to which merchandise is
within the final scope of the investigation and is subject to the
445
order.”
While citing its earlier guidance in Novosteel that scope
446
language must necessarily be in general terms, the court explained
that review of the petition and agency pronouncements during the
447
investigations “cannot substitute for language in the order itself.”
Therefore, because the scope ruling at issue did not explain how the
antidumping and countervailing duty orders themselves could be
read to include the patterned floor plate at issue, the scope ruling
constituted an invalid expansion of the scope as provided in the
448
orders.
2.

The right to sue
The jurisdictional scheme defining judicial review of final agency
determinations under the trade remedy laws is broad, providing in 19
U.S.C. § 1516a, that any “interested party who is a party to the
proceeding in connection with which the matter arises may
commence an action in the United States Court of International

440. Id.
441. Id. at 1094-95 (citing Ericsson, 60 F.3d at 782 and Eckstrom, 254 F.3d at 1072)
(noting that Commerce may not interpret an order so as to modify its scope or in any
other manner contrary to its terms).
442. Id. at 1095.
443. Id. at 1096.
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 1096-1097 (citing Novosteel, 284 F.3d at 1271).
447. Id. at 1097.
448. See id. at 1097-98 (emphasizing the importance of the language in the order
in construing its scope).
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449

Trade.” This provision was the subject of one dispute that reached
the Federal Circuit during the last three years.
450
In JCM, Ltd. v. United States, the Federal Circuit held that § 1516a
could not be circumvented by an interested party—JCM—that had
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before the Commerce
451
Department.
During the antidumping investigation of pasta from
Italy, certain Italian producers and exporters and certain U.S.
importers challenged the Department’s extension of provisional
452
measures following the preliminary antidumping determination. In
one of these challenges, the Court of International Trade held that
the extension was unlawful and ordered a refund of cash deposits,
453
with interest, of applicable entries.
Following that decision, JCM,
which had not participated in the previous challenges to the
extension of provisional measures, filed suit also seeking a refund,
asserting jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the residual
454
jurisdiction provision.
Agreeing with the Government that JCM
could have, but did not, participate in the administrative proceeding
and the challenge under § 1581(c), the Court of International Trade
455
dismissed JCM’s suit for lack of jurisdiction.
JCM subsequently
456
457
appealed. Reviewing the lower court’s analysis on a de novo basis,
the Federal Circuit explained that, because Congress has set out an
administrative process for the resolution of antidumping disputes,
failure of a claimant to follow this process precludes it from obtaining
review of the resulting antidumping determination in the Court of
458
International Trade.
The court further explained that 1581(i)
449. This provision is cross-referenced in the Court of International Trade’s
jurisdictional provisions, with 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) providing that the Court of
International Trade “shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced
under § 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930,” and § 1581(i) providing that that subsection
“shall not confer jurisdiction over an antidumping or countervailing duty
determination which is reviewable . . . by the Court of International Trade under
§ 516A(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930.”
450. JCM, Ltd. v. United States, 210 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
451. Id. at 1360.
452. See id. at 1358 (challenging Commerce’s authority to impose such an
extension). Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d), provisional measures, i.e., security
required on subject imports following a preliminary determination of dumping, may
only remain in effect for four months—unless exporters representing a significant
portion of exports of the subject merchandise request an extension. Id. The
determination at issue here is Certain Pasta from Italy, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,326 (Dep’t
Commerce June 3, 1996) (final antidumping determination).
453. See F.lli De Cecco Di Filippo Fara San Martino S.p.A. v. United States, 21
C.I.T. 1130 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1997).
454. JCM, 210 F.3d at 1358.
455. Id. at 1359.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id.
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jurisdiction is not available if the plaintiff could use other subsections
under 1581, unless the remedy under those subsections would be
459
JMC failed to make such a showing and,
“manifestly inadequate.”
additionally, the court rejected JCM’s contention that the Commerce
Department denied it “party to the proceeding” status when it did not
460
select JCM as a respondent in the antidumping investigation.
As
the court explained, by limiting the number of respondents, the
Commerce Department did not preclude any interested parties from
participation through written submissions, and in fact had obtained
written submissions from other interested parties that, like JCM, had
461
not been chosen to participate as respondents.
The court ruled
against JCM’s argument that it should be allowed to share in the
relief given to those who did participate in the proceeding before the
agency and, additionally, JCM’s failure to do so denied subject matter
462
jurisdiction to the Court of International Trade.
3.

Interaction of trade remedy and customs laws
During the last three years, the Federal Circuit twice considered
cases presenting conflicts arising from the interaction of the trade
remedy laws with Customs’ procedures for liquidating entries of
imported merchandise, and in both instances affirmed the
disposition of the Court of International Trade.
463
International Trading Co. v. United States involved the interaction of
the antidumping law with the “deemed liquidation” statute, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1504(d), which requires Customs to liquidate entries suspended
due to antidumping measures “within 6 months after receiving notice
of the removal [of suspension] from the Department of
464
Section 1504(d) also provides that any entry not
Commerce.”
liquidated within this timeframe “shall be treated as having been
liquidated at the rate of duty, value, quantity, and amount of duty
465
asserted at the time of entry by the importer of record.”
In this
case, Customs did not liquidate the entries at issue (entered at an
antidumping duty deposit rate of less than three percent but assessed
with antidumping duties of over forty-two percent) within the six459. Id. (quoting Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United States, 963 F.2d 356, 359
(Fed. Cir. 1992)).
460. See id. at 1360 (holding that JCM failed to pursue its claim via the
congressionally established path).
461. See id. (noting that had JCM participated in the administrative proceeding, it
would have been entitled to judicial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c)).
462. Id.
463. 281 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
464. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000). See Int’l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1270-71.
465. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d).
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month period because it did not receive timely, definitive liquidation
466
International
instructions from the Commerce Department.
Trading Company (“ITC”), the importer of the merchandise at
issue—shop towels from Bangladesh—challenged Customs’
liquidation at the higher antidumping assessment rate as a violation
467
of § 1504(d). The Court of International Trade agreed with ITC’s
contention that Customs should have liquidated the entries at the
468
deposit rate. The U.S. Government appealed this decision, arguing
that removal of suspension of liquidation, for purposes of § 1504(d),
occurs only when the Commerce Department instructs Customs to
liquidate—however long after completion of an administrative review
469
that may be.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s
decision, rejecting the government’s arguments and holding that
publication of the final results of administrative review in the Federal
470
Register triggers the six-month period.
Notably, in reaching its
decision, the Federal Circuit declined to defer to a series of Customs
rulings setting forth Customs’ view that the six-month liquidation
period commences upon receipt of liquidation instructions from the
471
Commerce Department.
472
Fujitsu General America, Inc. v. United States also involved the
liquidation of entries subject to antidumping duties—in this case,
color televisions from Japan—and in particular three protests by
Fujitsu challenging Customs’ assessment of interest on antidumping
473
duty liability.
At issue were entries that Fujitsu made between
466. Id. at 1270 (noting that Commerce explicitly instructed Customs not to
liquidate any entries until it received liquidation instructions). Pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§ 1675(a)(1), the Commerce Department establishes definitive antidumping and
countervailing duties on a retrospective basis in so-called administrative reviews, and
publishes the final results of review in the Federal Register.
467. Int’l Trading Co., 281 F.3d at 1271 (asserting that the appropriate deposit rate
was 2.72%).
468. Id. at 1277.
469. Id. at 1273 (basing its assertion on the ministerial nature of Customs’
liquidation of antidumping duties).
470. Id. at 1275 (reasoning that “the date of publication provides an unambiguous
and public starting point for the six-month liquidation period”). The court further
noted that keying the liquidation requirement off of publication in the Federal Register
“does not give the government the ability to postpone indefinitely the removal of
suspension of liquidation (and thus the date by which liquidation must be
completed) as would be the case if the six-month liquidation period did not begin to
run until Commerce sent a message to Customs advising of the removal of
suspension of liquidation.” Id.
471. Id. at 1274 n.2 (citing Mead Corp. v. United States, 533 U.S. 218 (2001))
(explaining that the Supreme Court has established that such rulings are not entitled
to deference but rather are entitled to weight “to the extent that they are carefully
considered, consistent, and persuasive”).
472. 283 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
473. Id. at 1367.
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March 20, 1986 and March 11, 1988, with respect to which the
Commerce Department, at the conclusion of extensive litigation, on
September 16, 1997, published a final antidumping duty rate of
474
26.17% ad valorem.
Customs liquidated the entries in installments
475
Fujitsu subsequently filed three
over the next six months.
476
The first two protests, filed on the same day, challenged
protests.
Customs’ assessment of interest in connection with the liquidation of
477
entries in late 1997.
Fujitsu also argued, in supplemental
submissions, that the entries should be deemed liquidated at the
much lower rates asserted at the time of entry, over a decade
478
earlier.
Fujitsu’s third protest advanced similar assertions with
respect to liquidation of entries in February 1998, but unlike the first
two protests, the supplemental deemed liquidation claim was filed
479
within ninety days of the protested liquidation. Customs denied all
three protests, and Fujitsu appealed the denials to the Court of
480
International Trade.
That court upheld Customs’ denial of the
protests, and held, with respect to the first two protests, that it lacked
jurisdiction to entertain the deemed liquidation claims because they
481
had not been timely raised.
With respect to the third protest, the
court held that, while the deemed liquidation claim had been timely
raised, Customs had properly liquidated the entries within six months
of the Commerce Department’s notice of removal of suspension of
482
liquidation, as required by § 1504(d).
483
The first issue it
Fujitsu appealed to the Federal Circuit.
considered, with respect to the second protest, was whether the lower
court had jurisdiction over the deemed liquidation claim pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), on the theory that Fujitsu had presented a “new
ground” in support of the original protest that triggered one of the
exceptions to the ninety-day filing requirement of 19 U.S.C.
484
§ 1514(c)(3). The Federal Circuit rejected Fujitsu’s “new ground”
474. Id. at 1368-69. See 62 Fed. Reg. 48,592 (Dep’t Commerce Sept. 16, 1997)
(publishing notice of the Fujitsu decision).
475. Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1368-69.
476. Id. at 1369.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id. at 1369-70.
480. Id. at 1369-70.
481. Id. at 1370.
482. Id. at 1370. See Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1061
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2000) (rejecting Fujitsu’s claim on the merits).
483. Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1370.
484. Id. at 1372 (noting that a party may assert “new grounds” in support of an
objection at any time prior to the disposition of the protest in accordance with
§ 1515).
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argument, holding that the underlying supplemental Customs filing
setting forth the deemed liquidation claim did not qualify as a “new
ground” in support of Fujitsu’s interest claim because it involved
485
“different Customs decisions for purposes of § 1514.”
The court
explained that the statute differentiates between charge or exaction
decisions, such as the interest assessments in this case, and
486
liquidation decisions. Accordingly, the lower court correctly found
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Fujitsu’s claim based on the second
487
The Federal Circuit next turned to Fujitsu’s alternative
protest.
argument that the Court of International Trade had jurisdiction over
the deemed liquidation claims relating to the first and second
protests pursuant to the residual jurisdiction provision, 28 U.S.C.
488
§ 1581(i).
The court rejected this argument as well, noting that
Fujitsu could have invoked jurisdiction pursuant to subsection
1581(a) if it had timely filed its protests, as demonstrated by the fact
489
that it had successfully done so in its third protest.
Finally, the
Federal Circuit considered Fujitsu’s deemed liquidation claims
490
As framed by
relating to the entries covered by the third protest.
the court, the issue before it was “[w]hen, as a matter of law, did
Customs receive notice of the removal of the suspension of
491
liquidation?” According to Fujitsu, Customs received this notice on
July 3, 1996, the date of issuance of the final judicial decision in the
litigation concerning the amount of antidumping duties owed on the
492
1986-88 entries.
Citing its decision in International Trading Co.
discussed above, the Federal Circuit held that the rationale applied
493
equally here.
Accordingly, it concluded that Customs received
notice of the removal of suspension of liquidation on September 16,
485. Id. at 1372-73 (citing New Zealand Lamb Co. v. United States, 40 F.3d 377
(Fed. Cir. 1994)).
486. Id. at 1372.
487. Id. at 1373 (holding that Fujitsu failed to file its deemed liquidation claim in
a timely manner and that the claim did not constitute a “new ground” in support of
the challenge to the assessment of interest in Protest 2).
488. Id. at 1373-74.
489. Id. at 1374.
490. Id. at 1376.
491. Id. at 1379.
492. Id. The court explained:
If, as Fujitsu argues, notice was received on July 3, 1996, when Fujitsu
General issued, Fujitsu wins. The reason is that more than six months passed
before Customs liquidated the entries on February 27, 1998. If, as the Court
of International Trade held, notice was received on September 16, 1997,
when Commerce published notice of the removal in the Federal Register,
the government wins. The reason is that Customs liquidated the entries
within six months of that date, on February 27, 1998.
Id.
493. Id. at 1381.

FINALINTERNATIONALTRADESUMMARY.DOC

1078

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/15/2003 1:31 PM

[Vol. 52:1027

1997, the date of publication in the Federal Register of the Commerce
Department’s notice of the conclusion of the litigation concerning
494
the 1986-88 entries.
4.

Antidumping duty methodologies
The majority of the trade remedy law cases before the Federal
Circuit in the last three years involved fine points of statutory
495
construction guiding the measurement of antidumping margins.
While the Commerce Department’s discretion is broadest in this area
(the courts often referring to it as the “master” of the antidumping
496
law), its discretion is not boundless and courts have, in many
497
Also, in many of
instances, reversed its determinations on appeal.
these cases—as in the other areas of international trade
jurisprudence reviewed in this Article—the Federal Circuit frequently
498
reversed the Court of International Trade.
Given the often
substantial impact of these cases on the duty liability of importers,
these cases highlight the uncertainties and pitfalls that can be
associated with the movement of goods across the U.S. border.
a.

Product comparisons

Because most antidumping cases involve ranges of related products
(e.g., cold-rolled carbon steel products within certain size parameters
and quality ranges) rather than fungible commodities (e.g., crude
oil), a threshold question in antidumping analysis is how to define
product categories for purposes of comparing a U.S. price (i.e., the
export price or constructed export price) with a normal value.
Moreover, in many cases, products sold by foreign exporters in the
494. Id. at 1382 (explaining that the publication of notice of Fujitsu constituted
“the first notification that Commerce had removed the suspension of liquidation”).
495. See, e.g., Timken Co. v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 2d 608 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2001) (determining whether Commerce correctly interpreted the provisions of the
antidumping statute applicable to non-market economy exporters as allowing it to
use Indonesian import statistics as a substitute value for raw material costs of steel
paid by Chinese producers).
496. See, e.g., Daewoo Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Int’l Union of Elec., Electrical, Tech.,
Salaried & Mach. Workers, 6 F.3d 1511, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (recognizing the
International Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce as the “master”
of the antidumping law).
497. See, e.g., Duferco, 296 F.3d at 1098 (reversing Commerce’s determination
regarding antidumping and countervailing duty orders on the ground that it
impermissibly modified the orders to include products beyond the intended scope).
498. See, e.g., Eckstrom, 254 F.3d at 1076 (reversing Court of International Trade
decision on the ground that cast stainless steel butt-weld pipe fittings were outside
antidumping order’s scope); U.S. Steel Group v. United States, 225 F.3d 1284, 1292
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (reversing Court of International Trade ruling that Commerce’s
interpretation of antidumping statute to include movement expenses as part of total
expenses in the constructed export price profit calculation was unreasonable).
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United States differ significantly from products sold by the same
companies at home or in other export markets; sometimes, the
product alleged to be dumped in the U.S. market is produced
exclusively for export to the United States. Accordingly, one problem
arising regularly is the definition of the “foreign like product,” i.e.,
the product or products sold in the foreign comparison market and
providing the basis for normal value. The antidumping statute
provides a definition of “foreign like product” at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(16), which establishes a three-level hierarchy for the
identification of the foreign like product, ranging from the specific
(“identical in physical characteristics”) to the general (“of the same
499
general class or kind”).
During the last three years, two cases
involving the definition of the foreign like product reached the
Federal Circuit, and in both, the court affirmed the original agency
500
determination.
501
In Pesquera Mares Australes Ltd. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s holding concerning two product
comparison issues in the antidumping investigation of salmon from
502
Chile.
First, the court found that the Commerce Department had
reasonably interpreted the phrase “identical in physical
characteristics” for purposes of 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16)(A) by reference
503
to commercial practices,
and second, that the Commerce
Department had properly compared the Chilean exporter’s U.S. sales
of “premium” grade salmon to Japanese sales of “premium” and
504
“super-premium” salmon.
The Federal Circuit discussed at length
the applicable standard of review, and specifically whether the court
should apply Chevron principles to the Commerce Department’s
administrative rulings—even though no formally promulgated
regulations were at issue—or whether it should apply a less
deferential standard consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent
499. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16) (1999).
500. Cases involving the interaction of the foreign-like product provision with the
statute’s prescribed methodologies for calculating constructed value, as arose in SKF
USA Inc. v. United States, 263 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001), are discussed below. See
discussion infra notes 494-514 and accompanying text.
501. 266 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
502. Id. at 1374. See Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,411 (Dep’t
Commerce June 9, 1998) (final antidumping determination).
503. Id. at 1376. Section 1677(16)(A) provides that the foreign like product may
be identified on the basis of “other merchandise which is identical in physical
characteristics with, and was produced in the same country by the same person as,
that merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16)(A).
504. Id. The antidumping law permits the Commerce Department to base normal
value on third-country sales (i.e., sales in countries other than the exporting country)
in the absence of satisfactory sales data in the exporting country. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1999).
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505

decision in Mead.
Citing a variety of factors, including the Mead
holding that antidumping determinations are “adjudications that
produce . . . rulings for which deference [under Chevron] is
506
claimed,” and its recent holding in American Silicon Technologies, the
court concluded that Chevron deference continued to be warranted,
507
following Mead, with respect to antidumping proceedings.
The Federal Circuit then turned to the question of statutory
interpretation—the meaning of “identical in physical characteristics”
508
for purposes of 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16)(A).
Reviewing a variety of
dictionary definitions, the court found that some dictionaries define
“identical” as requiring exact identity, and others as providing, more
broadly, for near identity; this, the court noted, left “the question of
which of the two common usages was intended by Congress: exactly
509
the same or the same with minor differences?”
Given this
ambiguity, the Federal Circuit reasoned that Chevron required
deference to the Commerce Department’s interpretation, which
permitted “identical” treatment of products having minor differences
510
in physical characteristics.
The Federal Circuit also found the
Commerce Department’s inclusion of both “premium” and “superpremium” salmon in its antidumping analysis to be supported by
511
substantial evidence. In reviewing the evidence relied upon by the
Commerce Department in rejecting its preliminary determination to
512
treat the “super-premium” salmon as a distinct product, the Federal
Circuit noted, in particular, the fact that other exporters to the
Japanese market (from Norway, Scotland, Canada, and the United
States) did not distinguish between “premium” and “super-premium”
513
grades.
The Federal Circuit again affirmed the Court of International
514
Trade in Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. v. United States, a case
brought by Japanese producers of Large Newspaper Printing Presses
505. See Pesquera, 266 F.3d at 1379-82.
506. Id. at 1382 (citing Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2171).
507. Id. (citing Am. Silicon Techs. v. United States, 261 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2001)).
508. 19 U.S.C § 1677(16)(A) (1999).
509. Id. at 1382-83.
510. Id. at 1383-84.
511. Id. at 1384.
512. Id. As explained by the court, in its preliminary antidumping determination,
“Commerce compared the prices charged by Mares Australes for premium salmon in
the United States only to the prices charged for premium salmon in Japan.” Id. at
1377. The Commerce Department did not include the higher-priced “superpremium” salmon sold in Japan in the foreign like product until its final
determination. Id.
513. Id. at 1384-85.
514. 275 F.3d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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(“LNPPs”) who contended that LNPPs sold in Japan could not
reasonably be compared to LNPPs sold in the United States for
515
The Court of
purposes of calculating an antidumping rate.
International Trade rejected this contention, affirming the
underlying agency determination as supported by substantial
516
517
evidence. Citing the statutorily prescribed standard of review, the
Federal Circuit noted that Japanese appellants had “chosen a course
with a high barrier to reversal” given the jurisprudence defining
518
substantial evidence.
The Federal Circuit rejected appellants’
argument that the Commerce Department had failed to properly
weigh the record evidence concerning the many differences between
LNPPs sold in Japan and those sold in the U.S. market. The court
acknowledged that LNPPs are custom-made, and that each individual
LNPP contains a unique combination of features, but stressed that,
due to the “long list of shared features,” the Commerce Department
519
could reasonably compare the Japanese and U.S. models.
The
court concluded that, while the appellants would draw different
inferences from the evidence of differences between individual
LNPPs, it did not mean that the Commerce Department’s conclusion
520
warranted reversal under the substantial evidence standard.
The Federal Circuit then turned to appellants’ claim that the
Commerce Department had misinterpreted 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16),
521
defining “foreign like product.”
More specifically, it considered
that it was inconsistent for the Commerce Department to rely on this
provision to reject actual Japanese market prices in favor of
constructed value, on the one hand, and, on the other, to use actual
Japanese market sales as the basis for the profit component of the
522
constructed value calculation. The court, however, determined that
515. Id. at 1059. Appellants objected in particular to the Commerce Department’s
use, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(2)(A), of Japanese home market LNPP profits
in the constructed value calculation used to determine normal value. Id.
516. Id. at 1060. See Large Newspaper Printing Presses and Components Thereof,
Whether Assembled or Unassembled, from Japan, 61 Fed. Reg. 38139 (Dep’t
Commerce July 23, 1996), amended 61 Fed. Reg. 46621 (Dep’t Commerce Sept. 4,
1996) (antidumping duty order and amended final antidumping determination).
517. Mitsubishi, 275 F.3d at 1060 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (1999)).
518. Id. (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951), Am.
Silicon Techs. v. United States, 261 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
519. Id. at 1061. The Federal Circuit asked, with respect to one LNPP for which
the record contained a product brochure, “[t]he critical point is, given that
individual differences exist from order to order, can the custom-made merchandise
from Japan and the United States be reasonably compared?” Id. at 1062. The court
answered in the affirmative—“not perfectly, not identically, but reasonably.” Id.
520. Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 750 F.2d 927, 933
(Fed. Cir. 1984)).
521. Id. at 1063-64.
522. Id.
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this issue was “not ripe for decision,” as appellants had failed to show
evidence of an inconsistent interpretation of the statute, and that
523
appellants were “chasing a phantom inconsistency in this case.” As
explained by the court, review of the Commerce Department’s
determination revealed that it “certainly did not decide that the
home market LNPPs, in general, could not be a foreign like
product,” and thus that there was no inconsistent application of
524
§ 1677(16).
b.

Calculation issues

A series of trade remedy law cases before the Federal Circuit
during the last three years involved the calculation of normal value
and U.S. price (i.e., export price or constructed export price), the
real “nuts and bolts” of the antidumping law. Many of these cases
arose out of disputes about the interpretation of statutory
amendments introduced by the URAA. As in other areas of Federal
Circuit international trade jurisprudence, this area experienced a
high rate of reversal of the Court of International Trade.
As explained above, the URAA amendments base U.S. price on
either export price or constructed export price. Certain adjustments
to the U.S. starting price are required to reach both export price and
constructed export price, while certain additional adjustments—
typically reflecting the activities of affiliated U.S. importers, including
profit—apply only to a constructed export price calculation. In U.S.
525
Steel Group v. United States, the Federal Circuit examined the profit
element of constructed export price (“CEP profit”), i.e., the
deduction for profit associated with the activities of affiliated U.S.
importers. More specifically, the court examined whether the
statutory formula for determining CEP profit (“total actual profit”
times the ratio of “total U.S. expenses” to “total expenses”) included,
as part of the total expenses denominator, foreign exporters’
526
movement expenses.
In an administrative review of AG der
Dillinger Hüttenwerke’s duty liability under the antidumping duty
order on carbon steel plate from Germany, the Commerce
Department, consistent with its policy, interpreted 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677a(f)(2)(C) to include movement expenses as part of “total
527
expenses.” The Court of International Trade agreed with domestic
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.

Id. at 1064.
Id. at 1065.
225 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1285. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(f) (1999).
Id. See Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Germany, 62 Fed. Reg.
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producers’ challenge to the Commerce Department’s inclusion of
528
The
movement expenses in total expenses, and reversed.
Government appealed.
Applying a Chevron analysis, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower
court’s judgment, finding that it had failed to accord sufficient
deference to the Department’s reasonable interpretation of a
529
statutory ambiguity.
Finding, first, that the statute defines “total
530
expenses” in a “complex, ambiguous manner,” the Federal Circuit
531
turned to a “‘holistic’ review of the relevant provisions,” and
532
concluded that they equated “total expenses” with “all expenses.”
The court further reasoned that there was no basis for the
“symmetry” argument advanced by domestic parties and embraced by
the Court of International Trade, i.e., that the express exclusion of
movement expenses from the “total U.S. expenses” numerator
mandated exclusion of movement expenses from the “total expenses”
533
denominator.
On this point, the court concluded that “the
definitions in the Act themselves undercut symmetrical treatment of
534
The court also found
‘total U.S. expenses’ and ‘total expenses.’”
the Department’s interpretation to comport with commercial reality
and basic accounting principles, and noted that, if movement
expenses were to be excluded from the “total expenses”
denominator, that would “unduly skew the U.S. profit computation
against importers because the computation would exclude their
heaviest expense category, leaving them with a disproportionately
535
high dumping margin.”
Judge Lourie dissented from the panel majority’s opinion, arguing
that there is no ambiguity in § 1677a(f)(2)(C) because “all expenses”
is modified by the phrase “with respect to the production and sale,” a
clear indication, in his view, that Congress intended movement
536
expenses to be excluded from “all expenses.” Judge Lourie further
reasoned that the structure of the statute, and in particular the
definition of “total U.S. expenses” in § 1677a(f)(2)(B), support a

18,390 (Dep’t Commerce Apr. 15, 1997) (final admin. review).
528. Id. at 1286.
529. Id. at 1289.
530. Id.
531. Id. (citing Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir.
1998)).
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Id.
535. Id. at 1291.
536. Id. at 1292 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
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parallel reading of the numerator and denominator in which both
537
exclude movement expenses.
538
AK Steel Corporation v. United States involved both sides of the
dumping analysis—the determination of U.S. price and normal
value—and again resulted in reversal of the lower court’s decision.
The issues arose in the Commerce Department’s second
administrative review of the antidumping duty order on cold-rolled
and corrosion-resistant steel products from Korea, and with respect to
several Korean producers, including Pohang Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.
539
(“POSCO”) and certain of its affiliates. In that review, and over the
objections of the U.S. petitioning industry, the Commerce
Department classified the Korean producers’ U.S. sales as export
price (rather than constructed export price) sales pursuant to 19
540
U.S.C. § 1677a(a)-(b)
and its longstanding methodology for
distinguishing between the two types of sales, the so-called PQ test.
Under this test, developed prior to the URAA, the Commerce
Department classified sales made by U.S. affiliates of foreign
producers as export price sales if three criteria were met: (1) the
subject merchandise was shipped directly from the producer to the
unaffiliated U.S. buyer; (2) direct shipment from the producer to the
unaffiliated U.S. buyer was the customary channel for sales of the
merchandise at issue; and (3) the U.S. affiliate acted merely as a
541
“paper-pusher,” or processor of sales-related documentation.
The
537. Id.
538. 226 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
539. See Certain Cold-Rolled and Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products
from Korea, 62 Fed. Reg. 18,404 (Dep’t Commerce Apr. 15, 1997) (final admin.
review).
540. Certain Cold-Rolled and Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from
Korea, 62 Fed. Reg. at 18,434. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(a) defines “export price” as:
the price at which the subject merchandise is first sold (or agreed to be sold)
before the date of importation by the producer or exporter of the subject
merchandise outside of the United States to an unaffiliated purchaser in the
United States or to an unaffiliated purchaser for exportation to the United
States, as adjusted under subsection (c) of this section.
Section 1677a(b) defines “constructed export price” as:
the price at which the subject merchandise is first sold (or agreed to be
sold) in the United States before or after the date of importation by or
for the account of the producer or exporter of such merchandise or by a
seller affiliated with the producer or exporter, to a purchaser not
affiliated with the producer or exporter, as adjusted under subsections
(c) and (d) of this section.
Thus, export price sales are sales made prior to importation and outside of the United
States; constructed export price sales are sales made either prior to or following
importation, but only inside the United States.
541. Certain Cold-Rolled and Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from
Korea, 62 Fed. Reg. at 18,432. The Commerce Department developed the PQ threepart test in 1987, on remand from the Court of International Trade in PQ Corp. v.
United States, 652 F. Supp. 724, 733-35 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1987). See AK Steel, 226 F.3d at
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Department also, and again over the objections of the U.S. industry,
determined to “collapse” POSCO and its affiliates, thereby treating
542
them as a single entity for purposes of its antidumping analysis.
Based on this collapsing determination, the Department did not
apply 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(2) and (3), the so-called “fair-value” and
“major-input” provisions—used to revalue certain transactions
between affiliated parties for purposes of establishing normal value—
543
to transactions among POSCO and its affiliates.
On appeal, the
Court of International Trade sustained these aspects of the
544
Commerce Department’s determination. On further appeal to the
Federal Circuit, U.S. producers raised two legal issues: whether the
PQ test represents a reasonable interpretation of the URAA’s
definitions of export price and constructed export price, and
whether the Commerce Department has the discretion under the
statute not to apply the fair-value and major-input provisions to
545
transactions between affiliated producers that have been collapsed.
Applying a de novo standard of review and the Chevron two-step
546
analysis, the Federal Circuit rejected the PQ test, but affirmed the
Department’s interpretation of the fair-value and major-input
547
provisions. The issue before the Federal Circuit was “whether a sale
to a U.S. purchaser can be properly classified as a sale by the
producer/exporter, and thus an EP sale, even if the sales contract is
between the U.S. purchaser and a U.S. affiliate of the
548
producer/exporter and is executed in the United States.”
The
Federal Circuit answered in the negative, agreeing with the U.S.
petitioners that such a scenario, allowed by the PQ test, was in fact
precluded by the URAA’s definitions of export price and constructed

1365.
542. Certain Cold-Rolled and Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from
Korea, 62 Fed. Reg. at 18,430.
543. Certain Cold-Rolled and Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from
Korea, 62 Fed. Reg. at 18,430. Pursuant to § 1677b(f)(2), the fair-value provision,
the Department is authorized to revalue, based on market conditions, any
transaction between affiliated persons. Where the transaction involves a major input,
§ 1677b(f)(3) authorizes the Department to revalue the transaction based on the
higher of market value or cost of production. These provisions apply to the
determination of cost of production (§ 1677b(b)) and constructed value
(§ 1677b(e)).
544. See AK Steel Corp. v. United States, 34 F. Supp. 2d 756 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1998).
545. AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 1363-64.
546. Id. at 1366 (citing Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed.
Cir. 1994), Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 665
& n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1992), Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
547. Id. at 1364.
548. Id. at 1368.
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549

export price.
Turning to the statutory language, the court
reasoned that, when read without reference to the pre-URAA U.S.
price definitions, “the plain meaning of the language enacted by
Congress in 1994 focuses on where the sale takes place and whether
the foreign producer or exporter and the U.S. importer are affiliated,
making these two factors dispositive of the choice between the two
550
classifications.”
The court further reasoned that, when read
together, the export price and constructed export price definitions
made clear that the key distinction drawn by the statute is the
551
geographic “locus of the transaction.” This geographic distinction,
the court explained, meant that the statute precludes what the PQ
test allows, i.e., classification of U.S. sales made through U.S.
affiliates—sales made “in the United States” for purposes of the
552
statute—as export price sales. In rejecting the PQ test, the Federal
Circuit explained that “Commerce does not require a cumbersome
test, examining the activities of the affiliate, to determine whether or
not the U.S. affiliate is a seller, when the answer to that question is
plain from the face of the contracts governing the sales in
553
question.”
The Federal Circuit also rejected the Korean producers’ arguments
that the SAA evinced Congress’s intent that the PQ test continue to
apply in distinguishing between export price and constructed export
554
price sales.
The court found that: (1) the PQ test “is hardly
consistent with the pre-1994 statute, read as a whole,” as well as even
555
earlier versions of the antidumping law; (2) the Federal Circuit has
556
never endorsed the PQ test; (3) the Court of International Trade
has only affirmed the test in scenarios involving constructed export
557
price, rather than export price, sales; and (4) there is no other
indication in the legislative history that Congress intended to endorse
the PQ test and the amendments to the statute suggest that it did
558
not.
Turning to the Commerce Department’s application of the fairvalue and major-input provisions, the Federal Circuit emphasized
549. Id. at 1364.
550. Id. at 1369.
551. Id.
552. Id. at 1370.
553. Id. at 1372.
554. Id.
555. Id. at 1373.
556. Id.
557. Id. (citing Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd. v. United States, 15 F. Supp. 2d 807,
815 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1998)).
558. Id. at 1374.
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that, given the uncontested decision of the Department to “collapse”
POSCO and affiliated producers, the only issue for review was
whether the Department had discretion not to apply these provisions
559
as between these companies. The court accepted the Department’s
defense that “a decision to treat affiliated parties as a single entity
necessitates that transactions among the parties also be valued based
560
on the group as a whole.” Noting that both the fair-value and the
major-input provision only apply to transfers between “persons,” the
court reasoned that once the Commerce Department has properly
determined to treat affiliated parties as a single person, it need not
561
apply these provisions.
The court also noted favorably the
consistency between this methodology and the Department’s practice
of not applying these provisions between divisions of the same
company, as well as that the statute would not have required
application of the fair-value and major-input provisions even if
562
POSCO and its affiliates had not been collapsed.
The Federal Circuit considered additional U.S. starting price
563
adjustment issues in Micron Technology, Inc. v. United States, and again
disagreed with the Court of International Trade’s interpretation of
564
the statute as amended by the URAA. The case involved two aspects
of the adjustments required under 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d) for
constructed export price sales: the types of expenses covered by
subsection (d)(1)(D)’s reference to “any selling expenses not
deducted under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C),” and the statutory
provision, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B)(i), requiring the Commerce
Department to establish normal value “at the same level of trade as
565
the export price or constructed export price.” The issues arose in
the second administrative review of the antidumping duty order on
dynamic random access memory semiconductors (“DRAMs”) from
566
Korea, and in the context of sales made by LG Semicon Co., the
Korean producer, and its affiliated U.S. importer, LG Semicon
567
America, Inc.
On the first issue, the Commerce Department

559. Id. at 1375.
560. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
561. Id. at 1376.
562. Id. (citing Certain Forged Steel Crankshafts from the United Kingdom, 61
Fed. Reg. 54,613, 54,614 (Dep’t Commerce Oct. 26, 1996)).
563. 243 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
564. Id. at 1314-16.
565. Id. at 1304-05.
566. See Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of One Megabit or
Above from the Republic of Korea, 62 Fed. Reg. 965, 968 (Jan. 7, 1997) (final admin.
review).
567. Micron Technology, Inc., 243 F.3d at 1306.
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determined not to include in its constructed export price
adjustments under § 1677a(d)(1)(D) certain indirect selling
expenses incurred by LG Semicon in Korea that were not directly
568
related to sales to unaffiliated U.S. purchasers.
Micron appealed,
and the Court of International Trade affirmed the Department’s
569
On the second issue, the Commerce Department,
methodology.
also applying its policy at the time, conducted its level-of-trade
analysis after adjusting the U.S. price to obtain the constructed export
570
price. As a consequence, the Department compared LG Semicon’s
Korean sales to adjusted U.S. sales, determining that the former
represented a more advanced level of trade than the latter, and
accounting for this disparity by allowing LG Semicon a “constructed
571
export price offset” to normal value.
Micron also appealed this
issue. The Court of International Trade agreed with Micron, and
572
rejected the Department’s methodology. Micron appealed the first
issue to the Federal Circuit, and LG Semicon cross-appealed as to the
573
second.
574
Applying de novo review and Chevron principles, the Federal
Circuit rejected Micron’s arguments that the statute and legislative
history clearly mandate the deduction of all (rather than just U.S.)
575
selling expenses related to constructed export price sales.
The
Federal Circuit first construed the phrase in § 1677a(d)(1) requiring
the deduction of “any selling expenses not deducted under
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C),” and framed the question before it as
the following: “While we agree that the word ‘any’ necessarily

568. Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of One Megabit or Above
from the Republic of Korea, 62 Fed. Reg. at 967 (explaining that these indirect
selling expenses did “not result from or bear relationship to selling activities in the
United States”). As explained by the Federal Circuit, its record did not contain a
detailed description of the indirect selling expenses at issue, but they appeared to
include “the rents on LG Semicon’s sales offices incurred in Korea, the salaries for
LG Semicon’s salesmen incurred in Korea, and certain inventory carrying costs.”
Micron, 243 F.3d at 1306. Micron contended that all these selling expenses should be
included in the section 1677a(d)(1)(D) adjustments to the constructed export price.
Id. at 1307.
569. Micron Tech., Inc. v. United States, 40 F. Supp. 2d 481, 485 (Ct. Int’l Trade
1999).
570. Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of One Megabit or Above
from the Republic of Korea, 62 Fed. Reg. at 966.
571. Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of One Megabit or Above
from the Republic of Korea, 62 Fed. Reg. at 966.
572. Micron, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 481.
573. Micron Tech., Inc. v. United States, 243 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
574. Id. at 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The Federal Circuit emphasized that it reviews
issues of statutory construction “without deference.” Id. (quoting U.S. Steel Group v.
United States, 225 F.3d at 1286).
575. Id. at 1309-10.
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576

includes ‘all,’ the real question here is ‘all of what’?”
The court
then applied the statutory construction rule of ejusdem generis which, it
reasoned, supported the conclusion that Congress intended
subsection D to encompass the same types of expenses as included in
subsections A, B, and C—i.e., expenses incurred in the United
577
Thus, to the extent subsection (D) was ambiguous, the
States.
578
Commerce Department’s interpretation was reasonable.
The Federal Circuit next rejected Micron’s argument that, as
revealed by the URAA’s legislative history, Congress intended the preURAA treatment of indirect selling expenses—in Micron’s view,
579
capturing all expenses—to continue.
As the court explained, the
legislative history did not show that Congress intended the
Commerce Department’s treatment of indirect selling expenses to
remain the same; rather, Congress, if anything, continued an
580
“existing ambiguity.”
Moreover, in rejecting Micron’s argument,
the Federal Circuit emphasized that Congress cannot be presumed to
have intended to “freeze an administrative interpretation of a
statute;” such an approach would violate Chevron’s recognition of the
power of administrative agencies to change their interpretations of
581
the statutes they are charged with administering.
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Micron’s argument that
deduction of all indirect selling expenses would serve the statute’s
purpose of preventing the false characterization by foreign producers

576. Id. at 1308.
577. Id. (citing Sports Graphics, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 1390, 1392 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (“Under the rule of ejusdem generis, which means ‘of the same kind,’ where an
enumeration of specific things is followed by a general word or phrase, the general
word or phrase is held to refer to things of the same kind as those specified.”)).
578. Id. at 1309. The Federal Circuit further explained that the Commerce
Department’s construction of subsection 1677a(d)(1) was strongly supported by 19
U.S.C. § 1677a(f), providing for the deduction in determining the constructed
export price of U.S. profit. Id. The court stated, “subsection (f) assumes that the
expenses at issue are indeed those expenses arising specifically out of the sale of the
subject merchandise in the United States.” Id. The Federal Circuit also noted the
SAA’s instruction that the profit deduction applies only to profit amounts “allocable
to selling, distribution and further manufacturing activities in the United States.” Id.
579. Id. at 1309.
580. Id. at 1310. Notably, the court rejected Micron’s contention that Congress
should have been aware, when it enacted the URAA, of a Court of International
Trade decision supposedly supporting Micron’s interpretation of the Commerce
Department’s pre-URAA practice with respect to indirect selling expenses. See id. at
1310-11 (citing Silver Reed Am., Inc. v. United States, 683 F. Supp. 1393 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 1988) (“We are unwilling to apply the presumption relied upon by Micron
when there is no evidence that Congress’ attention was directed to the decision in
Silver Reed when the statute was re-enacted.”)).
581. Id. at 1312 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
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582

of their selling expenses.
In response, the court noted that the
Commerce Department did indeed sometimes include in its
constructed export price deductions certain indirect selling expenses
incurred outside of the United States but with some nexus to the
583
activities of the U.S. importer and reseller.
The court concluded
that Micron’s interpretation of § 1677a(d)(1) “makes no sense in
584
terms of the statutory purpose.” This purpose, the court noted, was
served in this case by deducting only those expenses incurred by LG
Semicon in connection with sales, through its U.S. affiliate, to
585
unaffiliated U.S. purchasers.
The Federal Circuit reversed the Court of International Trade on
the second issue—whether to undertake the level of trade analysis
before or after the constructed export price deductions enumerated
586
in § 1677a(d).
The Federal Circuit reasoned that the statutory
scheme clearly contemplated the level of trade analysis to be
performed at the level most closely corresponding to the export
587
price.
Any deductions required to “construct” an export price,
588
thus, were required to be made before the level of trade analysis.
Relying heavily on the SAA, the court concluded that
Congress’ intent is clear: when making a level of trade comparison
for EP sales, Commerce is to use the ‘starting price,’ i.e., the
unadjusted price. In contrast, when making a level of trade
comparison for CEP sales, Commerce is to use the ‘constructed’
price, i.e., the price that reflects the deductions made pursuant to §
589
1677a(d).

The Federal Circuit also dismissed Micron’s concern that, under
the Commerce Department’s methodology, in virtually every case
there would be either a level of trade adjustment to normal value or a
590
constructed export price offset to normal value.
The court noted
that the Department had specifically explained in promulgating its
582. Id. at 1312-13.
583. Id. at 1313 (citing Certain Stainless Steel Wire Rods from France, 61 Fed.
Reg. 47,874, 47,881-82 (Sept. 11, 1996) (final admin. review)).
584. Id. The court described it as making an apples-to-apples comparison between
U.S. price and normal value by “adjusting CEP so that it is at the same level of trade
as EP and then making a comparison to normal value.” Id.
585. Id. at 1313-14.
586. Id. at 1314-15.
587. Id. at 1314.
588. Id.
The court explained that, while the Commerce Department’s
methodology resulted in a comparison of an adjusted constructed export price with
an adjusted normal value, this seemingly asymmetric comparison is consistent with
the statutory purpose to determine if an adjustment to normal value (the
constructed export price offset) is warranted. Id.
589. Id. at 1315.
590. Id. at 1314.
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regulations that the constructed export price offset would not be
591
automatic, and that in several antidumping investigations involving
constructed export price sales, the Department’s methodology did
not result in either a level of trade adjustment or a constructed
592
export price offset.
593
In SKF USA Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit considered
the authority of the reviewing court to remand an antidumping
calculation issue to the Commerce Department in light of the
Department’s claim that it had erred in its underlying
594
determination.
The specific calculation issue involved the
treatment of the exporting company’s general and administrative
(“G&A”) expenses as a component of constructed value, for purposes
of 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(1)(B), in an administrative review of the
antidumping duty order on antifriction bearings (“AFBs”) from
595
During the administrative proceeding, the German
Germany.
respondent and its affiliated U.S. importer had argued that the G&A
expense calculation should not have taken into account a loss related
to the sale of a Korean subsidiary, but the Commerce Department
596
disagreed and included these expenses in the G&A calculation. On
appeal, however, rather than defend its G&A calculation, the
Commerce Department argued that the calculation should not have
reflected the loss associated with the sale of the Korean subsidiary,
597
and it sought a remand for recalculation.
The Court of
International Trade rejected the remand request, affirming the G&A
598
calculation.
The Federal Circuit reversed. Noting first that the
599
Federal Circuit had acknowledged “Commerce’s special expertise”
591. Id. at 1316.
592. Id. (citing Fresh Kiwifruit from New Zealand, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,844, 36,845-46
(July 8, 1999) (prelim. admin. review)).
593. 254 F.3d 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
594. Id. at 1025.
595. See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,472 (Dec. 17, 1996) (final admin. reviews and partial term.
of admin. reviews). Because this administrative review was initiated prior to the
effective date of the URAA amendments, the Commerce Department applied the
pre-URAA antidumping law.
596. Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom, 61 Fed. Reg. at 66,497.
597. See SKF, 254 F.3d at 1026.
598. SKF USA, Inc. v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1345-46 (Ct. Int’l Trade
1999). The Court of International Trade held that it could not “rely on the post-hoc
position advanced by Commerce in its brief as the basis to uphold or overturn its
administrative action.” Id. at 1345 n.3.
599. SKF, 254 F.3d at 1027 (quoting Micron Tech., Inc. v. United States, 117 F.3d
1386, 1394 (Fed.Cir. 1997).
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in administering the antidumping law, and that “factual
600
determinations” were owed considerable deference, the court went
on to review the various scenarios in which a remand to the agency
may be appropriate under the applicable standard of review. In
surveying the law applicable to remand requests based on agency
claims that the underlying determination is incorrect, the Federal
Circuit distinguished between “step one” Chevron issues and “step
two” Chevron issues. With respect to the former, where “the agency is
either compelled or forbidden by the governing statute to reach a
different result,” it is up to the reviewing court to decide the statutory
601
issue and whether a remand is warranted.
With respect to the
latter, as applied in this case given the broad discretion delegated to
the Commerce Department under the statute to calculate G&A
expenses, “a remand to the agency is required, absent the most
602
unusual circumstances verging on bad faith.”
The Federal Circuit
concluded that, because there was no evidence of the agency acting
in bad faith in seeking the remand, it was required to return the issue
603
to the Commerce Department for recalculation.
604
In Koenig & Bauer-Albert AG v. United States, the Federal Circuit
again considered the distinction between export price and
constructed export price sales, as well as the proper calculation of
constructed value. On the first issue, the German producer of the
subject LNPPs, and its affiliated U.S. importer, argued that the
Commerce Department had erred in treating its two U.S. sales during
605
the period of investigation as constructed export price sales.
The
606
Court of International Trade sustained the agency determination.
However, the lower court decision was made before the Federal
Circuit’s decision in AK Steel, which invalidated the longstanding PQ
600. Id. (quoting F.lli De Cecco di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United States,
216 F.3d 1027, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
601. Id. at 1029 (citing Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
602. Id. at 1030 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). The court also cited its earlier holding that
“any assumption that Congress intended to freeze an administrative interpretation of
a statute, which was unknown to Congress, would be entirely contrary to the concept
of Chevron—which assumes and approves the ability of administrative agencies to
change their interpretation.” Id. (citing Micron, 243 F.3d at 1312).
603. Id. Notably, the Federal Circuit did not include in its analysis a discussion of
finality of agency decision-making as a factor weighing against a remand under the
circumstances.
604. 259 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
605. See Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Large
Newspaper Printing Presses and Components Thereof, Whether Assembled or
Unassembled, from Germany, 61 Fed. Reg. 38,166 (July 23, 1996).
606. Koenig & Bauer-Albert AG v. United States, 15 F. Supp. 2d 384 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 1998).
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test for classifying U.S. sales as export price or constructed export
price. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit granted the request of the
Government and appellants for a remand for the Commerce
Department to reconsider classification of the U.S. sales in light of
607
the AK Steel test.
The Federal Circuit further instructed that the
Commerce Department should reconsider the proper treatment of
certain U.S. LNPP installation expenses and, more specifically,
determine whether they are movement expenses under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677a(c)(2)(A) (deducted from the U.S. starting price regardless of
how the U.S. sales are classified) or “further manufacturing” expenses
under 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(2) (deducted from the starting price only
608
if the U.S. sales are classified as constructed export price sales).
The Federal Circuit also considered appellants’ argument that, in
its constructed value calculations, the Commerce Department should
have excluded one of the German producer’s home market sales as
being outside “the ordinary course of trade,” for purposes of 19
U.S.C. §§ 1677b(e) and 1677(15), because that sale carried a
substantially higher profit margin than the other sales included in the
constructed value calculation. The Federal Circuit disagreed, and
upheld the lower court’s affirmance of the Commerce Department
on this issue. The Federal Circuit reasoned that, given “permissive
language” in the SAA underscoring the Department’s broad latitude
in determining when sales are outside the ordinary course of trade, it
was reasonable for the Department to conclude that the higher profit
margin on the single sale for which appellants sought exclusion did
not require exclusion of that sale from the constructed value
609
calculation.
610
In American Silicon Technologies v. United States, the Federal Circuit
upheld the lower court in affirming the Commerce Department’s
treatment of a Brazilian producer’s depreciation expenses—a
component of constructed value—in an administrative review of the
611
antidumping duty order on silicon metal from Brazil. The statutory
provision at the heart of the case, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(1)(A),
607. Koenig, 259 F.3d at 1344.
608. Id.
609. Id. at 1345. As the court noted, the SAA “provides several exemplary types of
sales that could be outside the ordinary course of trade, including ‘sales with
abnormally high profits.’ . . . [h]owever, the SAA only states that Commerce ‘may’ or
‘could’ consider such sales to be outside the ordinary course of trade.” Id.
610. 261 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
611. Am. Silicon Techs. v. United States, 2000 WL 278290 (Ct. Int’l Trade Mar. 9,
2000). The final results of the administrative review at issue in this case are
published at Silicon Metal from Brazil, 63 Fed. Reg. 6,899 (Feb. 11, 1998) (final
admin. review).
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requires costs, including depreciation costs, to “normally be
calculated based on the records of the exporter or producer of the
612
merchandise.” Such costs, however, may be rejected where they do
not “reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and
613
sale of the merchandise.”
According to the U.S. petitioners,
appellants in this case, the Commerce Department had erred in
accepting the Brazilian producer’s five-year, straight-line depreciation
methodology because the actual useful life of the industrial assets at
614
issue was at least twenty years.
Accordingly, the Brazilian
producer’s depreciation methodology did not reflect its true cost of
producing silicon metal, and should be rejected as mandated by
615
§ 1677b(f)(1)(A). Appellants also urged the Federal Circuit to take
account of a recent decision of the Court of International Trade in
which that court had decided, with respect to a different Brazilian
producer of silicon metal, that a five-year depreciation methodology
was contrary to law. Accordingly, appellants argued, the doctrine of
intra-court comity required the same result to be reached in this
616
case. The Federal Circuit disagreed. Noting that an administrative
determination can be supported by substantial evidence, even if it is
617
possible to draw a different conclusion from the record evidence.
Also noting that neither the statute nor the SAA dictated a particular
618
depreciation methodology, the Federal Circuit found that the
record made clear that the Brazilian producer’s depreciation
methodology was consistent with both Brazilian GAAP and Brazilian
619
income tax law. Invoking a heightened standard of deference with
respect to “determinations of the agency that turn on complex
620
the court held “that
economic and accounting inquiries,”
determining whether a depreciation practice comports with Brazilian
GAAP is one such complex economic and accounting inquiry, as is
612. Am. Silicon, 261 F.3d at 1376.
613. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(1)(A) (1999). As the court explained, constructed
value, as a general matter, comprises a respondent’s general expenses, including
overhead. Am. Silicon, 261 F.3d at 1376 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1999) and
IPSCO, Inc. v. United States, 965 F.2d 1056, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Overhead, in
turn, includes depreciation.
Further, “[i]f depreciation is not included in
production costs, the CV is lowered, thereby lowering the minimum price level at
which imported goods may be sold without incurring antidumping duties, i.e.,
lowering the dumping margin calculations.” Id.
614. Id. at 1378-79.
615. Id.
616. Id. at 1379.
617. Id. at 1376 (citing Fujitsu Gen. Ltd. v. United States, 88 F.3d 1034, 1044 (Fed.
Cir. 1996)).
618. Id. at 1378 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(1)(A) (1999)).
619. Id. at 1379.
620. Id. at 1380 (citing Fujitsu, 88 F.3d at 1044).
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determining whether reported costs reconcile to financial statements,
621
The court
particularly where monetary corrections are involved.”
also rejected the argument based on intra-court comity, noting that it
was not clear that the facts and issues of the two cases were identical,
and that the court was compelled to assume that the lower court
judge in this case “through her independent analysis found the issues
not to be identical or was convinced that her brother judge was
622
wrong.”
623
SKF USA Inc. v. United States involved a different aspect of
constructed value—the profit component of constructed value, as
defined in 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(2), and its relationship to the
624
foreign like product provision, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16).
In this
625
installment of the heavily litigated AFBs proceeding the specific
question before the Federal Circuit was whether the Commerce
Department may define “foreign like product” to include only
identical AFBs (or AFBs from the same “family” grouping) in making
its price-based comparisons; but then define “foreign like product” to
include aggregate date for multiple AFB “families” in calculating
626
constructed value.
In the reviews at issue, the Commerce
Department sought first to conduct price-based comparisons,
627
pursuant to § 1677b(a)(1)(B)(i), defining the foreign like product
as including only identical AFBs, or AFBs from the same family
628
grouping.
Employing this narrow definition of the foreign like
product, the Department found no “usable sales” and turned to
629
constructed value.
In calculating constructed value, however, the
621. Id. at 1380-81.
622. Id. at 1381.
623. 263 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
624. Id. at 1379-81 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
625. The issue before the court arose in two related administrative reviews of the
AFBs order: Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom, 63 Fed. Reg. 33,320 (June 18, 1999) (final admin. review) and
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, 64 Fed.
Reg. 35,590 (July 1, 1999) (final admin. review).
626. SKF, 263 F.3d at 1372.
627. This provision directs the Commerce Department to determine normal value
in the first instance on “the price at which the foreign like product is first sold (or, in
the absence of a sale, offered for sale) for consumption in the exporting country, in
the usual commercial quantities and in the ordinary course of trade and, to the
extent practicable, at the same level of trade as the export price or constructed
export price.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B) (1999).
628. SKF, 263 F.3d 1375.
629. See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom, 63 Fed. Reg. 6512-03, 6516 (Feb. 9, 1998) (prelim. review);
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from
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Department used a different definition of the foreign like product,
aggregating “all foreign like products,” i.e., AFBs from multiple
630
family groupings, purportedly in keeping with § 1677b(e)(2)(A).
The foreign AFB producers challenged the Department’s
methodology before the Court of International Trade, contending
that § 1677(16) obligated the Department to attempt to use
“identical” or “like” merchandise in the constructed value profit
631
calculation before turning to aggregated data.
The Court of
International Trade disagreed, affirming the Department’s
632
methodology.
On appeal brought by the foreign AFBs producers, the Federal
633
634
Reviewing the lower court’s decision de novo,
Circuit reversed.
and emphasizing the Department’s “special expertise” in
635
administering the antidumping law, the Federal Circuit began its
analysis by focusing on the “source of the confusion”—the
relationship between § 1677(16), defining “foreign like product,” and
the constructed value provisions at § 1677b(e), also employing that
636
term.
As the court noted, § 1677(16) appeared to apply only to
Part II of Subtitle IV (“Imposition of Antidumping Duties”), while §
637
1677b(e) was part of Part IV of Subtitle IV (“General Provisions”).
However, “its reference to part II was obviously designed to require
that Commerce use the definition in making the part IV calculation

France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom, 64 Fed. Reg. 8790-04, 8795 (Feb. 23, 1999) (prelim. review).
630. See 63 Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom, 63 Fed. Reg. at 33,333; Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered
Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom, 64 Fed. Reg. at 35,610. Section 1677b(e)(2)(A)
provides for the determination of constructed value based on “the actual amounts
incurred and realized by the specific exporter or producer being examined in the
investigation or review for selling, general, and administrative expenses, and for
profits, in connection with the production and sale of a foreign like product, in the
ordinary course of trade, for consumption in the foreign country.” 19 U.S.C.A.
§ 1677b(e)(2)(A) (1999). The methodology set forth in § 1677b(e)(2)(A) is the
preferred methodology; where the required data are not available, the statute
provides three alternate methodologies, set forth at subsections 1677b(e)(2)(B)(i)(iii). 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677b(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
631. SKF, 263 F.3d at 1377.
632. Id. at 1371.
633. Id. at 1372.
634. Id. at 1378.
635. Id. (quoting Micron Tech., Inc. v. United States, 117 F.3d 1386, 1394 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
636. Id. at 1379.
637. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(16) (1999). The chapeau to § 1677(16) provides that the
definition of foreign like product relates to “a determination for the purposes of part
II of this subtitle . . . .” Id.
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638

for purposes of part II.”
The Federal Circuit then proceeded to
address appellants’ statutory construction arguments.
While
dismissing their arguments that the statute precludes aggregation of
more than one product into the “foreign like product” under the
639
circumstances, the Federal Circuit did find persuasive the argument
that, when Congress uses a technical term in more than one part of a
statutory scheme, it is intended to carry the same meaning in each
640
instance. The court concluded that the Commerce Department, in
defending its varying interpretations of the term, had failed to rebut
the presumption “that Congress intended that the term have the
same meaning in each of the pertinent sections or subsections of the
641
statute. . . .” Dismissing the Government’s Chevron-based arguments
in defense of its determination, the Federal Circuit cited broader
administrative law jurisprudence and concluded “it is well-established
that ‘an agency action is arbitrary when the agency offers insufficient
642
reasons for treating similar situations differently.’”
In remanding
for reconsideration, the Federal Circuit further reasoned that while
643
the antidumping statute is “highly complex and often confusing,”
that fact only increases the burden on the Commerce Department to
644
make sense of its provisions. The court was careful not to direct the
agency to adopt identical interpretations of “foreign like product” in
the different parts of the statute where it applied, suggesting that this
case might present one of the rare scenarios in which perfect identity
of interpretations within the same statutory scheme was not
645
warranted. The court left this analysis for the agency on remand.
646
Thai Pineapple Canning Industry Corp. v. United States presented two
issues—the methodology for determining cost of production and
constructed value in an environment of rising costs, and whether the
Department properly computed a single assessment rate for the
647
entire period of review.
The Federal Circuit reversed the lower
638. SKF, 263 F.3d at 1379.
639. Id. at 1380. As the court explained, § 1677(16)(C) does permit aggregation,
because it “makes clear that Commerce may use aggregate data relating to
merchandise that is ‘of the same general class or kind as the subject merchandise.’”
Id. at 1380-81.
640. Id. (citing, inter alia, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 576 (1995)).
641. Id. at 1382.
642. Id. (quoting Transactive Corp. v. United States, 91 F.3d 232, 237 (D.C. Cir.
1996)).
643. Id.
644. Id. at 1382-83. The court posited, “[t]he more complex the statute, the
greater the obligation on the agency to explain its position with clarity.” Id. at 1383.
645. Id. at 1383 (citing Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992)).
646. 273 F.3d 1077 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
647. Id. at 1079.
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court on the first issue, and affirmed on the second.
In its first
administrative review of the antidumping duty order on canned
pineapple from Thailand, the Commerce Department found the
Thai home market for the foreign like product to be too small for the
determination of normal value, and turned instead to the Thai
649
producer’s sales in Germany. The Department further found that
some of these third-country sales were made at prices below the cost
of production and used constructed value for these sales as the basis
for normal value, calculating a single average cost of production for
650
the entire period of review.
The Thai producer objected to this
methodology, arguing that the Department should, due to rising
pineapple costs over the period of review, calculate separate costs of
production based on the company’s fiscal calendar, and also account
651
for the long lag time between production and sale.
The
Department did not alter its cost methodology, and the Thai
652
producer appealed to the Court of International Trade. That court
required the Commerce Department to recalculate cost of
production, taking into account the two fiscal periods overlapping
with the period of review, but it did not—as urged by the Thai
company—require the Department to base the cost of production on
merchandise sold (rather than produced) during the applicable
653
period.
The Court of International Trade also sustained the
Department’s decision to calculate a single assessment rate for the
entire period of review, rather than two rates, i.e., one for the socalled “cap period” preceding the final injury determination, and one
654
for the remainder of the period of review. An appeal to the Federal
Circuit followed.
648. Id.
649. See Canned Pineapple Fruit from Thailand, 62 Fed. Reg. 42,487, 42,488 (Aug.
7, 1997) (prelim. results and partial term. review).
650. Canned Pineapple Fruit from Thailand, 62 Fed. Reg. at 42,491. Pursuant to
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b)(3), the Commerce Department determines cost of production
by summing the cost of materials, fabrication, containers, coverings, and other
processing costs, and selling, general, and administrative expenses. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(b)(3) (1999).
651. See Canned Pineapple Fruit from Thailand, 63 Fed. Reg. 7,392, 7,399 (Feb.
13, 1998) (final admin. review).
652. Thai Pineapple, 273 F.3d at 1081.
653. See Thai Pineapple Canning Indus. Corp. v. United States, 1999 WL 288772
(Ct. Int’l Trade May 5,1999) (“Thai Pineapple I”) and Thai Pineapple Canning Indus.
Corp. v. United States, 2000 WL 174986 (Ct. Int’l Trade Feb. 10, 2000) (“Thai
Pineapple II”).
654. Entries of merchandise between the Commerce Department’s preliminary
antidumping determination and the International Trade Commission’s affirmative
injury determination are, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1673f(a), subject to an assessment
“cap.” 19 U.S.C. § 1673f(a) (1999). Specifically, if the deposit of the preliminary
estimated duty during this period is higher than the amount ultimately required by
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655

Applying the lower court’s standard of review,
the court
addressed the Thai producer’s contention that its dumping margin
was distorted by the Commerce Department’s refusal to address the
656
delay between production and sale.
The Federal Circuit rejected
the argument that the statute itself required closer matching of sales
with costs, finding that the statute did not dictate any particular
657
methodology in this regard.
However, turning to the question of
whether the Department’s interpretation was reasonable, the Federal
Circuit identified a series of instances in which the Commerce
Department had, in fact, adjusted its methodology to better match
658
production costs with prices.
Accordingly, it reasoned, “the
standard methodology may not be permissible in all scenarios
because Commerce has recognized that certain circumstances
659
warrant exceptions.”
Because the Department had departed from
its standard methodology in other cases presenting special
circumstances, the court reasoned that the Department was required
660
to do so in this case, which presented similar circumstances.
The
court remanded for reconsideration, ordering the Court of
International Trade to instruct the Commerce Department “to match
sales of goods to costs based on the period in which those goods were
661
manufactured, taking into account the inventory period.”
The Federal Circuit, however, upheld the Court of International
Trade’s decision affirming the agency’s calculation of a single
662
assessment rate for the entire period of review.
The court quickly
disposed of the argument that the statutory scheme, read as a whole,
663
requires assessment on an entry-by-entry basis.
As the court
explained, while 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2) requires dumping margins to
be determined on an entry-by-entry basis, § 1675(a)(2)(C) provides
the antidumping duty order, the difference is refunded; if, however, the preliminary
duty is lower, the difference is disregarded. Accordingly, the preliminary estimated
duty functions as a “cap” on the importer’s antidumping duty liability for entries
made during this period. Thai Pineapple I, 1999 WL 288772 at 11.
655. Thai Pineapple, 273 F.3d at 1083.
656. As the court explained, the other distortion alleged by the Thai producer—
the calculation, notwithstanding rising costs, of a single average cost of production
covering the entire period of review—was corrected on remand following the lower
court’s decision in Thai Pineapple I. Id. at 1081.
657. Id. at 1084 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b)(3) (1999)).
658. Id. (citing, inter alia, Static Random Access Memory Semiconductors from
Taiwan, 62 Fed. Reg. 51,422, 51,424 (Oct. 1, 1997) (prelimin. determination) (using
quarterly cost reporting periods during periods of significant price declines)).
659. Id. at 1084-85.
660. Id. at 1085.
661. Id.
662. Id.
663. Id. at 1086.
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considerable discretion with respect to the determination of
assessment rates, requiring only that calculated dumping margins
664
“shall be the basis” for antidumping duty assessment.
Finally, certain technical aspects of the dumping calculations in the
Commerce Department’s AFBs proceedings reached the Federal
665
Circuit in RHP Bearings Ltd. v. United States, and again the court
666
reversed part of the determination before it.
The issues—one
involving the “special rule” for calculating constructed export price
when substantial value is added to the merchandise by affiliated
667
importers post-importation,
and the other involving the
determination of constructed value—arose in the eighth
administrative review of the antidumping duty order on AFBs from
668
the United Kingdom.
On the first issue, the Commerce
Department, during its administrative review, sought and obtained
information from the U.K. producers regarding the value of further
processing of their merchandise in the United States prior to resale
669
to unaffiliated customers.
Notwithstanding the substantial value
that the Department found was added by the post-importation
further processing, it did not apply the special rule to the U.K.
670
producers’ sales.
Over the objections of the U.K. producers, the
Department explained in its final results of review that the rule was
discretionary, and that it was unnecessary to apply it where, as here,
671
the value added in the United States could be readily calculated.

664. Id. at 1085.
665. 288 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
666. Id. at 1347.
667. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(e), the special rule applies where “the value
added in the United States by the affiliated person is likely to exceed substantially the
value of the subject merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(e) (1999). Where the
Commerce Department finds this to be the case, and where the data permit, it must
base the constructed export price on either “[t]he price of identical subject
merchandise sold by the exporter or producer to an unaffiliated person,” or “[t]he
price of other subject merchandise sold by the exporter or producer to an
unaffiliated person.” § 1677a(e)(1)-(2). Section 1677a(e) also permits the
Department, where the U.S. value added is substantial, to employ “any other
reasonable basis” for determining the constructed export price.
As explained by the Federal Circuit, § 1677a(e), unlike § 1677a(d)(2) (requiring
the U.S. starting price to be reduced by the cost of any further manufacture or
assembly in the United States), “provides for calculating constructed export price
without reference to the price at which the further manufactured goods are sold to
an unaffiliated purchaser.” Id. at 1338.
668. See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom, 63 Fed. Reg. 33,320 (June 18, 1999) (final admin. review).
669. See id. at 33,345.
670. Id. at 33,338.
671. Id. at 33,338.
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The Court of International Trade affirmed this determination. On
the second issue, the Commerce Department applied the same
normal value methodology at issue in SKF, discussed above; i.e., it
determined it could not, using a narrow definition of the foreign like
product (identical AFBs or AFBs within the same family grouping),
base normal value on home-market prices; but then, for purposes of
establishing constructed value, it applied a broader measure of the
673
foreign like product.
The Court of International Trade also
674
affirmed this aspect of the Commerce Department’s determination.
U.K. producers appealed both issues to the Federal Circuit.
Stressing that its review of issues of statutory construction is
675
676
“without deference,” and applying Chevron principles, the Federal
Circuit turned first to the U.K. producers’ argument that the statute
mandates application of the special rule for determining constructed
export price under the circumstances because this result is explicitly
required by 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(2), which applies except where the
677
circumstances identified in § 1677a(e) are present.
Parsing the
statute, the court determined that Congress had directly addressed
the issue, in that it had left to the agency’s discretion to determine
when the “triggering circumstances” for application of the special
678
rule are present. The court also found that the legislative history to
the special rule made clear Congress’ intent to “ease administrative
burden” associated with the calculation of constructed export price,
in scenarios complicated by extensive value-added activities of U.S.
affiliated importers, by granting to the Commerce Department
practical alternatives to the complex task of isolating the value of the

672. See RHP Bearings, Ltd. v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2000).
673. See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom, 63 Fed. Reg. at 33,333.
674. See RHP, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1126-27.
675. RHP, 288 F.3d at 1343 (citing U.S. Steel Group v. United States, 225 F.3d
1284, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
676. See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (establishing a two step inquiry into administrative interpretation of statutes
which first examines the clarity of the statute and, absent clarity, examines whether
the administrative construction was reasonable and permissable).
677. RHP, 288 F.3d at 1343.
678. Id. at 1345. In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit focused on two
aspects of § 1677a(e)—first, that the Commerce Department was required to turn to
the two types of sales described in the special rule only if it “determines that the use
of such sales is appropriate,” and second, that the final sentence of the provision
empowers the Department to base constructed export price “on any other
reasonable basis.” Id. The court further noted, “[w]e do not think that the language
of the statute could present a clearer grant of discretion to Commerce.” Id.
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679

post-importation activities.
Having determined that Congress had
spoken directly to the issue, the court noted that it might have been
expected to turn to the question whether the Commerce
Department’s application of the special rule in this instance was
680
reasonable.
However, the court reasoned, appellants had not
raised the reasonableness of the Department’s methodology, arguing
before the court only that the statute dictated application of the
special rule: “[a]ccordingly, as far as the special rule is concerned,
the only thing left for us to do is affirm the conclusion of the Court of
681
International Trade.”
With respect to the constructed value issue,
the Federal Circuit vacated the lower court decision based on its
recent holding in SKF, and remanded for reconsideration in light of
682
that decision.
c.

Non-market economy exporters

The antidumping law provides a distinct methodology for the
calculation of normal value for exporters in non-market economy
683
(“NME”) countries.
The Commerce Department presumes that
NME producers and exporters operate under the control of the state,
and therefore does not determine normal value based on the home
market sales of such companies; rather, it constructs normal value
684
based on a “factors of production” methodology, which identifies
surrogate market economy values for the factors in countries at a
685
level of economic development comparable to the NME country.
During the last three years, two cases involving NME issues reached
the Federal Circuit—one involving the valuation of certain inputs, or
679. Id. (noting that the special rule “establishes a simpler and more effective
method for determining export price in situations where an affiliated importer adds
value to subject merchandise after importation”).
680. Id. at 1345-46.
681. Id. at 1346.
682. Id. (citing SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 263 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
683. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1) (1999) (providing that “the administering
authority shall determine the normal value of the subject merchandise of the basis of
the value of the factors of production utilized in producing the merchandise and to
which shall be added an amount for general expenses and profit plus the cost of
containers, coverings, and other expenses.”).
684. Id.
685. See id. (providing further that “valuation of the factors of production shall be
based on the best available information regarding the values of such factors in a
market economy country or countries considered to be appropriate by the
administering authority”). Subsection (c)(4) further instructs the Commerce
Department to “[u]tilize, to the extent possible, the prices or costs of factors of
production in one or more market economy countries that are (A) at a level of
economic development comparable to that of the non-market economy country, and
(B) significant producers of comparable merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4)
(1988).
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686

material factors, used by an NME producer, and the other involving
the circumstances pursuant to which resellers of NME-produced
687
merchandise are entitled to their own antidumping duty rates. The
Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court in both cases.
In Shakeproof Assembly Components, Inc. v. United States, the petitioner
in the investigation of helical spring lock washers from the People’s
Republic of China (“PRC”) challenged the Commerce Department’s
valuation, and the Court of International Trade’s affirmance, of steel
wire rod used by the PRC producer in manufacturing the subject
688
merchandise.
The Federal Circuit sustained the lower court’s
689
affirmance of the Commerce Department determination. Applying
690
Chevron deference, and noting that constructing normal value for a
producer in a non-market economy country is a “difficult” and
691
“imprecise” process, the Federal Circuit sustained the Commerce
Department’s methodology for valuing steel wire rod, based on
certain actual purchases of steel wire rod made by the PRC producer
692
from a British company.
Shakeproof contended that the
Commerce Department should have rejected this methodology
because the steel purchases at issue represented only one third of the
PRC producer’s total purchases of steel wire rod (the remainder
693
having been purchased from PRC suppliers).
The Federal Circuit
rejected this argument, agreeing with the Government that the
purchase price of the UK steel constituted the most accurate
information to determine the normal value of the domestically
694
obtained steel.
695
In Transcom, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit again
696
This time it affirmed
affirmed the Court of International Trade.
686. Shakeproof Assembly Components Div. of Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. United
States, 268 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
687. See Transcom, Inc. v. United States, 294 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
688. Shakeproof, 268 F.3d at 1378-80.
689. See id. at 1383 (agreeing with lower court that Commerce did not abuse its
discretion); see also Shakeproof Assembly Components Div. of Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v.
United States, 102 F. Supp. 2d 486 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2000); Certain Helical Spring
Lock Washers from the Peoples Republic of China, 62 Fed. Reg. 61,794 (Dep’t
Commerce Nov. 19, 1997) (final results of antidumping duty administrative review)
(upholding the use of actual imported steel prices to value steel inputs).
690. See Shakeproof, 268 F.3d at 1380-81 (addressing whether Congress has directly
spoken to the issue and whether the statutory interpretation is “based on a
permissive construction of the statute”).
691. Id. at 1381 (citing Nation Ford Chem. Co. v. United States, 166 F.3d 1373,
1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
692. Id. at 1382-83.
693. Id. at 1382.
694. Id. at 1383.
695. 294 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
696. See Transcom, Inc. v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 2d 690, 709 (Ct. Int’l Trade
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with respect to a dispute arising out of the Commerce Department’s
longstanding methodology of applying single, countrywide NME
antidumping rates unless individual exporters could demonstrate
legal, financial, and economic independence from the NME
697
government. At issue in Transcom was the PRC-wide rate calculated
by the Commerce Department in connection with the seventh
administrative review of the antidumping duty order on tapered
698
roller bearings (“TRBs”) from the PRC. Transcom sought to avoid
application of the seventh review rate—calculated on the basis of the
best information available (“BIA”)—to two of its Hong Kong-based
699
resellers of Chinese TRBs.
Transcom argued first, that under the
statutory and regulatory scheme in effect at the time of initiation of
the seventh review, requesters were required to identify all companies
for which review was requested, and second, that the Commerce
Department was required to limit any review to the companies
700
identified in the review request. The Federal Circuit rejected these
arguments, emphasizing that neither the statute nor the regulations
701
The Federal Circuit next rejected
required this approach.
Transcom’s argument that its resellers had not received adequate
notice that their U.S. sales would be affected by the seventh
702
administrative review of the TRBs order.
The court noted that a
“reasonably informed party” should be able to comprehend from
Commerce’s published notice whether the particular entries in which
the company has an interest may be affected by the administrative
703
review.
The court analyzed the Department’s initiation notice in
2000) (finding Commerce’s determination of antidumping duty rates to be
unreasonable under the relevant statutes).
697. Id. at 1381 (finding the statute to be silent regarding whether Commerce may
presume that parties are entitled to independent treatment). See generally Sigma
Corp. v. United States, 117 F.3d 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (discussing presumption that a
company that fails to establish independence from the NME entity is subject to the
country-wide rate, while a company that demonstrates its independence is entitled to
an individual rate).
698. See Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished,
from the Peoples Republic of China, 62 Fed. Reg. 6,189 (Dep’t Commerce Feb. 11,
1997) (final results of antidumping duty administrative review and revocation in part
of antidumping duty order) (finding that non-PRC exporters of merchandise from
the PRC will be subject to the cash deposit rate applicable to the PRC supplier).
699. Transcom, 294 F.3d at 1376. Under the pre-URAA antidumping law,
Commerce was authorized to resort to BIA when a party “refused or is unable to
produce information requested in a timely manner and in the form required, or
otherwise significantly impedes an investigation.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) (1988).
700. Id. at 1377.
701. Id. at 1377-78 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (1988) and 19 C.F.R. § 353.22,
provisions that have been superseded).
702. Id. at 1379.
703. Id. at 1378 (quoting Transcom, Inc. v. United States, 182 F.3d 876, 882-83
(Fed. Cir. 1999)).
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this case and found that, notwithstanding certain ambiguities in the
notice, it clearly announced that all exporters of TRBs from the PRC
704
The Federal
were subject, in the first instance, to the review.
Circuit further identified specific steps that Transcom’s resellers
could have taken to protect themselves from the possible adverse
705
effects of unfavorable final results of review.
Finally, the court
rejected Transcom’s argument in the alternative that, even if the
Commerce Department had properly subjected all exporters to the
706
review, its resort to BIA was improper.
As reasoned by the court,
Transcom’s contentions in this respect lacked merit because they
proceeded from the assumption that its resellers’ PRC producers
were independent of the PRC-wide entity, “when in fact the NME
presumption begins with the assumption that the producers are part
707
of the NME entity until they prove otherwise.”
d.

Determinations on the basis of the “facts available”

Antidumping and countervailing duty investigations are
complicated and fact-intensive, and usually entail the submission of
multiple rounds of questionnaires completed by respondents.
However, respondents sometimes do not—or cannot—provide
requested information, leaving gaps in the investigative record. The
statute, at 19 U.S.C. § 1677e, addresses the problem by authorizing
708
the Department to fill such gaps with the “facts available.”
The
statute also authorizes the Department to employ adverse inferences
in selecting from the facts available—but only if it finds that the party
has not acted “to the best of its ability” to comply with the
709
information request.
The statute also imposes on the Commerce
Department the obligation to corroborate any secondary information
(i.e., information not obtained from the respondents) used as facts
710
available. During the last three years, two cases involving the limits
704. Id. at 1378.
705. Id. at 1379. As the court explained, Transcom could have protected itself by
making sure that its Chinese suppliers proved their entitlement to separate rates by
participating in the review, or Transcom could have made sure that its Hong Kong
resellers verified their entitlement to intermediate country rates under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(f). Id.
706. Id. at 1380-81.
707. Id. at 1381.
708. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a) (2000) (providing that when necessary information
is not available the administering authority should use the facts available when
reaching a determination under this subtitle).
709. Id. § 1677e(b).
710. See § 1677e(c) (requiring that if the administering authority must rely on
secondary information instead of information received directly from a party in an
investigation or review, the administering authority should attempt to corroborate
that information with other, independent sources “reasonably at [its] disposal”).
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of the Commerce Department’s authority to employ facts available
came before the Federal Circuit, and in both instances the court
711
affirmed the lower court.
712
In F.lli De Cecco Di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United States, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of International Trade’s decision
requiring the Commerce Department to reset an adverse facts
available rate found for De Cecco in the antidumping duty
713
investigation of pasta from Italy. The Commerce Department, in its
original antidumping determination, found that De Cecco had not
cooperated with the investigation, and, based on information
supplied in the underlying petition, imposed on it an adverse rate of
714
46.67%.
De Cecco challenged this determination in the Court of
International Trade, which remanded the determination and
ultimately affirmed the Department’s use of a lower rate, 24.31%, as
715
had been calculated and verified for another respondent.
The
Government appealed, and the Federal Circuit reviewed the lower
716
court decision pursuant to the substantial evidence standard. First,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of International Trade’s
outright rejection of the 46.67% rate originally applied to De
717
Cecco.
The court found that there had been substantial evidence
before the lower court discrediting that rate, and that to permit
Commerce to impose such a high punitive rate, which has been
discredited by Commerce’s own investigation, would exceed the
718
agency’s already broad discretion. The Federal Circuit then turned
to the lower court’s suggestion that the Commerce Department use
the lower rate of 24.31%—the highest verified margin for another
719
pasta producer.
The Federal Circuit rejected the Government’s
contention that the lower court had ordered the Commerce
Department to apply this rate, finding the remand imposed no limit
711. See, e.g., F.lli De Cecco Di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United States, 216
F.3d 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United States, 298
F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
712. F.lli De Cecco, 216 F.3d 1027.
713. See id. at 1035 (finding that the Court of International Trade did not impose
on Commerce a required rate simply by suggesting a rate that would withstand
judicial scrutiny).
714. See Certain Pasta from Italy, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,326 (Dep’t Commerce June 17,
1996) (final determination).
715. See Borden, Inc. et al. v. United States, 1998 WL 895890 (Ct. Int’l Trade Dec.
16, 1998) (holding that, pursuant to CIT Rule 54(b), there was no reason to delay
entering a separate judgement concerning DeCecco’s claim).
716. F.lli De Cecco, 216 F.3d at 1031 (providing that the court would uphold
Commerce’s determination unless there was a finding of insufficient evidence).
717. See id. at 1033 (establishing that the rate was uncorroborated by Commerce).
718. Id. at 1033.
719. Id.
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720

on Commerce. However, the Federal Circuit also held that, even if
the Court of International Trade had specifically ordered use of the
24.31% rate, such an order would have been within the court’s
authority because the facts of the case so clearly showed that De
721
Cecco’s actual antidumping margin would have been even lower.
The court further emphasized that the corroboration requirement of
§ 1677e(c) demonstrated that Congress intended any adverse facts
722
available rates to be reasonable and grounded in reality.
723
In Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United States, the Federal
Circuit again affirmed the Court of International Trade’s holding
concerning the limits of the Commerce Department’s authority to
724
apply adverse facts available.
The case involved the third
administrative review of the antidumping duty order on welded
725
stainless steel pipe from Taiwan —the first of the reviews initiated
under the URAA provisions—and, specifically, the Commerce
Department’s determination, on remand, to apply an adverse facts
available rate to Ta Chen in light of its failure to supply information
726
about sales through a U.S. distributor, Sun Stainless, Inc.
The
Department found, based on the expanded affiliation provisions of
727
the URAA, that Ta Chen and Sun were affiliated for a portion of
728
The Department applied
the period covered by the third review.
an adverse facts available rate of 30.95% to Ta Chen, based on data
720. Id. Judge Schall issued a separate opinion on this point, concurring in part
and dissenting in part. Id. at 1035-37. In his view, the Court of International Trade
had set a ceiling on the adverse facts available rate that the Commerce Department
was allowed to use in setting De Cecco’s rate and, in doing so, had erred as a matter
of law by improperly limiting the agency’s discretion on remand. Id. As Judge Schall
explained, he would have remanded to the Commerce Department with instructions
to set a rate lower than 46.67%, but without specifying which rate to apply. Id. at
1036-37.
721. Id. at 1034. The court reasoned that De Cecco was considered a high-end
producer and “the other high-end producers, Delverde and De Matteis, received
dumping margins of only 2.80 percent and 0.67 percent (de minimis) respectively.”
Id. When compared to low-end producers who had higher dumping margins, those
averaged 16.71%. Id. The maximum of the “low-end rates was 24.31 percent; the
‘all-others’ rate was 12.09 percent;” therefore, “applying the highest low-end
producer rate to high-end producer De Cecco [was], in itself, an adverse inference.”
Id.
722. Id.
723. 298 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
724. Id. at 1340.
725. See Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe from Taiwan, 62 Fed. Reg. 37,543
(Dep’t Commerce July 14, 1997) (final admin. review).
726. See Ta Chen, 298 F.3d at 1334 (noting further that pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677m(d), Commerce should have provided adequate notice to Ta Chen regarding
the requirement to furnish Sun’s sales data for the United States).
727. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(33) (2000) (defining individuals that shall be considered
“affiliated” or “affiliated persons.”).
728. Ta Chen, 298 F.3d at 1333.
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derived from Ta Chen’s own sales during the third review period.
The Court of International Trade affirmed the Department’s remand
730
determination, and Ta Chen appealed.
Ta Chen raised three claims before the Federal Circuit related to
the Commerce Department’s imposition of adverse facts available
731
and the Federal Circuit rejected each.
First, Ta Chen argued that
the record of the third review did not contain substantial evidence of
732
affiliation with Sun.
The Federal Circuit, however, found that Ta
733
Chen had the burden to create an accurate record, and that it had
been on notice since the first administrative review that information
pertaining to its relationship with Sun might be requested, such that
734
it could have taken steps to preserve relevant records. Second, Ta
Chen argued that the Court of International Trade had
impermissibly affirmed the third review final results on grounds other
than those relied upon by the Commerce Department, but the
Federal Circuit held that the reasoning of the Court of International
735
Trade was consistent with the grounds invoked by Commerce.
Third, Ta Chen argued that the Commerce Department had violated
19 U.S.C. § 1677m by failing to notify it of deficiencies in the record
736
while those deficiencies could have been addressed.
The Federal
Circuit, however, held that where, as here, a party informs the
Commerce Department that it will not provide the requested
information, the Department is under no obligation to provide
737
subsequent deficiency notices. As explained by the court, § 1677m
applies only when a “response to a request” is insufficient, and an
absolute failure to respond is not a “response” for purposes of the
738
statute.
Finally, the Federal Circuit upheld the Court of
International Trade’s decision affirming the 30.95% adverse facts
729. Id. at 1334.
730. Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe v. United States, 2000 WL 1225799 (Ct. Int’l
Trade Aug. 25, 2000).
731. Ta Chen, 298 F.3d at 1336-41.
732. Id. at 1336.
733. See id. (citing Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1573, 1583 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (explaining that the burden of production belongs to the party in
possession of the required information).
734. Id. (explaining that Ta Chen assumed the risk that Commerce would need
the sales data alleged to be evidence of dumping activity when Sun was sold without
preserving the records of sale).
735. Id. at 1337.
736. Id. at 1337-38.
737. Id. at 1338.
738. Id. at 1338. 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d) provides that if Commerce finds a
response to an information request is deficient in that it does not address the
request, Commerce must inform the party submitting the response and provide that
person with an opportunity to correct the deficiency within the time limits
established for the completion of investigations and reviews. Id.
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available margin found by the Commerce Department, reasoning
that, unlike the situation before the court in De Cecco, this rate was
739
corroborated by actual Ta Chen sales data.
Judge Gajarsa issued a strong and lengthy dissent from the majority
opinion, arguing in essence that the Court of International Trade
and the panel majority had expected too much of Ta Chen and
740
Sun.
As he explained, Ta Chen could not reasonably have been
expected to know that the Commerce Department might in the
future request U.S. sales information based on a finding of affiliation
741
with Sun. Judge Gajarsa concluded that, if Commerce would like to
require all importers to keep sales records from any U.S. distributor
that might someday be deemed an affiliate, it must create a
742
regulation pursuant to statutory authority.
e.

Duty absorption

The URAA also amended U.S. antidumping law to provide for socalled “duty absorption inquiries,” pursuant to which the Commerce
Department is authorized to determine whether foreign producers
and exporters subject to antidumping duties are “absorbing” the cost
of antidumping duties through affiliated U.S. importers and resellers,
rather than passing this cost along to U.S. purchasers in the form of
higher prices. Specifically, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(4), the
Commerce Department must, if requested in administrative reviews
initiated two or four years following the imposition of an
antidumping duty order, “determine whether antidumping duties
have been absorbed by a foreign producer or exporter subject to the
order if the subject merchandise is sold in the United States through
an importer who is affiliated with such foreign producer or
743
exporter.” If the Commerce Department finds that duty absorption
739. Id. at 1339 (citing ., F.lli De Cecco Di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United
States, 216 F.3d 1027, at 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
740. Id. at 1340-50 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting).
741. Id. Judge Gajarsa observed, among other things, that during the third
administrative review, Commerce did not make clear to Ta Chen that under the new
statutory definition, Sun would be considered an affiliate, or even a potential
affiliate. Id. at 1344. Gajarsa went on to explain that “[a]lthough I agree with the
panel majority and the CIT that substantial evidence supports Commerce’s
determination that Sun and Ta Chen were affiliated within the meaning of
§ 1677(33)(G) for the early part of the third review period, I do not agree that any
statutory or regulatory authority authorizes the imposition of an adverse inference
against Ta Chen for Ta Chen’s failure to predict that Commerce would reach this
determination.” Id. at 1343-44.
742. Id. at 1349.
743. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(4) (1999). See FAG Italia S.P.A. v. United States, 291
F.3d 806 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining that the purpose of this provision is “to ensure
that foreign exporters identified by Commerce as dumping goods in the United
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has occurred, it is instructed by § 1675(a)(4) to notify the U.S.
International Trade Commission, which in turn is required to take
such a finding into account in conducting the required five-year, or
“sunset,” review of the antidumping order pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
744
§ 1675(c).
In the two duty absorption cases that reached the
Federal Circuit in the last three years, the court affirmed the Court of
International Trade in overturning the Commerce Department’s
interpretation of the duty absorption statute.
745
In FAG Italia, the Federal Circuit considered the legality of the
Commerce Department’s policy with respect to duty absorption
inquiries for so-called “transition orders,” i.e., antidumping duty
orders that entered into effect before January 1, 1995, the effective
746
date of the URAA.
Pursuant to its policy at the time, and as
reflected in its regulation promulgated in 1997 to implement
§ 1675(a)(4), the Commerce Department conducted duty absorption
747
inquiries for post-URAA orders, as well as for transition orders, even
though the statutory authority to conduct duty absorption inquiries
748
At issue in FAG
does not, on its face, apply to transition orders.
States do not undermine the purpose of the antidumping laws by ‘absorbing’ the
duty rather than passing the duty on to United States purchasers in the form of
higher prices”). In such circumstances, dumping continues despite the assessment
of the duty, and, as a result, “‘the remedial effect of an antidumping order may be
undermined . . . .’” Id. at 809 (citing Joint Report of the Committee on Finance,
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, Committee on Governmental
Affairs of the United States Senate to accompany S. 2467, S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 44
(1994)).
744. See FAG Italia, 291 F.3d at 810 (“[t]he consequence of a finding of duty
absorption by Commerce is that the anti-dumping order is less likely to be revoked as
a result of a sunset review.”). U.S. antidumping law as amended by the URAA
requires orders to be revoked five years after their imposition unless the Commerce
Department determines that revocation “would be likely to lead to continuation or
recurrence of dumping” and the U.S. International Trade Commission determines
that revocation “would be likely to lead to . . . material injury.” See 19 U.S.C. §
1675(c)(1) (1999).
745. FAG Italia, 291 F.3d at 806.
746. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(6)(C) (1999) (defining “transition order” as “an
antidumping duty order . . . which is in effect on the date the WTO Agreement
enters into force with respect to the United States,” i.e., January 1, 1995).
747. See FAG Italia, 291 F.3d at 811-12 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(j) (1998)); see
also § 351.213(j)(2) ( “For transition orders defined in § 751(c)(6) of the Act, the
Secretary will apply (j)(1) of this section to any administrative review initiated in
1996 or 1998.”).
748. In response to the Commerce Department’s proposed duty absorption
regulation, one commentor questioned the applicability of the regulation to
transition orders. Preamble to Proposed 19 C.F.R. § 351.213, 62 Fed. Reg. 27296,
27317 (May 19, 1997). The Commerce Department responded as follows: “Under
§ 751(c)(6)(D) of the Act, the Department is to treat transition orders, such as the
1993 orders in question, as being issued on January 1, 1995. Therefore, paragraph
(j)(2) properly permits absorption inquiries for transition orders to be requested in
any administrative review initiated in 1996 or 1998, because these are the second and
fourth years after the date on which transition orders are deemed to be issued.” Id.
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Italia was the transition order on AFBs from Italy, which had been
749
imposed in 1989. In its seventh administrative review of this order,
initiated in 1996, the Department conducted a duty absorption
inquiry and found that two Italian producers and exporters of subject
750
AFBs had engaged in duty absorption. The Court of International
Trade determined that the Department lacked statutory authority to
751
conduct duty absorption inquiries for transition orders, and the
Government appealed.
In articulating its standard of review, the Federal Circuit stated that
it would review this issue of statutory interpretation without
deference, except to the extent that deference might be warranted
752
under Chevron. The court then turned to § 1675(a)(4), noting that
the authority to conduct duty absorption inquiries was expressly
limited to reviews “initiated two years or four years after the
publication of an antidumping duty order” (i.e., 1991 and 1993 for
the AFBs order), and that the provision deeming transition orders to
be issued on January 1, 1995 operated, on its face, only with respect
753
to sunset reviews. The court rejected the Government’s arguments
that the Commerce Department was authorized to conduct two and
four-year reviews of transition orders based on the absence in the
statute of an express prohibition to do so, noting that “Commerce
754
seriously misunderstands its role under Chevron.”
The court went
on to stress that, notwithstanding the Commerce Department’s view
that application of the duty absorption statute was consistent with the
overall statutory scheme, “the absence of a statutory prohibition
755
cannot be the source of agency authority.”
at 27318.
749. See Ball Bearings and Cylindrical Roller Bearings, and Parts Thereof, from
Italy, 54 Fed. Reg. 20,903 (Dep’t Commerce, May 15, 1989).
750. See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts
Thereof From France et al., 62 Fed. Reg. 31,566 (Dep’t Commerce, June 19, 1997)
(preliminary admin. review) and Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France et al., 62 Fed. Reg. 54,043 (Dep’t
Commerce, Oct. 17, 1997) (final admin. review).
751. See FAG Italia S.P.A. v. United States, 2000 WL 978462 (Ct. Int’l Trade Ju. 13,
2000).
752. FAG Italia, 291 F.3d at 814.
753. Id. at 814. The court observed that “[t]here is no provision creating a
‘treated as’ date for transition orders for purposes of subsection (a), the subsection
governing duty absorption inquiries.” Id.
754. Id. at 815 (“Commerce can identify no ambiguities in the statute, nor any
statutory ‘gaps’ that Commerce is entitled to fill.”).
755. Id. at 816 (citing So. Cal. Edison Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 195
F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). The court explained that “the statutory silence as to
Commerce’s power to initiate duty absorption inquiries for transition orders does
not give Commerce authority to conduct such inquiries. The fact that Commerce is
empowered to take action in certain limited situations does not mean that
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Judge Michel concurred in part and dissented in part, concluding
that Congress did intend to provide to the Commerce Department
756
authority to conduct the requested duty absorption inquiry.
Explaining, among other things, that “[w]e read statutes not in
757
isolation but as a whole,” and that “where our construction involves
multiple statutory sections that were enacted simultaneously as part
758
of the same Act, ‘the duty to harmonize them is particularly acute,’”
Judge Michel reasoned that the various statutory provisions
connecting sunset review procedures with the authorization for duty
absorption inquiries could be reconciled by reading the statute to
authorize duty absorption inquiries in reviews of all orders, including
759
transition orders.
Duty absorption also arose in NTN Bearing Corporation, but the
Court of International Trade had already held that the Commerce
Department had no authority under the statute to conduct a duty
760
absorption inquiry for the transition order at issue, and so the
Federal Circuit merely referenced its earlier decision on this point in
761
FAG Italia, and affirmed.
f.

Assessment

While calculation of an antidumping rate typically is already
complex, actual assessment of the rate with respect to individual
762
entries of merchandise can present additional complexity. During
the last three years, in addition to the assessment issue that arose in
Thai Pineapple, the Federal Circuit was presented with one case—Koyo
Seiko Co. v. United States—involving the Commerce Department’s
assessment regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 351.212(b)(1), and specifically
whether this regulation constituted a reasonable interpretation of the
763
antidumping statute. Section 351.212(b)(1) provides, in pertinent
Commerce enjoys such power in other instances.” Id. at 817.
756. Id. at 822.
757. Id. at 820 (citing United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822 (1984)).
758. Id. (quoting U.S. West Comm., Inc. v. Hamilton, 224 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th
Cir. 2000)).
759. Id. at 821.
760. See NTN Bearing Corp. of Am. v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 2d 110, 157-58
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2000) (ordering annulment of the Department’s duty absorption
findings).
761. NTN Bearing Corp. of Am. v. United States, 295 F.3d 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
762. See, e.g., Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 258 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(explaining the wide range of numbers that can occur when calculating the
assessment rate by linking it to specific entries of imported merchandise, but
ultimately upholding Commerce’s use of entered value of imported merchandise in
the assessment calculation).
763. Id. at 1341-42. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(C) (Supp. 2002) (providing that
“the determination . . . shall be the basis for the assessment of countervailing or
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part, that the Department will “calculate the assessment rate by
dividing the dumping margin found on the subject merchandise
examined by the entered value of such merchandise for normal
764
customs duty purposes.” As explained by the court, “the assessment
rate is calculated ‘as a percentage of entered value’ of the subject
765
merchandise sold in the United States during the review period.”
Such a methodology is required because a respondent’s sales and
imports are not the same during any particular review period—and in
766
fact may be significantly different.
Koyo Seiko challenged the
Department’s assessment regulation before the Court of
767
International Trade,
which upheld the regulation and the
768
Department’s assessment methodology. This appeal followed.
Koyo argued before the Federal Circuit in Koyo Seiko that because
the numerator of the Commerce Department’s assessment formula is
based on sales values (i.e., the difference between home market and
United States sales values), the denominator must also be based on
769
sales values.
Beginning its Chevron analysis with the express
language of the statute, the Federal Circuit noted at the outset that
nothing in the statute required Koyo’s methodology or invalidated
770
the Department’s methodology. The Federal Circuit acknowledged
that Koyo’s preferred methodology appeared logical, but explained
that its burden was to show that the Department’s regulation was
771
arbitrary or otherwise unreasonable; and it failed to do so.
The

antidumping duties on entries of merchandise”).
764. 19 C.F.R. § 351.212(b)(1) (2000). As explained by the Federal Circuit,
“entered value” is typically defined as being “equal to the invoice value of the subject
merchandise less freight, insurance premium costs, and other non-dutiable charges.”
Koyo Seiko, 258 F.3d at 1243 n.3 (quoting Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 110 F.
Supp. 2d at 934, 938 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2000)).
765. See Koyo Seiko, 258 F.3d at 1343 (citing Torrington Co. v. United States, 44
F.3d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
766. Id. at 1342.
767. The underlying administrative determination is the Commerce Department’s
final results of the 1996-97 administrative review of the antidumping order on
Tapered Roller Bearings from Japan. See Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof,
Finishing and Unfinished, from Japan, and Tapered Roller Bearings, Four Inches or
Less in Outside Diameter, and Components Thereof, from Japan, 63 Fed. Reg.
63,875 (Dep’t of Commerce Nov. 17, 1998). In this determination, the Department
explained that, “[i]n accordance with 19 C.F.R. 351.212(b)(1), we will calculate
importer-specific ad valorem assessment rates for the merchandise based on the ratio
of the total amount of antidumping duties calculated for the examined sales made
during the [period of review] to the total customs value of the sales used to calculate
those duties [i.e., the entered value].” Id. at 63,875. This rate will be assessed
uniformly on all entries each importer made during the period of review. Id.
768. Koyo Seiko, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 943.
769. Id. at 1346.
770. Koyo Seiko, 258 F.3d at 1346.
771. Id. at 1347.
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court reasoned that if, alternatively, the Department’s methodology
were to be applied to a base of constructed export price sales, such a
methodology would be unreasonable “since an accurate assessment
rate using sales figures would recover the dumping margin, and no
772
more and no less.”
However, it further reasoned, the assessment
rate is not applied to a respondent’s sales during the period of review
but, as required by 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a), to its customs entries during
773
this period. The court also noted that “since the assessment rate is
applied to entries and not to sales, there is at least a certain symmetry
774
in using entered value as the denominator.”
Finally, the court
posited that Koyo’s strongest argument might have been that the
Commerce Department’s assessment methodology is unreasonable
because the Department uses a different methodology for cash
deposits; however, it concluded that the statute does not require
assessment rates and cash deposit rates to be calculated in the same
775
manner.
5.

Countervailing duty methodologies
During the three years under review, the Federal Circuit issued a
single published decision concerning the calculation of
776
countervailing duties, Delverde, SrL v. United States, and reversed the
Court of International Trade on one of the most hotly disputed
countervailing duty issues of recent years—whether subsidies
benefiting a firm’s productive assets can “pass through” to new
owners of those assets when they are sold in an arm’s-length
777
transaction.
Delverde, a respondent in the Commerce
Department’s countervailing duty investigation of Pasta From Italy,
had purchased certain assets prior to initiation of the Department’s
investigation from an unrelated company that had previously
778
Applying its
received subsidies from the Italian government.
standard methodology, the Commerce Department quantified a “pass
through” benefit amount representing a residuum of the subsidies to
772. Id. at 1348.
773. Id.
774. Id.
775. See id. (citing Torrington Co. v. United States, 44 F.3d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1995)).
776. 202 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (rehearing granted with modification June 20,
2000; rehearing en banc denied June 20, 2000, reported at 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
15215).
777. Delverde, 202 F.3d at 1369-70 (vacating the Court of International Trade’s
decision and instructing that court to remand the case for the Department to
determine if Delverde received a subsidy).
778. Id. at 1362 (describing Delverde’s assets from the purchase as including a
pasta factory, related products assets, name, and trademark rights).
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the previous owner of the assets and imputed that benefit amount to
779
Delverde challenged the Department’s methodology,
Delverde.
and the Court of International Trade eventually affirmed, on
780
remand. Delverde appealed to the Federal Circuit.
At the core of the Federal Circuit’s analysis was the “Change of
781
Ownership” provision added by the URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(F).
Section 1677(5)(F) provides that “[a] change in ownership of all or
part of a foreign enterprise or the productive assets of a foreign
enterprise does not by itself require a determination by an
administering authority that a past countervailable subsidy received
by the enterprise no longer continues to be countervailable, even if
the change of ownership is accomplished through an arm’s length
782
transaction.” Reviewing this provision, its statutory context, and the
legislative history, the Federal Circuit concluded that the meaning of
the statute was clear, such that it was not necessary to defer to the
Department’s interpretation under Chevron, but to determine if the
783
Department’s interpretation was in accordance with the statute.
Because the statute barred the operation of a pass-through
presumption, while the Department had “conclusively presumed that
Delverde received a subsidy from the Italian government,” the court
784
struck down the Department’s interpretation.
The court also
distinguished the facts of the case at bar from the “privatization”
785
cases
in which courts had reviewed a series of government
divestitures of industrial assets, and whether those transactions had
786
endowed the new owners of the assets with countervailable benefits.

779. Id. (citing Certain Pasta from Italy, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,288 (Dep’t of Commerce
June 14, 1996) (final affirmative countervailing duty determination).
780. Delverde, SrL v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d 314 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1998).
781. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(F) (2000).
782. Id.
783. Delverde, 202 F.3d at 1367.
784. Id. The court found that the Department had applied a per se rule in that it
had deemed the facts and circumstances surrounding the sale to be irrelevant, and
that it had not identified any evidence that Delverde received a financial
contribution and benefit for purposes of 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(D) and (E). Id. As
summarized by the court, “[n]owhere following its methodology did Commerce
determine whether Delverde directly or indirectly received a financial contribution
and benefit from one of the acts enumerated.” Id.
785. See, e.g., Saarstahl AG v. United States, 78 F.3d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(“Saarstahl II”) (finding reasonable Commerce’s determination that subsidies were
not extinguished by privatization through arm’s-length sale, but could be partially
repaid by the purchase price); British Steel PLC v. United States, 127 F.3d 1471 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (holding that Commerce developed “reasonable interpretation of
countervailing duty statute to account for repayment of prior subsidies during
privatization of government owned entity”).
786. See generally Delverde, 202 F.3d at 1369-70 (analyzing related Federal Circuit
precedent and distinguishing it from the case at bar).
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As the court noted:
[T]here are significant differences between privatization and
private-to-private sales. The government has different concerns
from those of a private seller. Unlike a private seller who seeks the
highest market price for its assets, the government may have other
goals, such as employment, national defense, and political
concerns, which may affect the terms of a privatization
787
transaction.”

In concluding its discussion, the court also noted that a WTO
dispute settlement panel had recently found the same methodology,
as applied in the privatization context, to be inconsistent with U.S.
obligations under the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
788
Agreement.
However, the court dismissed the relevance of that
789
panel ruling to its analysis in this case. The court remanded to the
Court of International Trade, ordering it to instruct the Commerce
Department to determine, based on the specific facts and
circumstances surrounding the Delverde transaction, whether that
company had indirectly received a financial contribution and benefit
through the transaction and if it did not, to recalculate Delverde’s
countervailing duties without regard to subsidies bestowed on the
790
previous owner of the assets.
B. U.S. International Trade Commission
Finally, during the last three years, three decisions of the U.S.
International Trade Commission reached the Federal Circuit. Under
U.S. trade remedy law, antidumping and countervailing duties may
be imposed only if the Commission finds, following an investigation
as prescribed by law, that the imports under investigation (or subject
imports) cause material injury, or threaten to cause material injury,
791
However, notwithstanding the
to the U.S. industry seeking relief.
787. Id. at 1369.
788. See id. at 1369 (citing WTO Dispute Panel Report on United States—
Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth
Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, No. WT/DS138/R, at 3950 (Dec. 23, 1999)) (finding that the privatization of a government-owned company
in an arm’s-length, fair market value transaction extinguishes any pre-privatization
subsidies, such that the new owner of the company does not benefit from the
previously bestowed subsidies).
789. Id. (explaining that the court did not consider the relevance of the WTO
panel decision, except to say the decision was not inconsistent with the current
decision, since Commerce’s methodology was invalid under the Tariff Act).
790. Id. at 1369-70.
791. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a), 1673 (1999). Current U.S. law recognizes one
exception to the general requirement that duties may be imposed only upon a
finding by the Commission of injury or threat of injury. Specifically, with respect to
countervailing duties only, the requirement applies only “in the case of merchandise
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considerable commercial implications of Commission injury
determinations—affirmative
injury
determinations
allow
antidumping and countervailing duties to stand, while negative injury
determinations preclude their imposition—they are appealed far less
frequently than antidumping and countervailing duty determinations
792
of the Commerce Department. In the three cases discussed below,
the Federal Circuit applied the same level of rigorous review as seen
in its review of other trade remedy cases—resulting in two
793
affirmances of the Court of International Trade, and one reversal.
794
In Goss Graphics Systems, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
quickly disposed of a challenge brought by German and Japanese
producers of Lareg Newspaper Printing Presses (“LNPP”s) to two
aspects of the Commission’s determination involving this
795
merchandise. The producers contended, first, that the Commission
had improperly “cumulated” German and Japanese imports in
assessing the effects of the imports on the U.S. industry pursuant to
796
19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(G)(i) and (H)
and, second, that the
imported from a Subsidies Agreement country.” 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2) (1999).
U.S. law defines a “Subsidies Agreement country” as: (1) any Member of the WTO;
(2) any country with respect to which the United States has assumed obligations
“substantially equivalent” to obligations under the WTO SCM Agreement; and (3)
any country with respect to which the President of the United States has made
certain enumerated findings. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b) (1999).
At the heart of the Commission’s analysis is a statutorily mandated three-part test,
which requires the Commission, in an injury investigation, to consider: (1) the
volume of imports of the subject merchandise; (2) the effect of subject imports on
U.S. prices; and (3) the impact of subject imports on the U.S. industry seeking relief.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B) (1999).
792. The fact that appeals of Commission determinations are infrequent when
compared to appeals of Commerce Department determinations may reflect, in part,
the sense that appeals are unlikely to lead to reversal of the challenged
determination. For example, even if the reviewing court finds certain aspects of a
Commission determination to be unlawful, a remand determination correcting the
error or errors can reach the same result as the underlying, challenged
determination.
793. The standard of review prescribed by statute requires the reviewing court to
“hold unlawful” a determination that is “unsupported by substantial evidence on the
record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i)
(1996) In applying this standard (the same standard applied by the Court of
International Trade), the Federal Circuit does not defer to the lower court.
Nevertheless, in one of the decisions discussed the Federal Circuit cited an earlier
decision holding that, in performing its review, it “will not ignore the informed
opinion of the Court of International Trade.” See Taiwan Semiconductor Indus.
Ass’n v. United States, 266 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Suramerica de
Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 44 F.3d 978, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
794. 216 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
795. Id. at 1359.
796. Section 1677(7)(G)(i), which applies to material injury, and § 1677(7)(H),
which applies to threat of material injury, both provide, with respect to petitions filed
on the same day, for cumulative assessment of the “volume and price effects of
imports of the subject merchandise . . . if such imports compete with each other and
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Commission’s threat-of-injury determination was unsupported by
797
Applying the substantial evidence standard of
record evidence.
798
review, the Federal Circuit upheld the Court of International
Trade’s affirmance of the Commission’s determination on both
799
counts. On the cumulation issue, the Federal Circuit stated at the
outset of its analysis that the Commission enjoys considerable
flexibility in determining whether there is overlapping competition
between subject imports and the domestic like product for purposes
800
of § 1677(7)(G) and (H), and hence that cumulation is warranted.
The court reviewed the various factors that the Commission had
801
examined, and noted that the challenge was based on purported
misapplication of only one of these factors, i.e., that the German and
Japanese LNPPs competed directly with each other in the final stage
802
of the bidding process. The court rejected this argument, agreeing
with the Commission that “no single indicator for weighing
competitive overlap is dispositive,” and that the record as a whole
provided “sufficient evidence of overlap in the end-use market to
803
justify cumulation.”
In its review of the Commission’s threat
determination, the Federal Circuit emphasized that, under
§ 1677(7)(F), “[a]n affirmative finding of threat of material injury
requires substantial evidence on the entire record that the domestic
industry faces a real threat of imminent material injury from the
804
subject imports.”
The court also stressed that, pursuant to
§ 1677(7)(F)(ii), a threat determination requires findings of both a
“temporal relationship” and a “causal connection” between the
with domestic like products in the United States market.” In other words, in certain
injury investigations involving imports from more than one country, the Commission
does not examine the effects of the imports on the U.S. industry on a country-bycountry basis, but considers the effects on an aggregated, or cumulative, basis. 19
U.S.C. 1677(7)(G)(i), (7)(H) (1996).
797. Goss, 216 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
798. Id. at 1361 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (1999) and Suramerica de
Aleaciones Laminadas v. United States, 44 F.3d 978, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
799. See Goss Graphic Sys., Inc. v. United States, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1104 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 1998); see also Large Newspaper Printing Press and Components Thereof,
Whether Assembled or Unassembled, from Germany and Japan, Inv. Nos. 731-TA736 and 737, 61 Fed. Reg. 46824 (Sept. 1996).
800. Goss, 216 F.3d at 1361 (citing Fundicao Tupy, S.A. v. United States, 859 F.2d
915 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (stating that, while a Fundicao analysis helps identify
overlapping competition, “other ways may apply in future cases”).
801. Id. at 1361-62 (noting that the Commission found that German and Japanese
LNPPs: (1) were generally sold through similar channels of trade, (2) occupied the
market simultaneously, and (3) were not limited by geographic boundaries within
the United States).
802. Id. at 1362.
803. Id.
804. Id. (citing Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 44
F.3d 978, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
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805

subject imports and the threat of material injury.
The court then
found that the Commission had examined all pertinent factors—
including all factors required to be examined under § 1677(7)(F)(i),
such as the ability of importers to shift future production to the
United States, the rate of increase of subject producers’ U.S. market
penetration, and factors likely to contribute to price suppression and
depression—and that the Commission’s findings were supported by
806
substantial evidence.
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Taiwan Semiconductor concluded
lengthy litigation involving two remands from the Court of
International Trade to the Commission and the ultimate reversal of
the Commission’s original determination that imports of Taiwanese
static random access memory chips (“SRAMs”) materially injured the
807
U.S. SRAMs industry.
Based on an antidumping petition filed by
Micron Technology, Inc., a U.S. semiconductor producer, the
Commission in its original investigation found that imports of
808
Taiwanese SRAMs injured the U.S. industry. On review, the Court
of International Trade neither affirmed nor reversed, but remanded
to the Commission for further explanation of the causal nexus
809
between the subject imports and injury to the U.S. industry.
On
remand, the Commission again found that subject the imports
injured the domestic industry, and on review, the Court of
International Trade again held that more explanation was required,
810
and remanded for a second redetermination. In its third decision,
the Court of International Trade upheld the Commission’s
811
determination.
Micron appealed.
Applying the substantial
evidence standard of review—but also noting that the lower court’s
812
opinion “deserves due respect” —the Federal Circuit first addressed
Micron’s claim that the Court of International Trade had improperly
805. Id. at 1362 (citing NEC Corp. v. Dept. of Commerce, 36 F. Supp. 2d 380, 391
(Ct. Int’l Trade 1998)).
806. Id. at 1363. Section 1677(7)(F)(i) enumerates nine factors that the
Commission “shall consider, among other relevant factors.”
19
U.S.C.
§ 1677(7)(F)(i) (1999).
807. Taiwan Semiconductor Indus. Ass’n v. United States, 266 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
808. Id. at 1341 (citing Static Random Access Memory Semiconductors from
Taiwan, 63 Fed. Reg. 8909 (Dept. of Commerce, Feb. 23, 1998)).
809. See Taiwan Semiconductor Indus. Assoc. v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1324
(Ct. Int’l Trade 1999).
810. See Taiwan Semiconductor Indus. Assoc. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1283
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2000).
811. See Taiwan Semiconductor Indus. Assoc. v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 2d
1250 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2000).
812. Taiwan Semiconductor, 266 F.3d at 1343-44 (quoting Suramerica de Aleaciones
Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 44 F.3d 978, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
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remanded the Commission’s initial affirmative injury decision. The
Federal Circuit reviewed the lower court’s reasons for seeking
additional explanation from the Commission and, citing its decision
in Gerald Metals, stressed the requirement for the Commission to
determine that the subject imports are causing the injury, “not simply
814
The
contributing to the injury in a tangential or minimal way.”
Federal Circuit then turned to the substance of the Commission’s
second remand determination that the subject imports did not make
a material contribution to the injury suffered by the U.S. SRAMs
industry. Noting, among other things, that during the time of
greatest injury to the U.S. industry, Taiwanese imports tended to be
priced higher than U.S.-produced SRAMs, and also that Taiwanese
market share had remained relatively constant while non-subject
imports, predominantly of Japanese and Korean origin, had
increased substantially, the Federal Circuit held that substantial
evidence supported the Commission’s finding that the Taiwanese
imports did not contribute materially to the injury caused by the
815
other factors. The Federal Circuit concluded that “the high volume
and low price of Taiwanese SRAMs had some injurious impact on
United States industry,” but also that substantial evidence before the
Commission demonstrated the existence of multiple causes of injury
816
to the U.S. industry other than the Taiwanese imports.
817
In Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
vacated and remanded the decision of the Court of International
Trade, finding that it had improperly sustained the Commission’s
analysis with respect to each of the three factors that the Commission
must consider under § 1677(B)(i), i.e., the volume of subject imports,
the price effects of subject imports, and the impact of subject imports
818
on the domestic industry. In its underlying injury investigation, the
813. Id. at 1344. While the court applied the substantial evidence standard of
review, stating that it was “stepping into the shoes of the Court of International
Trade and duplicating its review,” the court also noted that the standard of review
applicable to a Court of International Trade request for further information “is a
matter of first impression for this court.” Id. Citing decisions of the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the Federal Circuit concluded that a
remand for further explanation was within the lower court’s discretion, and was
reviewable for abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470
U.S. 729, 744 (1985) and Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1988)).
814. Id. at 1345 (citing Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d 716, 722
(Fed. Cir. 1997)).
815. Id. at 1346-47. The Federal Circuit also identified an oversupply caused by
industry-wide mis-estimation of demand for certain types of SRAMs in personal
computers as a significant factor in the injury experienced by U.S. producers. Id.
816. Id. at 1347.
817. 287 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
818. Id. at 1368. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(B)(i) (1999).
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Commission determined that the merchandise covered by the
petition, coiled stainless steel plate, encompassed two distinct
domestic like products—hot-rolled plate and cold-rolled plate—and
819
found injury with respect to the former but not the latter.
The
820
Court of International Trade affirmed, and Allegheny appealed
that portion of the decision affirming the Commission’s finding that
the U.S. cold-rolled steel plate industry was not injured by subject
821
imports. Citing its articulation of the applicable standard of review
822
823
in Taiwan Semiconductor and Gerald Metals, the Federal Circuit
turned first to Allegheny’s contention that the Court of International
Trade had improperly affirmed the Commission’s application of
824
§ 1677(4)(D)—the so-called “product line provision” —in analyzing
the effect of subject imports on product prices and their impact on
825
the domestic industry.
Specifically, because of the scarcity of
separate data for the very small cold-rolled segment of the stainless
steel coiled plate market, the Commission invoked the product line
provision and based key portions of its injury analysis on data
pertaining not to the narrow cold-rolled sector, but to the entire
826
stainless steel coiled plate market.
The Federal Circuit agreed with Allegheny, however, that the
Commission should have done more in attempting to obtain data
specific to the cold-rolled portion of the stainless steel coiled plate
827
market.
Citing Court of International Trade precedent requiring
819. Allegheny, 287 F.3d at 1368. Central to the Commission’s determination of
two like products was its finding that the industry producing cold-rolled plate was
very small in comparison to the industry producing hot-rolled plate, and that the
cold-rolled plate industry served a small, niche market. The court explained that
“[a]s cold-rolled plate requires additional processing, it is more costly than hot-rolled
plate,” and also that “[o]ver 99.9 percent of domestic steel plate production is hotrolled plate.” Id.
820. Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2000).
821. Allegheny, 287 F.3d at 1369.
822. 266 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
823. 132 F.3d 716 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
824. The “product line provision” provides as follows:
The effect of dumped imports . . . shall be assessed in relation to the United
States production of a domestic like product if available data permit the
separate identification of production in terms of such criteria as the
production process or the producer’s profits. If the domestic production of
the domestic like product has no separate identity in terms of such criteria,
then the effect of the dumped imports . . . shall be assessed by the
examination of the production of the narrowest group or range of products,
which includes a domestic like product, for which the necessary information
can be provided.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(D) (1999).
825. Allegheny, 287 F.3d at 1370-72.
826. Id. at 1370-71.
827. Id. at 1375-76.
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“the Commission to actively attempt to obtain relevant data before
828
resorting to the product line provision,” and noting, among other
things, that the Commission (unlike the Commerce Department) has
the authority to issue subpoenas in connection with its investigations,
the Federal Circuit held that the Commission should have attempted
to obtain additional information specific to the cold-rolled sector
829
before resorting to the product line provision. The Federal Circuit
also found fault in the Commission’s analysis of the effect of subject
imports on domestic prices, finding in particular that the
Commission had drawn the wrong inference from the decline,
during the period of investigation, of the average unit value (“AUV”)
830
and that reliance on AUV data was
of the subject imports,
questionable given that these data were “strongly influenced by a few
831
orders of particular grade or size.”
Finally, the Federal Circuit
considered whether the Court of International Trade had properly
based its affirmance of the Commission’s finding of no material
injury with respect to cold-rolled coiled stainless steel plate on the
domestic industry’s apparent lack of interest in the production and
832
sale of this specialized product. The Federal Circuit held that the
lower court had erred. While it was proper for the Commission to
assess economic factors other than those specifically enumerated in
the statute, such an analysis “cannot replace the mandatory elements
of the analysis {i.e., price, volume, and impact}, absent a showing that
833
The
those elements, in a given case, simply cannot be assessed.”
Federal Circuit further clarified that a reviewing court may uphold a
Commission determination containing some errors, but that a
determination resting on flawed application of each of the three
mandatory statutory factors cannot stand under the substantial
evidence standard—particularly where, as here, the Commission has
834
not met its obligation to seek the necessary information.
828. Id. at 1371 (citing Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United States, 521 F. Supp. 479
(Ct. Int’l Trade 1981)).
829. Id. at 1372 (citing Olympic Adhesives, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1565,
1571 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
830. Id. at 1374. While the Commission had concluded that declining subject
import AUVs over the period of investigation did not cause the concurrent domestic
price declines (because subject import prices were higher than domestic prices), the
Federal Circuit found that “the falling prices of the imported merchandise would
seem to support a finding of material injury to domestic producers, despite the fact
that the subject imports were priced higher than corresponding domestic like
products.” Id.
831. Id.
832. Id. at 1375-76.
833. Id. at 1375-76 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B) (1999)).
834. Id. at 1376-77 (citing, inter alia, Angus Chem. Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d
1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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III. TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The recent international trade jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit
also reflects—as would be expected given the sweeping nature of the
Court of International Trade’s residual jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(i)—initiatives by Congress to restrict or control foreign trade
835
based on environmental considerations.
As with many of the
international trade cases described above, the disputes discussed
below played out over many years, were hotly contested, and
generated substantial commercial uncertainty prior to final
disposition by the Federal Circuit. These cases also present a mixed
record of affirmance and reversal of the lower court.
836
First, in The Humane Society of the United States v. Clinton, the
Federal Circuit affirmed a decision of the Court of International
Trade denying relief sought by a coalition of animal protection
organizations under the High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement
837
Act (“Driftnet Act”). The Driftnet Act, enacted by the United States
in 1992 to implement various U.N. resolutions calling for a global
ban on certain driftnet fishing practices, authorizes the United States
to take certain actions against foreign countries—in this case, Italy—
in response to continued use of large-scale driftnet fishing practices
838
on the high seas.
The Driftnet Act provides, among other things,
that whenever the Secretary of Commerce has reason to believe that
vessels or nationals of any nation are conducting large-scale driftnet
fishing on the high seas, the Secretary must identify that nation, and
839
notify the President and the offending nation of the identification.
Upon such notification, the President is obligated to consult with the
foreign government “for the purpose of obtaining an agreement that
will effect the immediate termination of large-scale driftnet fishing by
840
the nationals or vessels of that nation.”
Unless such consultations
are “satisfactorily concluded,” the President must order the Secretary
of the Treasury to prohibit importation into the United States of fish
841
and fish products from that country.

835. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (1999).
836. 236 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
837. Id. at 1333. Plaintiffs-appellants were the Humane Society of the United
States, Humane Society International, and Defenders of Wildlife. See id. at 1321.
The Driftnet Act is codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1826-1826g (1999).
838. Humane Soc’y, 236 F.3d at 1322-23.
839. 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)(1)(B) (2000).
840. 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b) (2000).
841. 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2000).
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In response to an earlier challenge by the Humane Society, the
Department of Commerce, in March 1996, identified Italy as a nation
for which there was reason to believe its nationals or vessels were
843
conducting large-scale driftnet fishing.
Subsequently, acting
through the Department of State, the President entered into
consultations with Italy concerning its fishing practices on the high
seas, and in July 1996 the two countries finalized an agreement that
844
Italy would end driftnet fishing by its nationals and vessels.
In
January 1997, the Secretary of Commerce certified to the President
and Congress that Italy had terminated the illegal driftnet fishing
845
practices at issue.
The Humane Society, however, obtained
evidence of the continuation of proscribed driftnet fishing practices
by Italian vessels in the Mediterranean, and filed suit with the Court
846
of International Trade.
Before that court, the Humane Society
sought: a writ of mandamus directing the President to impose
sanctions on Italy based on the 1996 identification; an order
requiring the Secretary of Commerce to revoke his 1997 certification
that Italy had discontinued prohibited driftnet fishing practices; and
an order requiring the Secretary of Commerce to re-identify Italy
847
under the Driftnet Act. The Court of International Trade held for
the Government on the first two counts, but for the Humane Society
848
on the third. The Humane Society appealed the first two aspects of
the lower court’s decision, and the Federal Circuit affirmed.
After stating that the dispute would be reviewed pursuant to the
849
APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard, the Federal Circuit turned
to the threshold question whether the President and other executive
842. See, e.g., Humane Soc’y of the United States v. Brown, 901 F. Supp. 338 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 1995); Humane Society of the United States v. Brown, 920 F. Supp. 178
(Ct. Int’l Trade 1996) (suing Secretaries of Commerce and State to compel
enforcement of the Driftnet Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1826-1826g).
843. See Humane Soc’y, 920 F. Supp. at 195 (stating that “[t]his court is now
constrained to conclude that identification of Italy under 16 U.S.C. § 1826(b)(1)(B)
has been unlawfully withheld and unreasonably delayed”); see also Humane Soc’y, 236
F.3d at 1323 (describing the Secretary of Commerce’s recommendation of sanctions
against Italy in response to the Court of International Trade’s earlier decisions).
844. Humane Soc’y, 236 F.3d at 1323.
845. Id.
846. Id. at 1323-24.
847. Id. at 1323.
848. Humane Soc’y of the United States v. Clinton, 44 F. Supp. 2d 260, 279 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 1999), aff’d, 236 F.3d 320 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
849. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1996) (instructing the reviewing court to hold unlawful
any conclusions found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or
otherwise not in accordance with law.”). The court explained that it “will apply the
standard of review set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 706 to an action instituted pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1581(i).” Humane Soc’y, 236 F.3d at 1325 (citing Miami Free Zone Corp. v.
Foreign-Trade Zones Bd., 136 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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officers were immune from suit due to sovereign immunity.
The
answer hinged on the interpretation of the pertinent provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 1581(i), specifically subsection 1581(i)(3), covering
“embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of
merchandise for reasons other than the protection of the public
851
and subsection 1581(i)(4), covering
health and safety,”
852
“administration and enforcement.”
The Federal Circuit agreed
with the Humane Society that the legislative history to the Customs
Courts Act of 1980 indicated that § 1581 itself waived sovereign
853
immunity.
The court also reasoned that statutory provisions and
caselaw defining the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims—a
court with jurisdiction “complementary” to that of the Court of
International Trade—compelled the conclusion that Congress
854
intended § 1581 to waive sovereign immunity.
The court further
noted the federal courts’ longstanding recognition of “the standing
of organizations such as the Humane Society to bring suits against the
855
Government to implement environmental legislation.” The Federal
Circuit, however, did not agree with the Humane Society’s
contentions that the President should have been ordered, by
856
mandamus, to impose sanctions on Italy.
While it held that there
was no question that the Humane Society had exhausted all avenues
for relief, it also held that the Society had failed to show that the
President did not carry out a clear, non-discretionary duty under the
857
Driftnet Act.
The Federal Circuit reasoned that, evidence of
continued driftnet fishing by Italian vessels notwithstanding, the
“satisfactorily concluded” standard of 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)(3)(A) was
so broad as essentially to render judicial review of such presidential
850. See id. (explaining that the lower court did not address the sovereign
immunity issue, finding it unnecessary to do so given its holding on the merits for
the U.S. Government, such that the issue before the Federal Circuit was one of first
impression).
851. Id. at 1326.
852. Id.
853. Id. at 1327.
854. See id. at 1327-28 (explaining unless Congress granted a coextensive waiver of
sovereign immunity along with a grant of jurisdiction, that action would give no
benefit to the “sovereign’s subjects” and have no consequences to the sovereign).
855. See id. at 1328 (citing Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S.
221 (1986)) (explaining that the adverse environmental impact alleged in these
types of cases is sufficient to establish these groups suffered an injury).
856. See id. (citing Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984)) (reviewing the
analysis of the lower court as to whether the issuance of a writ of mandamus was
appropriate, and finding that two requirements must be satisfied: “(1) the plaintiff
must have exhausted all avenues for relief; and (2) the defendant must owe the
plaintiff a clear non-discretionary duty.”).
857. See id. at 1328-30 (holding that the President had acted in good faith and
therefore fulfilled his duty).
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858

decision-making infeasible.
In reaching this decision, the court
cited a long line of cases emphasizing the deference owed the
President in carrying out foreign relations functions: “In these
matters, it is generally assumed that Congress does not set out to tie
859
the President’s hands; if it wishes to, it must say so.”
On the second issue—whether the Secretary of Commerce violated
the Driftnet Act by certifying in 1997 that Italy had terminated largescale driftnet fishing—the Federal Circuit again noted the
considerable lack of guidance provided by the Act and its legislative
860
history.
After first rejecting the government’s argument that the
861
issue was not justiciable for lack of a live case or controversy, the
862
Federal Circuit turned to a review of the 1997 certification.
Distinguishing between the Secretary’s underlying identification of a
nation as engaged in illegal driftnet fishing and any subsequent
certification that such a nation has terminated the illegal fishing
practices, the Federal Circuit agreed with the lower court that the
former determination was focused on the acts of individuals, while
863
the latter was concerned with government action.
Accordingly,
with respect to the latter, individual violations by some Italian vessels
would not be sufficient to support the claim that the Secretary’s
864
decision was unreasonable.
On this basis, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s judgment that the Secretary’s 1997
certification, based on the earlier U.S.-Italy agreement, was not
865
arbitrary or capricious.

858. Id. at 1329-30.
859. Id. at 1329-30 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
320 (1936)).
860. See id. at 1330 (emphasizing that the Act does not delineate which factors or
evidence should guide the Secretary in his decision, making judicial review difficult).
861. Id. at 1331. The Government argued that the issue was moot in light of the
Court of International Trade’s order for the Secretary of Commerce to identify Italy,
for the second time, as a nation violating the Driftnet Act. Id. The Federal Circuit
disagreed. Id. at 1332. Noting that the propriety of a certification could potentially
escape judicial review in the event of subsequent re-identification, the court held that
the Act would be better effectuated by not rendering the question of whether the
Secretary’s decision was in accord with the law moot because of a later reidentification. Id.
862. See id. at 1332-33 (reviewing the merits of the Humane Society’s claim that
the Secretary’s decision was arbitrary and capricious).
863. See id. at 1332 (finding the trial court’s analysis to be a sensible approach to
the statutory language).
864. See id. (holding that acts by individuals could not be determinative).
865. Id. at 1333.
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Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Evans also involved a suit
brought by a coalition of environmental organizations for judicial
867
The Turtle Island cases
enforcement of animal protection laws.
represented the culmination of a decade’s worth of litigation
868
concerning the interpretation of § 609(b) of Public Law 101-162 —
characterized by the Federal Circuit as “a long and tortured history,
chiefly marked by the Government’s protean efforts to escape the
869
statutory interpretations being imposed upon it.” At issue in Turtle
Island I was the U.S. Government interpretation of the certification
procedures set forth in guidelines promulgated by the State
Department in 1999 to implement § 609(b) certification
870
procedures.
Under the 1999 guidelines, a country could obtain
authorization to export shrimp to the U.S. market either by requiring
its entire fleet to be equipped with TEDs, or by requiring TEDs only
871
on those vessels harvesting shrimp for the U.S. market.
In Turtle
Island’s view, § 609 required the U.S. Government to ban
importation of all shrimp from an uncertified country, rather than
only those shipments not in accordance with the certification
872
procedures.
In the Court of International Trade opinion at issue
here, that court found the 1999 State Department guidelines to be
inconsistent with § 609(b) because, as maintained by Turtle Island,
those guidelines impermissibly allowed the importation of TED873
caught shrimp from uncertified countries.
However, the Court of
866. 284 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Turtle Island I”). See also Turtle Island
Restoration Network v. Evans 299 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Turtle Island II”)
(denying a combined petition for a panel rehearing and a rehearing en banc).
867. See Turtle Island I, 284 F.3d at 1284 (reviewing restrictions on shrimp
harvesting techniques designed to protect sea turtles by requiring foreign shrimp
harvesters to use turtle excluder devices (“TEDs”) as a condition of access to the U.S.
market). TEDs are designed to prevent sea turtles from being swept into trawl nets—
typically by means of a metal grid at the closed end of the net with bars spaced so as
to allow shrimp to pass through but to “exclude” turtles by pushing them through
escape hatches above or below the grid. Id.
868. Section 609(b) is codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1537(b) (2000). In general,
subsection (b)(1) prohibits the importation of shrimp or products from shrimp in
which harvesting equipment was used that adversely affects certain species of sea
turtles except as provided in paragraph (2). Id. Subsection (b)(2) sets forth
certification procedures to be adopted by a harvesting nation seeking an exception
from a subsection (b)(1) prohibition. Id.
869. Turtle Island I, 284 F.3d at 1287.
870. See id. at 1286 (citing Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of § 609 of
Public Law 101-162 Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing
Operations, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,946 (July 8, 1999)).
871. Id.
872. See id. (arguing that certification is the only means by which shrimp may be
imported into the United States).
873. See Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Mallett, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2000) (holding that the 1999 Guidelines resulted in weakened
protections for the sea turtles targeted by § 609).
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International Trade did not grant Turtle Island’s requested
874
injunctive relief or attorney fees.
Turtle Island I came before the Federal Circuit on cross-appeals—
Turtle Island seeking reversal of the Court of International Trade’s
denial of an injunction and attorney fees, and the Government
challenging that court’s judgment that the importation of TEDcaught shrimp from uncertified countries, permitted by the 1999
875
guidelines, violates § 609.
The Federal Circuit turned first to the
foundational issue in the case—construction of § 609—clarifying that
its analysis was a matter of law to be reviewed without deference to
876
the lower court.
Parsing the language of § 609, the court found,
based on its plain meaning, that it authorized imports of TED-caught
shrimp from uncertified countries, and that its embargo provisions
877
applied on a shipment-specific basis.
The court rejected Turtle
Island’s contentions that the statutory framework and legislative
history compelled the conclusion that § 609 applied only on a nation878
by-nation basis.
The court found it telling that Congress had
declined to include an express nation-by-nation embargo provision in
879
§ 609, when it had done so in a series of comparable statutes. The
court noted in concluding its analysis that, while it respected the
plaintiff’s cause, Turtle Island’s view of the legislative intent of § 609
880
was simply unfounded.
The court reversed the Court of
International Trade’s holding that the Government’s interpretation
of § 609 was in error, and affirmed that court’s denial of injunctive
881
relief and attorney fees.

874. See id. at 1018 (noting that the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff would
be truly extraordinary in this type of case). Additionally, the court held that while
plaintiffs clearly prevailed, there was insufficient evidence in the record to support
the relief sought by plaintiffs. Id.
875. Turtle Island I, 284 F.3d at 1284.
876. Id. at 1291 (citing SKF USA Inc. v. Unietd States, 263 F.3d 1369, at 1378
(2001)).
877. See id. at 1292-93 (noting that if the statute intended to make certification the
only way these imports could enter the U.S. market, much of the statutory language
would be “largely superfluous”).
878. See id. at 1292-94 (emphasizing that according to the legislative history, the
passage of § 609 was not motivated by the need to protect the sea turtle but rather
the need to protect the domestic shrimping industry).
879. See id. at 1295-96 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) (2000)) (authorizing nationby-nation embargoes triggered by foreign restrictions on U.S. fishing vessels); see also
16 U.S.C. § 1826(b)(3)(A) (2000) (authorizing nation-by-nation prohibition on
imports of fish and fish products from countries employing large-scale driftnet
fishing).
880. See Turtle Island I, 284 F.3d at 1297 (holding that the State Department’s
interpretation of the congressional intent behind § 609 was in fact the proper
interpretation).
881. Id. at 1297.
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Judge Newman dissented from the majority decision, arguing that
the decision was an improper departure from the established method
882
Judge Newman reviewed
of protecting this endangered species.
extensively the legislative history, concluding that Congress intended
to preclude the shipment-by-shipment methodology adopted by the
883
State Department.
This approach was fully consistent with the
desire of Congress to protect the U.S. shrimp industry by requiring
shrimpers of any other nation desiring access to the U.S. market to
884
employ TEDs. Newman emphasized that there is no support in the
legislative record for the claim that Congress intended to permit the
885
shipment-by-shipment method. Judge Newman also stated that the
State Department guidelines did not, in his view, survive Chevron
886
scrutiny in light of Congress’ clearly articulated intent.
Furthermore, looking at earlier WTO decisions cited by the
government as supporting the 1999 guidelines, Judge Newman
concluded that that WTO panel decisions should not and could not
authorize the courts or the Executive Branch “to rewrite the
887
statute.”
In Turtle Island II, the Federal Circuit rejected Turtle Island’s
888
petition for rehearing en banc.
However, Judges Gajarsa and
Newman dissented from the denial, drawing heavily from Judge
Newman’s dissenting opinion in Turtle Island I and arguing that the
majority had mistakenly approved the State Department’s 1999
889
Guidelines, which contravened clear congressional intent. Arguing
882. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that neither political nor diplomatic
concerns make it proper for the court to depart from the statute as enacted).
883. See id. at 1299-1302 (arguing that Congress recognized only a fleet-wide
approach, and not a shipment-by-shipment approach, would effectuate the goals of
the legislation).
884. See id. at 1300-02 (dissenting from the majority’s view that the existence of a
commercial purpose for the legislation renders the humanitarian purposes
irrelevant). Additionally, Judge Newman argued that the commercial goal of the
legislation—protecting the domestic shrimping industry—was in fact disserved by
condoning a shipment-by-shipment approach. Id. at 1302.
885. See id. at 1300 (noting that both the House and Senate reports call for foreign
nations to adopt regulations comparable to the United States fleet-wide adoption of
TEDs).
886. See id. at 1303 (stating that the State Department had attempted to defend
the guidelines on policy grounds, but that the court should not evaluate or effectuate
political accommodations).
887. See id. at 1303-04 (citing, inter alia, Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas C. A.
v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1992)) (arguing that well established
principles dictate when WTO rulings can be relied upon, and here the government’s
reliance was improper).
888. Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Evans, 299 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(“Turtle Island II”).
889. Id. at 1374-75 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, I.N.S. v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447-48 (1987)) (alleging that the panel majority adopted an
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that § 609 was intended to protect sea turtles, as well as serve other
commercial needs, the dissenters stated the majority had erred when
it held that a shipment-by-shipment approach was supported by the
890
statute.
According to Judges Gajarsa and Newman, § 609(b)(1)
plainly banned the importation of shrimp harvested without TEDs
unless excepted under the guidelines laid out in § 609(b)(2) or
891
harvested from waters uninhabited by these species of sea turtles.
The two judges concluded that the majority decision had
“unreasonably construed a statute that was written to protect turtles
892
so as not to protect them.”
CONCLUSION
When it created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
Congress observed that the cases before it would be “unusually
893
complex and technical.”
The international trade jurisprudence of
the Federal Circuit over the last three years validates this prediction.
The ever-growing volume of international trade, combined with the
expanding web of laws, regulations, and practices guiding the flow of
commerce across the U.S. border, seem to guarantee that the
international trade cases before the court will only grow in number
and complexity. Notwithstanding this burden, the Federal Circuit
has in recent years performed its job admirably—rigorously and
quickly disposing of the complex international trade matters before
it, thereby contributing to certainty and predictability in the trading
system.

improper and unreasonable statutory interpretation in Turtle Island I).
890. Id. at 1375 (calling the panel majority’s holding that § 609 did not ban
importation from uncertified countries a “fatal error”).
891. Id. at 1376 (claiming the statutory language and structure demands this
interpretation).
892. Id. at 1378.
893. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 7 (1981).

